

1. SECRET

ALFRED G. JOHNSON 1st Lt.

Report on work done in the field Jan.-April 1945

January - March: attached to the First Army Detachment.

Work included recruiting, training, equipping, infiltrating agents through the lines, then setting up and forward listening base for making short range radio contacts. The object of the missions was to obtain information of tactical value. During this period, only one team, consisting of two men, succeeded in making a penetration of about eight miles, returning to our lines after ten days. They were unable to make any contacts by radio since their set (A Mk. 3) had been in the water whilst crossing a river and damaged.

Observations:

1. Agents must be briefed in detail as to the mission they are to accomplish. They must be given one or two specific objectives and not merely a general area to be covered. If not they are liable to send back a great deal of minute information which probably has only little value. The sending of such long messages by radio immediately consumes most of the power contained in the short-lived batteries which the agents carry.

2. On these short ranged missions, agents must not overload themselves with unnecessary equipment and heavy bulky food. Mobility in itself has a far greater 'security value' than a great deal of equipment which is not absolutely essential.

3. Radio equipment should be wrapped in a waterproof casing so as to prevent damage in case the set gets wet whilst crossing a river or through being left in the rain.

4. When using a radio set such as the T R 1, A Mk 11 or the A Mk 111, agents making a short range infiltration can take with them at the most two small batteries which last only a very short time. As a result of trials, the army voice (300) set was found to have many advantages when used between ground and air. Excellent contacts were made with these sets one of which was worked from a cub plane flying over thirty miles from the other set on the ground. Plans were made to use this method of communication allowing two hours for contact daily, one in the morning and one in the evening. The half battery which provides the power for this set has about three times the life of the small batteries which must be carried when using key sets, and are of an approximately the same weight. It is very easy to teach an agent how to use this set and he can handle it perfectly after a few days of practice with it.

5. Shallow infiltrations can never have the same advantages or value as in the case of agents dropped at a short distance behind the enemy line. With the First Army, advances were so rapid that agents were liable to be overtaken before reaching their objective.

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March-April: attached to First Allied Airborne Army detachment
 The object of the mission was to land four teams with the main landing of the 17th Airborne Division across the Rhine, with the teams infiltrating into the German held area immediately upon landing.

Observations:

1. On this operation the base station radio operators, who were to contact the agents and also maintain contact with 3 Corps, went in by glider with Division F.I. They did not have any transportation with them, which proved to be a great drawback and could have had serious consequences. As a result of this it was decided to use a radio jeep which would be brought in by glider on the next operation of a similar nature.

2. It would have been of far greater value had it been possible to drop the agents about fifteen miles behind the area chosen for the airborne landings twenty four hours before the time chosen for the landings. In this manner it would be possible to make contact with the agents as soon as the landings have taken place, obtaining information during the first twenty four hours of the landing which is the time when information of a tactical nature is of the greatest value. This is almost impossible to accomplish when the agents must infiltrate during or after the landings.

Alfred G. Johnson
1st Lt.

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Field Report
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director
FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office
SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Martin Stahl
SO/ETO

DATE: 24 July 1945

Mr. Stahl served with the German Section of the Westfield mission from October 1944 to June 1945. He makes no basic complaints. Lt. Duggan's covering memo contemplates no further action.

Thomas Victor
Pvt. Thomas Victor
Reports Office

581

1st Ind.

CPF/cd

Operations Officer, ESO, OSS, Washington, D.C. 30 June 1945

TO: Chief, SO

1. Forwarded for your information.

Charles P. Frank
CHARLES P. FRANK
1st Lt., FA
Asst. Operations Officer, ESO

2nd Ind.

VWB/cd

Chief, SO 13 July 1945

TO: The Director (through Reports Office of the Secretariat)

1. Report is brief but concise. It is considered adequate in view of subject's duty and the purpose of report.
2. No further action is contemplated.

William E. Duggan
WILLIAM E. DUGGAN
1st Lt., USMCR
Chief, SO

SECRET**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

28 June 1946

TO: Captain William d. Rantack
 THROUGH: Captain Harrison T. Barrow
 FROM: Martin Stahl
 SUBJECT: Overseas Report

1. From June 1944 to the middle of October 1944, I was Assistant Chief of the Central European Section, SO Branch, in London. My main functions were the planning of SO projects based in either London or Stockholm, Sweden, directed at Germany. From the middle of October 1944, until the middle of June 1945, I was assigned to the Westfield Mission, SO Stockholm, German Section. In Stockholm I was engaged in the recruiting, handling, briefing, documenting and dispatching of agents into Germany. In February 1945, I was dispatched to London for a ten-day period for consultation on the cover and documentation problems involved in the Tissue and Pore operations. In May 1945, I returned to London and was then sent to Germany via Denmark to retrieve two of our agents who had been overrun by the British, and after returning to London, I was again dispatched to escort our chief organizer of operation Tissue who had been overrun by the Russians. On June 26th, my assignment was considered completed and I returned to Washington to report on June 28th.

2. The work of the German Section of the Westfield Mission was completed as far as feasible and Mr. J. T. Kloman, who remains in Stockholm, will follow through on pending matters. The successful penetration of Germany by Birch, Pine and Chestnut has been reported in separate reports, copies of which have been sent to Washington.

3. As SO activities to which I was assigned are to be terminated, there is no comment I feel I must make with regard to conditions in the field which might be improved.

4. The main difficulty encountered in my own job was the lack of frequent personal liaison between Stockholm and London. I feel that had there been more frequent personal contact, we could have dispatched more agents and had them in the field at an earlier date.

5. Mr. George Brewer has incorporated in his final report on the Westfield Mission a complete report on the German section, a copy of which has been forwarded to Washington.

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Office Memorandum

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director
 FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office
 SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Pierre Haas
SI/Spain

DATE: 24 July 1945

HOLD FOR WJD

1. From May 1944 on, Mr. Haas worked with the Freno mission in Spain and helped to create and maintain an intelligence chain from Spain to Paris and the entire south coast of France.

2. He is highly critical of the lack of direction given to men in the field and the lack of cooperation among the different services within OSS, and between OSS, the State Department and G-2. Mr. Lockwood believes his criticism is unjustified and due to Haas' ignorance of overall OSS operations in Spain.

Thomas Victor
 Pvt. Thomas Victor
 Reports Office

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

July 9, 1945

TO: Mr. Whitney A. Shepardson
FROM: A. S. Lockwood
SUBJECT: Pierre Haas - Field Report

I am attaching hereto Pierre Haas' Field Report dated July 5. Mr. Haas, as you will notice, has made some rather rash statements which are far from the facts of the case, but I attribute a great deal of this to his lack of intimate knowledge of how the ~~US~~ operated in Spain.

I note on the third page that, unknown to me, during the time I was in Spain there were "SO people" (?) in Spain.

The general impression amongst my colleagues in Spain was rather favorable towards Pierre Haas but definitely unfavorable towards his inseparable partner, and it was for this reason it was necessary to keep them at arm's length on many occasions.

If it is desired to look further into the achievements of the Franco situation in Spain I am sure that both Argus and Queros would be able to give you a more thorough and detailed report than I can.

A. S. Lockwood
A. S. L.

Attachment

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5 July 1946.

REPORT OF PAST ACTIVITIES

I left Philadelphia on 22 April 1944 on the Serpantino. My cover was that I was supposed to travel to do some wine business. However, it did not help much to send people abroad with such a cover, as everyone knew that, at the time, the State Department only gave passports to people who were working for the Government. In similar circumstances in the future I would suggest that it would be advisable to grant more passports to regular business men in order to cover up the others. The trip was uneventful and I arrived in Lisbon where I stayed for about ten days.

In Lisbon I got in touch with Charlie Grey and with different people in business, so as to substantiate the excuse of a business trip, as had been planned. I then left for Madrid and immediately put myself at the disposition of Mr. Gregory Thomas. I had a few letters with me which he would not let me keep: one to the head of the British Intelligence Service who, it appeared, were not working in conformity with our general instructions. At that time the State Department as well as the British and also the French Provisional Government were very anxious to find out the whereabouts of Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil who had escaped from North Africa. Through sheer luck I was able to locate him in Madrid as he was staying at the apartment of a Frenchman I knew very well, Mr. Labouret. I learned later on that he had been placed there by Colonel Stevens of G-2 and we did not know anything about it -- which proves the lack of cooperation between G-2 and OSS. I got in touch with Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil and, as he was very proficient, he tried to explain to me that all he had done was for the best interests of both France and the United States. He related to me different conversations he had had in the White House with late President Roosevelt, Admiral Leahy, etc., and in North Africa, especially with Mr. Murphy. He also told me he had different letters with him showing his good faith, these letters being signed by the above mentioned gentlemen; and I induced him to let me take back with me to the hotel all these letters so that I could study them. Of course, I immediately brought these letters to Gregory Thomas and, instead of finding a delighted man, I found a rather reluctant man for the State Department had given orders to drop Lemaigre-Dubreuil. Anyhow I had the letters photostated in the office and you probably have copies of them in your files. In August Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil went into France over the mountains. He has informed you at that time. Several months later he was arrested by the French authorities and subsequently released.

NOT TO BE ACCESSIONED

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By that time (about May 15) my associate, R.B., arrived in Madrid and we decided to take a trip to Xerez to keep our cover. We stayed in Xerez about two days, visiting all the wine houses and our friends there. During that trip we found out that most of the old families and big business men were sick and tired of the Franco regime and would have liked to see the king back on the throne.

We went back to Madrid and it was then decided that our post would be in San Sebastian. R.B. stayed in Madrid and, before going to San Sebastian, I decided to go to Barcelona to contact our office over there to find out through them what was most necessary, and also to investigate a shipment of champagne which had arrived in Barcelona consigned to a certain Mr. Village who was trying to export it from Spain to North or South America. Of course, to do that he needed a British service which I knew sure he couldn't get. In Barcelona I contacted our office who told me the most urgent need was the creation of new lines into France as most of our lines had been disrupted by the Germans and we had practically no communications.

I arrived in San Sebastian, where R.B. joined me, and found an office well organized, with a good stenographer, Miss Goodrich. R.B. and I were lucky enough to meet, two days after our arrival, two Frenchmen friends of mine who were working for the British Intelligence Service and had just crossed the mountains. They steered us right and we were able, through their good offices, to meet the group of Basques who were doing all the smuggling of people and goods in and out of France. We created a line which went up to Paris and covered all the South Coast of France. We had a correspondent in Paris, brother of R.B.; one in Bordeaux, Xavier de Laborde Nogues; one in Bayonne, Bernard de Laborde Nogues. Our office told us that they did not have any information to give us to employ our lines and to please secure the information ourselves, which we did through the channels above mentioned. We were also lucky enough to meet different Frenchmen just back from France who had full information as to damage done by air raids, the movement of certain German divisions, etc. About two weeks before D-day we sent a full report which covered quite extensively the damage done to railways, bridges, etc. and showed already that the Germans did not intend to defend Paris if the invasion was successful. Meanwhile we had also done quite a bit of I.R. work as different personalities who were visiting in San Sebastian, such as Andromas (stolen cars), Wilds (works of art stolen from Holland) etc. At the request of our office we had also secured the list of all the prisoners who were at the concentration camp of Miranda, etc. Just before the invasion we had also established a radio post in Paris with a special code, and that was turned down.

After the invasion our lines were completely disrupted and we had orders to remain in San Sebastian to do some G.R. work, as very many Frenchmen who had been collaborationists were passing the border. In order to do that work we had to employ a Frenchman by the name of Aincourt who had been, in appearance, very close to the Germans and to the collaborationists but who, in reality, had been working for the French 2^d Bureau. He

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went practically each day to Irun and, through his good services, we got extensive reports on at least three-hundred people. These reports were sent to Madrid but we never heard of them again; so much so that I finally wrote to the office in Madrid telling them that, if I did not hear from them, I would turn these reports over to the French Intelligence Service. Not having heard to the contrary I turned these reports over to Mr. Mattei, French Consul and also attached to the B.C.R.A.

As a matter of fact, we had been working all the time in close contact with the French Intelligence Service. They gave us information which, I hope, was useful; and we gave them some information, but only on C.E.

The only criticism I could make about our organization is the absolute lack of general directions given to the men in the field. During the whole time I stayed in San Sebastian we saw Gregory Thomas once for about an hour and Larry Mellon once for about half-a-day. It is very difficult to start working on a certain problem and to give information to your principals all the time if they do not point out what part of your work is useful and what part is not. We made reports at least once a week about our activities and about the information we had gotten during that week, and during our whole stay we received in all one letter from Madrid, pointing out certain discrepancies in a previous report made by us on the positions of German divisions, and a cable in code which proved to be so badly written out that I took it back to Madrid and they were unable to decipher it themselves. The lack of cooperation between the different services was also appalling. For instance, I was asked not to see Colonel Jeffers, of G-2, who happened to be a very good friend of mine before I entered the service. G-2 didn't like us and we didn't like G-2. In our own organization the S.I. people didn't like the S.O. people and the S.O. people didn't like the S.I. The G-2 people would not have anything to do either with the S.I. or the S.O. Most of the G-2 work done by us was not even given to the G-2 people -- that information I secured from John Potter who was, as you know, C.E. in Barcelona and whom I met in Madrid. I think that he finally got his chief to look into our files. Our Ambassador in Spain, Mr. Mayne, did everything to interfere with our work, even to the point of forbidding me to go to the American Consulate in San Sebastian where our office was, with the result that I had to have someone from our office come to my apartment when I had some information to give, which was certainly not good for whoever came, as the Spanish police is pretty well informed and was keeping in close touch with the Gestapo.

In December 1944, our job in Spain being completed, we secured personally French visas from the French Intelligence Service (for whom R.B. had been working in the past) and went to Paris, where we remained quite a long time, contacting Charlie Gray at the Embassy and Major Grenary at our office and giving them some information which, we hope, has proven useful.

I have learned that everyone who worked for us in Spain was imprisoned by the Gestapo. The reason we were not caught is that I had

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two good friends of influence with the Spanish Government. One is J.M. de Huarte y Jauregui, Chef de Cabinet of General Segbader. The other is the Duchesse de Montpensier, friend of my family, and who was born Marquise Valde Torazo.

Our code names were Freno 1 and Freno 2 -- P.H. being Freno 1 and R.B. Freno 2.


Pierre Haas

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CONFIDENTIAL**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : The Director, OSS
 THRU: Chief, SI
 FROM : Vincent Scamperino
 SUBJECT: Mr. James St. L. O'Toole

DATE: 19 July 1946

1. Attached hereto is the complete field record of Mr. O'Toole. My report was delayed pending its arrival.

2. My appraisal of the subject's work in the theater was, "Subject has failed to grasp nature of work, despite fair trial period. He feels incapable of carrying out assignments." I recommend his dismissal from OSS.

3. The subject's primary interest was to renew his business contacts, engage in the buying of works of art, rather than to serve in his assigned capacity as undercover agent for the gathering of political and economic intelligence.

4. Contrary to his report, and by admission in his memorandum of 8 February 1945, copy of which is attached hereto, the subject was briefed in detail concerning not only his activities, but also the manner in which his activities should be conducted. In the third paragraph of that report he states,

"Vincent returned to town on January 8th and discussed with me my ideas about my activity here and agreed with me that the sooner I made myself scarce around headquarters, the better it would be for me and my hoped for activity."

Mr. O'Toole was told, for security reasons, to keep away from headquarters. He was also told to refrain from making any telephone calls since it is a matter of common knowledge that most telephones in Italy are tapped and many others are monitored.

5. He states in the fourth paragraph,

"This first month has been spent building up my cover as a member of the Commission of Fine Arts."

From the time of his arrival to the date of this memorandum, no information or reports of any type had been submitted by the subject.

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6. On 28 February 1945, he submitted a report, a photostatic copy of which is attached hereto, in which he stated,

"During this past fortnight I have not been as active as I would have preferred to have been. A slight injury to left leg developed an infection which resulted in some illness, and up to today has limited my movements, but now the worst of it is over, and I hope to resume my activity."

I wish to bring to your attention that up to February 28th this subject had not submitted a report containing any political or economic intelligence. In the meantime I knew definitely that he had been spending his time under his supposed cover, attending various auction sales of works of art and making purchases. Some of these works of art were returned to the United States by him and others have been left in Italy. The subject was concerned only with per diem and expense accounts.

7. He complained about lack of transportation. Transportation was not denied to him. The system was set up that whenever he needed transportation he was to let us know through our undercover office, and it would be furnished upon request, more or less on a roster pool basis. Our transportation problem was critical at this time and we all had to more or less share what we had.

8. In the memorandum of February 28th the subject makes a statement,

"I have made written and verbal requests to the office for some definite statement concerning the amount on which I can count monthly, to establish some sort of a budget or living expenses, but after two months here I am still waiting for a decision."

The subject was informed that all financial problems, payment of living allowances, etc., were the responsibility of the Fiscal Office. I limited his expenses to a sum not exceeding \$35.00 per month. This applied to everyone else in the theater. Exceptional cases, however, would have to first be brought to my attention for approval. At no time did the subject complain to me about his limited expense account. He was told, furthermore, that additional rationing would be supplied when and if the occasion required.

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9. On March 4, 1945, the subject stated,

"In finishing up my second month here in Rome, I am persuaded, finally, that I will not be able to accomplish the results for which I hoped with the means available to me."

In the third paragraph of said memorandum the subject requested my approval to work with Mr. Girosi and to return to Washington with him.

10. Mr. Girosi had been in to see me during the latter part of February, informing me that Mr. O'Toole was definitely not qualified for the type of work assigned to him, and that we should arrange, quietly and diplomatically, to return him to the United States. He proposed that Mr. O'Toole accompany him under cover of the excuse that he needed someone with him to protect certain documents that he would be taking back. I questioned Mr. Girosi, and his reasons, and stated that before granting approval I would speak to Mr. O'Toole about the matter. On or about March 6, Mr. O'Toole called my office and agreed to carry on for an additional month at my request, so as to determine fully whether or not he could carry on with his work. He was again briefed and encouraged to remain. At that time I also gave him my approval to work with Mr. Girosi.

11. On March 14, 16, 17 and 21, the subject submitted reports of his activities. Photostatic copies are attached hereto. I made it a practice to read all reports from all sources. You will note my initials on these memorandums. On page two of the March 14th memo the subject mentions a business proposal. His reports lacked any intelligence. On March 16, he mentions the fact that a certain Lipinsky desired additional income and would be willing to furnish reports. The report submitted by the said Lipinsky contained no intelligence. It was suited for newspaper print only. The March 17 report again proves beyond any doubt the inability of the subject to grasp his job. The same is true of the report of March 21.

12. On April 2, 1945, the subject again requested that he be returned to Washington. Mr. Girosi, in the meantime, had been in to see me several times, urging and recommending that the subject be returned to Washington. However, I wish to emphasize that during all this period Mr. Girosi and Mr. O'Toole were constantly together and that

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I knew that Mr. O'Toole was failing to give any consideration or to put any effort in his work as an official of the government. I state for the record that Mr. O'Toole promoted his business interests. For that reason he was considered by me to be undesirable, and my recommendation that he be dismissed from OSS followed.

13. I call to your attention that the "F Assessment of Traits and Abilities" recommends the separation of this individual from OSS.

14. In supervising a secret intelligence organization, neither Mr. O'Toole nor any other agent, under the policy set up by me, had any business to know what anybody else in the field was doing. This may have given him the impression that he was kept outside of what was going on. I repeat, this applied to all personnel and without prejudice.

15. I agree in principle with the statement made by the Chief, SI, in paragraph (c) of his memorandum, June 28, 1945, covering the field report of Mr. O'Toole. It was not the lack of personnel that prevented giving to Mr. O'Toole more complete directions in his work. Mr. O'Toole received complete directions. What is regrettable is that Mr. O'Toole completely failed to lend his cooperation to his work and his superiors, also that Mr. O'Toole was not qualified for his job. An agent, after receiving his indoctrination and training in Washington and his directive should need no further supervision in the field. An undercover agent cannot afford to jeopardize his security under any circumstances.

16. I regret that Mr. Girou's interest in Mr. O'Toole had objectives other than Mr. O'Toole's welfare.


V. S.

- Attachments:
1. O'Toole's field record.
 2. Lipinsky's report
 3. Area F personnel file
 4. Comm. No. R-104, from Richard Masterrini
 5. Chief, SI, memo to Director, OSS, June 28, 1945.
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SECRET CONTROL**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : Director

DATE: 24 July 1945

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: James St. Lawrence O'Toole
SI/REITO

1. Mr. O'Toole was attached to the Italian and Albanian Section, SI.

2. He criticizes the appearance of the name of OSS on travel orders as weak security, and the lack of sufficient guidance and advice from a superior, (p. 5). Mr. Shepardson agrees with these criticisms and states that recently it has been possible to have travel orders issued by the Adjutant General's Office, War Department, rather than by Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment.

3. Mr. Shepardson questions Mr. O'Toole's confidence in the value of the Vatican as an intelligence source.

Thomas Victor
Pvt. Thomas Victor
Reports Office

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No.

Date Rec'd. SA.....

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd.	For'd.		
Mr. Tolson	1102	5/30/45		S	
Mr. E.A. Tamm	1122	5/30/45	4/10/45	MS	
Mr. Clegg	1102	4-7-45			
Mr. Glavin		4-7-45			
Mr. Ladd					
Mr. Nichols					
Mr. Rosen					
Mr. Tracy					
Mr. Carson					
Mr. Egan					
Mr. Gurnea					
Mr. Hendon					
Mr. Pennington					
Mr. Quinn					
Mr. Nease					
Mr. Gandy					

Each document should be initialed in correspondence with author in To column.
 A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
 Officer's signature should be placed in To column.
 All documents should be routed before further routing.
 Action required by other offices should be indicated in Comments column.
 Routing sheet should be retained in file.
 For routing instructions see regulations.

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, OSS

DATE: 28 June 1945

FROM : Chief, SI

SUBJECT: Field Report of Mr. James St. Laurence O'Toole

1. In compliance with OSS General Order No. 63, revised, I forward herewith the field report of Mr. James St. Laurence O'Toole, submitted to me on 28 June 1945 by Mr. Earl Brennan, Chief, Italian & Albanian Section, SI, to whom Mr. O'Toole was attached during his tour of duty in Italy.

2. Mr. O'Toole's report covers his activities during the three and one half months which he spent in Italy in which he worked under partial cover as a member of the Fine Arts Commission. As is indicated in the biographical notes attached hereto, he was well-qualified to utilize such cover. Mr. O'Toole's report lists his primary contacts in Italy, which fall principally into the two categories of Vatican circles and art circles. He also lists a number of secondary contacts of lesser potential value. In concluding his report on activities in the field, he describes a project which he worked out with art associates in Rome for organizing an art exhibition and auction sale to be presented in the United States, the profits of which are intended to go to the reconstruction of war damage in Tuscany.

3. Concerning Mr. O'Toole's section on field conditions and recommendations, I make the following comments:

a. His belief that the Vatican is a valuable source of world-wide information and that adequate transportation, funds, and

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sources of extra rations are essential to the proper development of this and other sources, is a question under consideration from varying points of view.

b. I agree that the name of this organization should not appear on the travel orders of an individual who is proceeding overseas to operate under partial or complete cover. I understand that the Italian & Albanian Section of this Branch, in the case of personnel sent to the field more recently, has been able to have the travel orders issued by the Adjutant General's Office, War Department, rather than by Hq. & Hq. Det., and to have the orders show either the name of the cover organization or the War Department, avoiding any reference to OSS. The problem of the mail address for agents is not likely to arise in the case of men actually under cover since they can most appropriately use the address of their cover organization. However, in the case of men who are under partial cover or who are sent overseas as OSS employees, and develop cover after arrival, the matter of an address is a problem which requires a solution.

a. I am inclined to agree with Mr. O'Toole that an agent should receive as much guidance, advice and supervision from an experienced superior as may be possible, consistent with the maintenance of security. I consider it regrettable that because

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of the combined wartime and peacetime activities being carried on in the single area of Italy it was not possible to have the additional personnel available to give Mr. O'Toole more complete direction in his work.

William H. Shepherd
William H. Shepherd
Chief, SI

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MR. JAMES ST. LAURENCE O'TOOLEPersonal Background

Mr. O'Toole was born in Baltimore, Maryland, in 1895 of an American mother and an Irish father. His schooling included two years of college in the United States. He was an associate of De Hauke and Co., Paris, France, from 1922 to 1925 where he specialized in buying and selling works of Modern Art and in organizing exhibitions. From 1925 until 1935 he was an associate of Jacques Seligmann and Son of New York and Paris, France, where he specialized in buying and selling works of art and in organizing exhibitions. From 1935 until his entry into OSS, Mr. O'Toole conducted his own art business and he has art galleries in Paris and Venice as well as in New York.

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FIELD REPORT OF JAMES ST.L. O'TOOLE

I

ITINERARY

28 December 1944	- Left Washington.
30 December 1944	- Arrived Caserta.
31 December 1944	- Arrived Rome.
14 April 1945	- Left Rome.
14 April 1945	- Arrived Caserta.
15 April 1945	- Embarked at Naples.
9 May 1945	- Arrived Brooklyn.
11 May 1945	- Arrived Washington.

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II

ACTIVITIES IN THE FIELD

1. On several occasions before my departure from Washington, I discussed with Mr. Brennan the assignment of duty in Italy, which I would eventually undertake. It was understood that I would center my activity around the Vatican, and among my many friends in the social and artistic world in Rome.

2. In the first two weeks after my arrival I was able to sublet a modest apartment at the Palazzo Taverna from an old friend, an elderly lady who was leaving Rome to live with relatives at Ancona. I began to renew old acquaintances, and to develop my cover as a member of the Fine Arts Commission. A satisfactory card was printed for me, and it served very well, as my profession was known to all of my acquaintances, and my art activity was natural.

3. After my first month in the field, I made an activity report giving a list of the people with whom I was active, but I began to discover that the goal I had set for myself was extremely difficult to achieve, with the limited means of transportation and funds available to me. I continued my activity to the best of my ability, although the scarcity of transportation, and the limit of four telephone calls daily, reduced the possible results considerably, and by the first of April when another member of this organization was returning to Washington with some very interesting material, it was suggested that I return with him and assist in the transportation, assembly, and translation of this material, so I wrote to Mr. Scamporrino requesting to be returned to Washington. Before my departure I introduced Mr. Richard Mazzavini to the more interesting people with whom I had contacts, and to make such use of them as he saw fit.

4. The more important individuals with whom I had many conversations are the following:

Monsignore FRANCIS BRENNAN - a Judge of the Rota, supposed to represent American clerical opinion in that body. **Monsignore WILLIAM MANN**, a Canon of St. Maria Maggiore, an old friend, very popular in diplomatic circles, and aware of all activity and gossip, particularly cultivated by Sir Harry Cables, British Ambassador to the Holy See, and Brennan's assistant, Major Uttley. Major Uttley is going out of his way to do kindnesses for me. Hence, so I am persuaded that our contact first was useful. Both of these clergymen are Americans, and have been good friends of mine for many years.

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DOCTORE ANGELO LAPINSKY, one of the editors of OSSERVATORE ROMANO, an art authority, author of many books, Roman by birth, who has a wide and interesting acquaintance. PRINCE FRANCESCO CHIGI, Commander of the Noble Guard at the Vatican, a close friend of the Pope, and well-informed on all Vatican policies and activity. It was through Prince Chigi that I had my first intimation of the conferences then being held through the Congregation of Oriental Rites with the USSR relative to the extent of liberty the Church would be allowed in Russia and Russian-occupied countries. Later I discovered that one of the key personalities in this conference was a Benedictine friar, a Walloon by birth, named DON GIROLAMO BENTINCK, O.S.B., with whom I was quite well acquainted because of his interest in books on art subjects. COUNT PAOLO LABIA, a Venetian, a close friend for twenty years, living in Rome at that time. He is married to an American. He is a cousin of Prince Chigi and related to many prominent families, and almost any contact can be made through him. He is an official of the ITALIA shipping lines, and represented that organization in France from 1930 to 1940.

AVV. RAFFAELLO LEVI, a refugee from Venice in Rome, a very prominent attorney, who has acted for my family in Venice for many years. He has a wide acquaintance among prominent politicians of all political parties recently active in the trials of Fascist party members. ERNEST DE WEERTH, an American journalist living in Rome and Venice for many years. When the American journalists left Rome at the outbreak of the war in 1941, De Weerth was refused an exit permit by the Fascist authorities, was later sought by the S.S. and took refuge in the Vatican at the Teutonic College, where he had access to some German information.

5. Among others at the Vatican with whom I have had conversations and visits are: PRINCE LUDOVICO CHIGI, Commander of the Order of Malta; REV. WILLIAM MCCORMICK, S.J., acting head of the Jesuit Order, an American, formerly of Woodstock, Md.; PRINCE GIULIO PACELLI, nephew of his Holiness; COMM. ENRICO PIETRO GALEAZZI, the Governor of Vatican City, who was Private Secretary of the Pope when, as Cardinal Pacelli, he made many trips around the world; the Ambassador of Eire to the Holy See, MR. KENNEDY.

6. Besides these Vatican connections, my activity in the art world was considerable. Most of the well-known artists have been my friends for many years, and the international dealers were delighted to see me, as I could bring them news of American activity and prices for which they were eager. Because of the financial situation, and the fear for Italian currency, prices were astronomically high in relation to international exchange value, but I found the market active and auction prices were sensational for really good works of art.

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7. About March 1st, through COUNT LABIA, an old acquaintance learned of my presence in Rome, and came to see me. He is MARIO VANINI PARENTI of Florence, an antiquarian having galleries at the Palazzo Strozzi. He is an art authority of some note, and had specialized in the field of Decorative Art. His most profitable client was the ITALIA shipping lines, as he decorated the larger ships such as the REX, CONTE DI SAVOIA, VULCANIA, VICTORIA, etc. He, together with some other prominent art authorities in Tuscany, had developed the idea of taking from the crowded storerooms of various museums in Tuscany really fine examples of Renaissance art that are duplicated by other better examples of the work of the particular artists, then organizing in America a fine exhibition to be followed by an auction sale, the entire profit to go to the restoration of war damage in Tuscany. I was invited to be one of the experts with Berenson, Longhi, Brighanti, and two others in the choice of the particular works, and to have charge of the exhibition and sale in New York.

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III

FIELD CONDITIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. I am confident that valuable information can be secured through the Vatican with its close ties with all the world. The contact should be as natural as possible, and the agents supplied with adequate transportation and funds, also extra rations at this time when it is so difficult to purchase food in the open market, as entertaining is the best method to cultivate the personalities desired.

2. It seems to me that the weakest part of security is the open statement of an individual's connection with this organization which appears on the travel orders, and therefore is open to any curiosity interest; also the mail address could possibly be limited to a single APO without any Army designation.

3. My particular disappointment was the fact that I did not have sufficient direct supervision by Mr. Scamporino. It seems to me that anyone going into the field should be guided and advised by some experienced person, at least during the initial period, and thereby save the loss of time of pursuing leads already adequately covered, and being instructed regarding the worth of effort for other activity with which one might be concerned. Reports should be discussed with agents, and as close a contact with them be maintained as consistent with cover and as opportunity permits. The above statements are all I have to report.

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Cut the edges of green
 cross indicate the edges of
 camera field

Even No. rolls
 [Exposure is $\frac{1}{25}$ @ f.6.3]

CONFIDENTIAL**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.****MEMORANDUM**

TO: Director, OSS, Administration Building 17 July 1945
VIA: Reports Office, Secretariat, 209 South Building
FROM: Acting Chief, Field Photographic Branch
SUBJECT: Overseas Returnee Report of George J. Gercke

Attached hereto is overseas returnee report of George J. Gercke for your information and files. The following comments are submitted:

Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 - No Comment

Paragraph 7 - Mr. Gercke goes to great length and says nothing.

Paragraph 8 - No Comment

Paragraph 9 - The Branch Chief in Washington has never had control over the manner in which information on OSS activities is disseminated to the branches in the theater. Problem mentioned in this paragraph is that of the Chief of Mission or his Executive.

Paragraph 10 - I concur with Mr. Gercke's remarks in this paragraph and often wonder why he did not do it more often. In the last part of the paragraph he is bitching because he could not wangle a couple hops back to the States.

Paragraph 11 - Simply an explanation of what his job should have embraced.

Paragraph 12 - An age-old OSS problem according to some people.

Paragraph 13 - No Comment

Mr. Gercke was asked to resign because of intoxication.

Encl. 1-Report of Mr. Gercke

E. R. Kellogg
 W. R. KELLOGG
 Lieut., USNR
 Acting Chief
 Field Photographic Branch

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CONFIDENTIAL**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

TO: Director, OSS, Administration Building 11 July 1945

VIA: Secretariat, Administration Building
Chief, Field Photographic Branch

FROM: George J. Gercke

SUBJECT: Overseas Returnee Report

In accordance with directives requiring reports of activities by overseas returnees, I submit the following:

1. On 1 March 1944 I entered on duty with Field Photographic Branch, OSS, at Washington, D.C., having resigned as a motion picture director with The March of Time with the understanding I was shortly to be assigned to the London mission of OSS to be in charge of motion picture and still photographic production under the Chief of Branch there. In this capacity I was to become familiar with OSS operations in the ETO, originate story ideas for motion picture and still coverage of such operations, prepare scripts, assign personnel, direct and produce these duties to include supervision of editing, writing of commentary, voice scoring, and such other stages in production leading to a finished product. It was definitely understood by me that the London unit was to be largely self-contained and that its function was to provide information and intelligence of ETO activities in picture form for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These were to be in the nature of reports on strategic services.

2. During my association with The March of Time, I had been accredited as a War Correspondent and had been out of the country in that status. It was my hope that I could secure a somewhat similar status with OSS and that my journalistic and motion picture experience could be utilized in the type of field reporting I envisioned as being my function. The General Counsel of OSS ruled, however, that I could not retain this status in OSS and I was therefore accredited by the Adjutant General's office as a U. S. Technical Representative attached to the armed forces, entitled to wear a uniform, and given the assimilated rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the event of capture by the enemy. At the request of Commander John Ford, I made no application then for a commission in the Navy or Army but proceeded as a civilian to London, arriving 15 May 1944.

3. Any plans I may have formulated were held in abeyance on my arrival, as all facilities and personnel were committed to SHARP for impending D-Day operations. Commander Ford himself was taking command of the unit, with additional Navy and Coast Guard personnel. I assisted in whatever way I could in these operations. After D-Day, when all personnel were released, I was directed by Captain (then Commander) Lester Armour, Asst. Strategic Services Officer of the London Mission, acting on orders from

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11 July 1945

Director, JCS

General Donovan, to undertake a complete documentation in motion pictures and stills (the latter being largely for the use of the War Diary Section to illustrate its official accounts) of all OOB activities in the ETO. Accordingly, beginning 1 June 1944, personnel and equipment available were assigned to Lt. J. H. and plans made for such documentation. These plans were approved by Commander Ford and Lieutenant Commander F. A. Connor, Chief of Branch in the 500. Location research and shooting began.

On 1 June 1944, shortly before then a month when Colonel D. K. F. Bruce, Chief of Division in the 500, sent orders that all possible personnel of the Field Photographic Branch were to be re-assigned to a new project on the Continent. I accompanied Commander Ford to France in his order to undertake research on this project, which was for the purpose of photographing, largely in stills, certain installations of the enemy. We were joined in a few days by Lieutenant Armitstead, who later was placed in charge of the project.

Thus, from that time (approximately 1 August 1944) to 14 February 1945, I was responsible for and devoted myself to the documentation of OOB activities. These were confined to the United Kingdom, as we could not secure permission to send any photographers to the Continent. More than 100,000 feet of film was exposed and rough-cut (edited in draft form). Work was performed by the unit left under my charge, the remaining personnel, and others who could be recruited from Washington and elsewhere, being transferred to the Continental project.

By agreement with Lieutenant Kellow, Acting Branch Chief, and Captain Armitstead, I returned to the United States on 4 April 1945, resigning as of 1 April 1945.

Certain problems encountered in photographing L-30 (the documentation project) stemmed directly from the exigencies of the military situation. For example, having only one unit to work with, selection had to be made as to which of several activities taking place simultaneously should be covered, knowing full well that activities of those not selected might be covered before the one selected was photographed. This proved to be the case in another instance, a request for one or more men to accompany one of the six lifts of boxes and packages to the Continent, in order to cover OOB activities in conjunction with OOB personnel, was not granted. From a journalistic point of view (if no other) this left the documentation with little accomplished except coverage of training in the UK. The basic design for the project coverage was (a) training and (b) application of training, i.e., operations. It is true that permission of our Allies may have had to be secured in order to send men to cover operations, and their professional interest was said to be in men and material, not cameramen. This point of view is understandable, but motion pictures have either a military value or they have not, and in my opinion action should have been taken with a decisive conviction on this point firmly in mind.

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11 July 1945

Director, NSC-

4. The list of characters encountered is long. The foregoing cited illustrations indicate their general nature.

5. For action picture reportage of any value, the closest liaison should have been maintained with the highest command. A news correspondent, for instance, or a military staff observer, would ordinarily depend for authentic information on the highest source, particularly if he were to report that in connection with such a high level as J.C. For another example, it might have been advisable for some representative of Field Photographic Branch to accompany a high officer of J.C. whenever he might make a reconnaissance of the battlefield of such a nature that a motion picture report might be obtained from the conditions or situation observed.

6. Liaison with Washington should be constant and thorough, even though the responsibility for producing a picture may rest in the theater. In other words, whenever clarification of a complex problem is needed, or the use of facilities available in Washington but not in the field, is required, a responsible officer should be required to make the trip for personal explanation. In many cases use of the air couch will be sufficient and written memoranda adequate. In many others, these will not suffice.

7. Constant vigilance should be exercised to make certain that material being produced that is of value to the ultimate audience and that audience's requirements should be constantly analyzed to determine whether they are being served.

8. The interchange of military, naval, and civilian personnel created certain problems, of which many were ironed out. The command function of civilians placed in charge of a group of men who are wholly or largely military or naval personnel must be carefully determined and then made clear to all concerned. In my opinion, more civilian personnel could be used in Field Photographic Branch if their status were made such as to be comparable to the military with whom they might come in contact. Some more satisfactory staff or technical representative might be worked out.

9. The particular problem in the FTO affecting coverage by motion pictures were usually complex and without precedent. Generally they were solved. Whenever the material photographed there is put into shape for presentation, we may find it has a unique and vivid record of its operations to the extent that they were covered.

Respectfully submitted,

George J. Seneke
George J. SENEKE

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10 April 1945

From: [redacted] *29*
 To: [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]
 Subject: Report on Versene Assignment

In accordance with directives regarding reports
 pertaining to Versene assignments, I submit the following:

1. On 1 March 1945 I entered on duty with Field
 Photographic Branch, OSS, at Washington, D.C., having resigned as
 a motion picture director with The March of Time with the understand-
 ing I was shortly to be assigned to the London mission of OSS to be
 in charge of motion picture and still photographic production under
 the Chief of Mission there. In this capacity I was to become familiar
 with OSS operations in the STO, originate story ideas for motion
 picture and still coverage of such operations, prepare scripts,
 assign personnel, direct and produce, those films to include
 reports, training, and to include commentary, voice scoring and
 in other stages in production leading to a finished product. It
 was definitely understood by me that the London unit was to be
 largely self-contained and that its function was to provide in-
 formation and intelligence of STO activities in picture form for
 the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These were to be in the nature of
 reports on strategic services.

2. During my association with The March of Time, I had
 been associated as a War Correspondent and had been out of the
 country in that status. It was my hope that I could secure a some-

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that similar status with OSS and hereby journalistic and motion picture experience could be utilized in the type of field ~~reporting~~ reporting envisioned as being my function. The Central Counsel of OSS ruled, however, that I could not retain this status in OSS and I was therefore accredited by the Adjutant General's office as a U. S. Technical Representative attached to the armed forces, entitled to wear a uniform, and given the assimilated rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the event of capture by the enemy. At the request of Commander John Ford, I made no application then for a commission in the Navy or Army but proceeded as a civilian to London, arriving 10 May 1944.

3. Any plans I may have formulated were held in abeyance on my arrival, as all facilities and personnel were committed to SHAEF for impending D-Day operations. Commander Ford himself was taking command of the unit, with additional Navy and Coast Guard personnel. I assisted in whatever way I could in those operations. After D-Day, when all personnel were released, I was directed by Captain (then Commander) Lester Armour, Assistant Strategic Services Officer of the London mission, acting on orders from General Donovan, to undertake a complete documentation in motion pictures and stills (the latter being largely for the use of the War Diary Section to illustrate its official accounts) of all OSS activities in the ETO. Accordingly, beginning 20 June 1944, personnel and equipment available were assigned to OSS Area II and plans made for such documentation. These plans were approved by Commander Ford and Lieutenant Commander F. A. Spencer, Chief of Branch in the ETO. Location reconnoitering and shooting began.

4. This work was underway less than a month when

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Colonel D. K. E. Stone, Chief of Mission in the ETO, sent orders that all possible personnel of the Field Photographic Branch were to be re-assigned to a new project on the continent. I accompanied Commander Ford to France on his order to undertake research on this project, which was for the purpose of photographing, largely in stills, certain installations of the enemy. We were joined in a few days by Lieutenant Armistead, who later was placed in charge of the project.

5. Thus, from this time (approximately 1 August 1944) to ~~February~~^{for} February 1945, I was responsible and devoted myself to the documentation of OSS activities. These were confined to the United Kingdom, as we could not secure permission to send any photographers to the Continent. More than ~~100,000~~ 100,000 feet of film were exposed in rough-cut (edited in draft form). Work was performed by one unit left under my charge, the remaining personnel, and such others as could be recruited from Washington and elsewhere, being transferred to the Continental project.

6. By agreement with Lieutenant Kellogg, Acting Branch Chief, and Captain Armour, I returned to the United States on 4 April, 1945, resigning on 10 April 1945.

7. Until I returned to the United States, I was photographing in the United Kingdom, and I should directly from the exigencies of the military situation. For example, having only one unit left under my charge, I was forced to be made a to which of my own unit I had to assign, and I should be ~~assigned~~ assigned to the activities of the unit. I was not allowed to select my own personnel. This proved to be a great disadvantage, as I had no experience, except as of the unit, in the assignment of the

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the lifts of the 1st Airborne Division, and the 1st
Army Air Corps activities in conjunction with the 1st Airborne Division, was not
granted. From the point of view of the 1st Airborne Division (the other) this
left the 1st Airborne Division in a position of being completely covered
of training in ~~the~~ the UK. The basic reason for the project
coverage was (a) training and (b) utilization of training, i. e.,
operations. It is true that permission of our Allies may have had
to be secured in order to send men to cover operations, and their
professed interest was to be to send men and materiel, not
casualties. This point of view is understandable, but motion pictures
have either military value or they have not, and in my opinion
action should have been taken with a decisive conclusion on this
point firmly in mind.

9. The list of obstacles enumerated is long. The above-mentioned illustrations indicate that paper is scarce.

9. For example, let us suppose that a report of any value, the closest liaison should have been in touch with the OSS high command. A new (correct) report, so to speak, on military staff observation, and ordinarily depend on authoritative information from highest sources, particularly if he were to report that information to such a high level as JCS. ~~For~~ For another example, there have been a number of cases where ~~representative~~ representative of Field Photographic Branch has been, say a high officer of OSS whenever he might make a reconnaissance or inspection of such a nature that certain pictures might conceivably be forthcoming from the conditions or situation observed.

10. * Liaison with Washington about the content and
through, even though not responsible for producing a picture

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rest of the year. In other cases, whenever a situation of complex problem is needed, or the use of facilities available in Washington or in the field, is required, a responsible person will be required to make the trip for personal explanations. In many cases use of the ~~in~~ in person will be sufficient and will be more than adequate. In many others, these will be sufficient.

11. ~~Constant~~ Constant vigilance should be exercised to make certain that material is being produced that is of value to the ultimate audience, *and that audience's requirements should be constantly analyzed to determine whether they are being served.* The internal turn of military, naval and civilian personnel are tied up in problems, of which many were ignored out. The core and function of a civilian placed in charge of a group of people who are totally or largely military or naval personnel must be carefully determined and then made clear to all concerned. In my opinion, more civilian personnel could be used in Field Theographic Branch if their status were made such as to be acceptable to the military. In the they might come in contact. Some were ~~not~~ satisfactory status than Technical Representative might be worked out.

12. ~~The~~ The particular problems in the ETO affecting coverage by motion pictures were usually complex and without precedent. Generally they were overcome. Whenever the material photographed there is put into shape for presentation, ODS may find it was a unique ~~and~~ and vivid record of its operations to the extent that they were covered.

Respectfully,
George J. Perkins

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 26 July 1945

TO : The Director
FROM : Secretariat: Reports Office
SUBJECT: Field Report of the Sparrow Mission

HOLD FOR WJD ✓

This report is an extremely interesting and detailed narration of the Sparrow Mission into Hungary. It is recommended in full to the Director's attention.

Thomas Victor
Pvt. Thomas Victor
Reports Office

File

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 19 July 1945

TO : Director, OSS
FROM : Chief, CI
SUBJECT: Report of Sparrow Mission

This report presents a most interesting detailed narrative of the experiences of Colonel Duke, Major Suarez and Lt. Dunn in their attempted accomplishment of a hazardous and important mission into hostile Hungary. The mission was unsuccessful through no fault of these three officers who performed their assigned duties with fortitude, patience and good judgment.

In paragraph 8, page 13, certain conclusions, which appear most logical, emphasize the unreliability of Hungarian officers and offer further proof of their propensity for double-dealing.

Walter H. Rappaport
Walter H. Rappaport

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JOINT REPORT ON FIELD CONDITIONS

by

Colonel Florimond Duke, SI, Southeast Europe Section
 Major Alfred M. Suarez, SI, Labor Section
 Lt. Guy T. Gunn, SI, Labor Section

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
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2. The Plan of the Mission	1
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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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9 July 1945

TO : Director, Strategic Services

FROM : Colonel Florimond Duke, SC, O-397257
Major Alfred M. Suarez, CE, O-925185
Lt. Guy T. Funn, AUS, O-2056280

SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions - SPARROW MISSION

1. The Purpose of the Mission:

Through our office in " ", we had indications that two members of the then existing Cabinet in Hungary were interested in opening negotiations for a separate peace. They had requested that someone be sent to talk with them. Along with this mission to meet with these Cabinet members, it was also agreed that we would be permitted to set up intelligence operations outside of Budapest.

2. The Plan of the Mission:

The plan was that three American officers would jump by parachute into Hungary during the moon period, between the 10th and 16th of March 1944. These men would then turn themselves over to the Hungarian military authorities and thereby become immediately prisoners of war of the Hungarian army. All soldiers and officers of the Hungarian army would naturally consider us as regular prisoners of war, and we would be passed along until we finally were to reach General Stephen Ujzassai, then the Chief of Intelligence of the Hungarian army, who had agreed to act as the go-between for us and the Cabinet members.

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3. The Execution of the Plan:

Major Alfred L. Suarez, an engineer officer and radio technician, was already in Algiers. Mr. Ray T. Nunn, a radio operator with language qualifications (German and French) was also in Algiers. They were asked if they would volunteer for such a mission and agreed. Colonel Florimond D. Duke was in Washington when asked if he would volunteer for the mission. He agreed and arrived in Algiers on March 6, 1944. Immediately he went through the preliminary training for parachute jump. The other two had already had this training and had made jumps.

After a week of preparation, we left Algiers on March 12, 1944, spent that night in Naples, then went to Brindisi where we spent the nights of the thirteenth and fourteenth. On the night of the fifteenth we left Brindisi in a British Bomber, a Halifax, with British crew, and flew first over northern Croatia where we threw out several bundles -- then we flew near Slovenia, where two Austrian boys jumped and their radios were broken after them. Then we flew back to our pin-point near the junction of the Sava and Drava rivers just over the border in Hungary from northern Croatia.

Duke jumped first, followed by Suarez and Nunn and then the radios. We landed perfectly at 2:30 in the morning in a plowed field -- signaled the plane as it made a circle to come over us and drop the three containers from the bomb racks packed with our extra clothing, food and other supplies.

We first located the region -- buried them in the woods, then buried our own suits and the seven parachutes and three large containers.

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This took until daybreak -- about six in the morning. Having completed this job, we walked to the nearest village we could see about a mile and a half away. Very few people were to be seen in the village at such an early hour, but we finally ran into one man who spoke French, who had been a waiter in Paris. He took us to the town hall, and in a short time the entire small village turned out and crowded around the outside of the building. These Hungarians were most friendly and said that we were fortunate to have landed in Hungary because there was no war there, plenty of food and we would be treated kindly by the Hungarian authorities. They brought us breakfast and appeared most friendly in every way.

He insisted, however, that we talk to the "military". Having no telephone in the small peasant village, they sent a boy on bicycle, to the next town about ten kilometers away, to a large Hungarian military barracks. About nine o'clock, the first military appeared. Thereafter, about each half hour a higher rank military would appear and they started questioning and examining us. We told them that we were part of a crew of a large bomber which had been hit by anti-aircraft, and in order to lighten the load so that the plane could return to its base the three of us had jumped.

However, the Hungarian military authorities became alarmed and put out searching parties to look for more parachutists since they feared that there were many more of us. In this search of the countryside they discovered our containers and some of the parachutes, but did not find our radios which we had taken particular care to conceal.

There were about a dozen Hungarian military around us by that time, and along about seven o'clock one of these men in civilian dress

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took me aside and said that he had been waiting for us for two or three days. I then realized that he was the representative of General Ujszaszi. He spoke English, was a Major in the Hungarian Air Force, named Kirali. He said we would have to go through that theatre of being examined, etc., but when they had finished he would take us and our equipment along with him.

It was about noon when we went with him and our equipment to the next town to this large Hungarian military barracks. There we had lunch at the officers' mess, spent the night in a small room under heavy guard. The next morning, Major Kirali took the three of us and our equipment, including our two radios which we returned to get, to Budapest, arriving there about seven o'clock in the evening.

We went to the headquarters of Internal Security Police in Budapest and were put in jail in the basement of this large building. The guards were quite friendly, left our cell door open during the day time and brought us good food from the restaurant around the corner. That evening, March 17th, about nine o'clock, the Major brought us upstairs to the office of General Ujszaszi, who was most cordial and pleasant, welcoming us to Hungary, asking what proposition we had. He spoke in French and was a very smooth diplomatic sort of person. I replied that we had no proposition, we came with none other than our regular terms of unconditional surrender, but that we were there to help and would be interested in learning of their plans or ideas. He then explained that the two members of the Cabinet that we wanted to see were out of town for the week-end and would return on Monday at which time he would arrange an appointment.

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He expressed his apologies for the necessity of our being held as "prisoners". After about twenty minutes or a half hour with him, we returned to our cell.

On Sunday morning, the 13th of March at 8 o'clock, we were awakened with the request that General Gjszaszi wanted to see us immediately. We dressed hurriedly, went upstairs and found him in a very nervous state. He had not slept all night -- practically had tears in his eyes -- as white as a sheet -- and informed us that three German Panzer Divisions had crossed the border from Austria into Hungary and were occupying the country and surrounding Budapest. He asked if we could send a message, but we informed him that we could not until about eleven o'clock because it would take us that long to set up our equipment. Actually we could not send a message before that time because eleven o'clock was our call time. The General then said that eleven or twelve o'clock would be too late. He asked him if he had an airplane hidden on some large estate outside Budapest that we could all get on and get out of there. He said that he had not made any such preparations. We then told him that if we worked fast we could get us down to the Yugoslav border and we would then make our way through Yugoslavia to join the Partisan resistance forces and in that way make our escape. He replied that it would be impossible because the German troops were already practically surrounding Budapest. In other words, the Hungarians offered no resistance whatsoever to German invasion and they did nothing to help us get away.

Later on that morning, at General Gjszaszi's request, we entrusted our two radio transmitters and some parts to his care. He offered to conceal the transmitters in a safe place to keep them from falling into the hands of the Germans, so that we could still make use of them if successful in

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returning to Hungarian jurisdiction. It should be noted that the "one time" code pass mentioned above could not be of any use to either the Hungarians or the Germans. This is an important point which you will see develop later on in the story.

That was the last we saw of General Ujszaszi, but his assistant, Major Virall, visited us occasionally in our cell to tell us of developments of the occupation and what was going on in the city and the surrounding country.

Germany had an agreement with Hungary that they would have the right to interview all Allied prisoners of war who landed in Hungary, but after this interview these prisoners would become prisoners of the Hungarians. At that time, when we were there, there were about eighteen United States Army airmen who had landed in Hungary and who were being held as prisoners of war by the Hungarians. This naturally would have been our first job to arrange a landing of an airplane in Hungary to take these men out. According to our plan, after the German authorities had had their interview with us we would have been taken outside of Budapest and allowed to set up our intelligence operations.

But under the circumstances, with the German army in occupation of Hungary, Major Virall told us, all Allied prisoners of war now held by the Hungarian authorities would automatically become prisoners of the Germans, and that would be our fate. Therefore, we sat in this Hungarian cell for the remainder of that week, and on Saturday, the 25th of March, we were turned over to the German authorities.

Consequently, as far as they knew - up to this point, we were simply airmen who had jumped into Hungary. The Germans took us to Pannova, the

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headquarters of the Luftwaffe intelligence for all of the Balkans, just across the river from Belgrade. Here we were questioned and we told the story. In order to protect the Hungarians), that we had agreed to tell with Major Kirali, namely that we had intended to join the Yugoslav Partisans in Northern Croatia, but had gone too far and landed in Hungary by mistake.

We were apparently getting away with this story so much so that we were actually in a bus to be moved to Frankfurt, Germany, which is the intelligence center for all of the Luftwaffe, when a Gestapo official arrived and asked the three of us to come out, leaving the other eight or ten British, American and Canadian airmen on the bus to proceed to Frankfurt. This official then took us back across the River to Belgrade and there we found ourselves in the hands of the Gestapo where we were thrown into three cells on April 1. The three of us were kept absolutely apart -- could not see each other, and were questioned on numerous occasions. We were still holding to our "Partisan" story and they were particularly anxious to learn if we had a radio since rumors had come back from Budapest that we were connected with a mission to Hungary. In fact they were questioning me one day as to whether or not we had a radio when they produced one of our code books and said, "what is this?" I then replied that we did have a radio.

After about a week they asked me why I did not tell them the truth because the German authorities had under arrest in Budapest three high ranking officers of the Hungarian army who said that we were directly connected with a mission into Hungary. I still insisted that I knew nothing about this and asked them to bring the three men to Belgrade and

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are then their statement to me, since I wanted to see whom they had under arrest. This one did not go, but on the night of April 11, we left Belgrade on train for Berlin. We spent two nights on the train and arrived in Berlin on the morning of April 14, where again we were put into solitary confinement with no cigarettes, no reading material and very little food until April 17. All during this time in Berlin, absolutely nothing happened -- no one came to see us, there were no questions asked, no interviews, no communications with the outside world, no Red Cross parcels, no exercise -- just waiting all day in a small cell.

On the morning of April 17, they told us to get ready to leave. This time we were handcuffed with our hands behind our backs. On all future moves we had been handcuffed the three of us together. They took us then in the usual "black maria" to an airport, with a guard for each one of us for the trip by airplane back to Budapest.

Arriving in Budapest, we were again put into solitary confinement in a large civilian jail in which the Gestapo had already taken over two of the six floors. When we left they occupied four floors.

The next morning, the Gestapo representative took me again handcuffed to the Gestapo headquarters. Here were the "big shot" interrogators, as the questioning in Belgrade by the Gestapo had been rather soft and tame. These men in Budapest were clever, smooth operators, well dressed in expensive civilian materials. On my first interview,

after he had asked me what I had to join the Partisans and after looking around for about ten minutes, my questioner looked at me and said, "You look like an intelligent guy -- there is no one like you here and nothing about the war -- here is the story." With that he tossed over

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to me twenty type written pages, a signed statement by General Vjszaszi, telling the entire story. I looked at this dossier and saw that it told the whole story. I then told him enough to confirm what Vjszaszi had already told him, but was very vague as to where we had come from -- that is what organization. I said we were air corps intelligence and that I had volunteered for a special mission for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and State Department. On returning to the jail I had an opportunity to tell Major Suarez and Lt. Hunt that the story had come out on the part of the Hungarian General so that on their interviews the following day they could confirm the story. After about a week, when we had told our individual stories, they moved the three of us together in one cell in the jail.

About two weeks later a special representative from the OKW came from Berlin to see me. He was a specialist on the American Army from the OKW intelligence. He particularly wanted to know how many troops we had in England. Although I had no idea, I told him that we had about two or probably three million who were getting ready for the invasion of France any day. I told him the invasion would be timed with the great push from the south of Italy and a big drive on the part of the Russians from the east, so that Germany would be squeezed in from all sides. He could hardly believe that we would ever make a landing in France and could not understand it. But I had a great time with him, and my statements to him are exactly what did happen, so he must have thought I had all the inside info.

A special representative from the intelligence in Vienna was also sent to interview me about the OAS organization. I told him that it was a well-known organization in America run by Colonel "Wild Bill" Donovan, specializing in all economic, financial, political problems

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of all countries in Europe, etc. In other words the organization was
 let A with Donovan as Chief of Research. This seemed to satisfy him and
 he went away happy.

We were told then, about the middle of May, that the Gestapo
 was finished with us and that we would be transferred to an officers'
 prison camp, but there was a jurisdictional fight on between the Gestapo,
 the Luftwaffe and the Wehrmacht as to whose prisoners we were. So we
 sat in the cell for another two weeks and finally the decision was made
 in Berlin that we would become prisoners of the Wehrmacht.

Therefore, on June 1, we left Budapest and traveled by train to
 Vienna where we were again put in a civilian jail. No one seemed to
 know why we were there and I insisted on talking to the Commandant the
 next day, but he did not know either. He phoned the Gestapo office, but
 they gave out no information and simply said that we must remain for
 further orders. After a five day wait we were moved to Stalag 17-A, about
 thirty kilometers west of Vienna. Instead of its being an officers' camp,
 it was a large enlisted men's camp of about 3,000 mostly Russians, some
 Belgians and French, and about 1,000 British. Here again we were held in
 cells, three of us Americans in one cell about seven feet wide and fifteen
 feet long. We were told that we had now become prisoners of the Wehrmacht
 and were allowed to write our first letters. For the first time we received
 a new brown paper, each week. But the security officer of the camp held
 up our mail until the middle of July before sending it. For we were still
 held in cells and considered as especially dangerous prisoners. After
 about a week or so, the Jews protecting power by chance happened to be
 making air raids and we were told by the prison to be able to visit the

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cells of the camp as in these cells there were American and British officers.

The protecting power insisted on coming to see us in spite of the fact that the Commandant of the camp and the security officer tried to prevent him from doing so and to conceal the fact that we were there. He visited us and saw the appalling condition under which we were living and made a severe report to Geneva. This was about the middle of June and was the first report, I believe, that got out about us. Soon after this, the Germans tried to give us a little more room and comfort and on the 20th of August the three of us, with six British and two Yugoslavs, were moved in one-third of a freight car -- thirteen German guards occupying the other two-thirds -- from there to Oflag 4-C at Colditz, 30 kilometers southeast of Leipzig. Again we were handcuffed to each other until we were in the freight car, and again on leaving the freight car to go to the officers' camp. The trip took three days and three nights and was most uncomfortable since we had only straw and could barely find room to lie down at night.

At Oflag 4-C, which was a large castle, in pre-war days an insane asylum with iron bars at all windows, living became a little more bearable than that which we had experienced previously. Here we had freedom of movement within the castle in the day although the three of us were classed as "Prominente", #1, and locked up every night from nine until eight in the morning. Class Prominente #1 consisted of about six British officers such as the nephew of the King, nephew of the Queen, Churchill's nephew, Tagore's son, etc. These people were being held as hostages because a week before we were liberated Lt. John Vincent, son of

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our ambassador in London, was moved to our camp and was made prominent. The prominent class were considered as "enemies of the Reich" in that we had been around the subject, had seen too much and were picked up under odd and strange circumstances. Stalag 4-C was a special German prison camp in which the Germans kept these particular prisoners and others who had escaped four or five times because this camp was supposed to be escape-proof and was very heavily guarded.

We remained there until we were liberated on April 10 by a Task Force of the First Army, made up of units of the 6th Infantry and the 4th Armored Division.

4. Conclusion and Comments:

Although the main purpose of the mission was not accomplished, in that we did not get to see the two members of the Cabinet who had indicated a desire to make a separate peace, nor did we ever set up the intelligence operations outside of Budapest, the mission from our side was carried out 100% according to plan. We did not know at the time we left of any German intent to occupy Hungary, but we did carry out our end of the plan to perfection in that we jumped between the dates specified, landed safely, exactly where we had pinpointed, turned ourselves over to the Hungarian authorities as their prisoners, and made the contact with the individuals intended. It is most unfortunate that the mission was ill timed from the standpoint that two days after we arrived the Germans occupied Hungary.

However, as prisoners of war of the Hungarians, and later the Germans, although we were ill treated and threatened with death on numerous

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occasions, and treated in such a manner that practically every article of the Geneva Convention was broken. We never at any time divulged any information concerning our mission other than what was obvious, nor did we divulge information concerning OSS.

B. Further Conclusions

As noted in the reading of this report, General Ujjaszi took our rifles and code books with the idea of hiding them in safe keeping. Later it developed that it was not long before he turned all of these over to the German authorities. On my return to Budapest, a little over a month after we were turned over to the Germans, I found that he had given a complete statement concerning our mission. I also learned later that there were others working from Ankara who may have known about this and who may have kept the Germans fully informed.

The Germans always went to "justify" their actions. They wanted to justify Hungary and in order to justify such action, our mission seemed to be good proof, for it clearly demonstrated that certain members of the cabinet were endeavoring to double-cross the Germans by negotiating a separate peace.

General Ujjaszi, I saw at a distance in the same jail in Budapest, where we were. However, he was released two days before we left for Vienna. Although there was a report on May 10 that he, his assistant, and his mistress had been shot, that was untrue because we saw him about May 11.

Since the Germans did nothing to him, and since they did not shoot us, it would appear that the whole scheme might well have been a

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plan in which they were in on, namely to give them the justification necessary for action such as occupying the whole of Hungary.

Florimond Duke
Colonel Florimond Duke, S.C.

Alfred M. Suarez
Major Alfred M. Suarez, C.E.

Guy T. Wynn *WH Aug*
Lt. Guy T. Wynn, AUS

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 11 July 1945

TO Acting Director
FROM Secretariat - Reports Office
SUBJECT Returnee Report: L. M. Homberger
R&A/ETO

Mr. Homberger, transportation expert for Europe-Africa Division of R&A, was sent to ETO from 15 April to 19 June 1945 to study international transport problems.

S.P.K.
S.P.K.

Attachments

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

TO : The Director, OSS
 FROM : Mr. William Langer, et al.
 SUBJECT: Assignment in ETC -- 15 April - 13 June 1945

DATE: 25 June 1945

1. Description of Duties and Activities

This section is to make a special study on various transportation matters, to make existing and to establish new contacts, and to lead the work of the ETC program.

Contacts were established by the use of the established personal contacts who lead to contacts with British transportation who willingly have me as a possible asset and to the British for valuable channels of information. In addition, the American Embassy in London had been asked by the State Department to make the necessary arrangements.

As a result of this study:

2. Description of the present transportation situation on Continental Europe

The present transportation situation on the Continent were the rehabilitation of the transportation and the efforts which have been made to rehabilitate the transportation system. It still exists in German transportation. In the future, the transportation will be a basis on the locomotive, the transportation will be a basis.

3. A study of the Provisional Organization of Transport

During the study of the Provisional Organization of Transport, a Provisional Organization of Transport (POT) was signed by the governments of the United States, Canada, France, Great Britain, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Norway. This agreement established the basis for the control and coordination of the transportation system, the maintenance of equipment, the rights of owners and the transportation system. The agreement will be extended, as soon as the political situation in Europe, the USSR and the other Eastern European countries.

The study of the Provisional Organization of Transport was by using the study of the Provisional Organization of Transport, the Provisional Advisory Committee on Transport (PATC). In addition, I was able to observe the transportation system in the organization of the Provisional POT and to obtain information on the organization of the POT from the Chairman of the POT, the Chairman of the POT, as well as from independent sources.

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With regard to the question of the role of the OSI in the field of international transportation problems, it is clear that the OSI is an integral part of the Department of Defense and is closely coordinated with the Department of State.

The OSI is also closely coordinated with the Department of State in the field of international transportation problems, and it is clear that the OSI is an integral part of the Department of Defense and is closely coordinated with the Department of State.

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OSI is an integral part of the Department of Defense

Line.

W.M. Hamberger

Special Representative

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO Acting Director
FROM Secretariat - Reports Office
SUBJECT Returnee Report: Lt. E. G. Lowenstein, USNR
Security/MedTO

DATE: 11 July 1945

1. From January to May 1945, Lt. Lowenstein was Security Officer at Florence and served as Investigating Officer for Company D. Previously he performed X-2 as well as Security functions in Siena and acted as Security Officer at Caserta.

2. Lt. Lowenstein mentions the ever-present scarcity of motor transportation and personnel, and proposes that locations be inspected for security before being taken over.

S.P.K.

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SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO The Director

DATE 9 July 1945

FROM Security Office

SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON REPORT OF FIELD ACTIVITIES BY LT.H.G.LOWENSTEIN, USNR

1. Lt. Lowenstein has performed his duties as assistant Security Officer, WTO, in a satisfactory manner. Temperamentally, he proved to be not entirely suited for Security work, but in spite of this he turned in a good performance. He received a great deal of support and encouragement from his Branch chief, Lt. Comdr. George G. Parry, USNR, who, while recognizing his weaknesses, gave him guidance and help in carrying out his assignment. Lt. Lowenstein's fluent knowledge of Italian made him particularly useful in the area to which he was assigned.
2. Comments regarding improvement of field conditions and personal difficulties reflect the criticisms of many members of this and other branches, as regards lack of transportation and adequate office assistance. Lt. Lowenstein also underlines the desirability of considering the security aspects of new locations before moving into them. His suggestions are considered entirely sound and should be valuable as a guide to be followed if possible in similar future operations.



A. van Beuren
Security Officer

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2 July 1945

To: Director
via Security Officer *Wk*
From: Lieut. Herbert G. Lowenstein, USNR
Subject: Report on Field Activities

In accordance with General Order # 63 I submit herewith
a report on field activities and conditions.

Herbert G. Lowenstein
Herbert G. Lowenstein
Lieutenant, USNR

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SECRET**A. ASSIGNMENTS****1. Naples, March - May, 1944.**

During most of this period, I acted as Assistant Security Officer to Mr. C. Cabot Briggs. Mr. Briggs was engaged in special investigations which kept him outside the office most of the time, and I, with the assistance of Miss Eleanor Greco, handled the routine work of the office, which included inspection of the physical security of the OSS staff quarters at the Villa San Pietro and Magnoli, the making of passes, and the keeping up to date of the files of the office. I was also charged with responsibility of mail passing through the office between the local civilian population and members of their families engaged in OSS activities in other parts of the world, with the investigation of possible violations, and with personnel investigations.

2. Naples, May - July, 1944.

Except for a period of two weeks at the beginning of June, during which I was at Bari, I acted as Security Officer at OSS Italian headquarters at Caserta, both in conjunction with Lt. Commander George C. Barry, USNR, and in his absence. Owing to my knowledge of the Italian language, I was able to do much interrogation of Italian-speaking agents returning from beyond the lines, and some investigation of suspected mole agents. I made inspections of the physical security of OSS establishments in the Naples area, and personnel investigations.

During the first two weeks of June, I was called to Bari to assist Major Louis Tublar, Security Officer at Bari, in the handling of a large backlog of personnel investigations. During this period, I also appeared for obtaining the services of a number of Italian soldiers to act as guards at our Communications establishments near Bari, through contacts with the Italian Army command at Bari and with the British authorities. I also inspected all OSS establishments along the coast from Bari to Brindisi.

3. Siena, July, 1944 - January, 1945.

My assignment to Company B, 267th Regiment, OSS, Siena, began about a week after the liberation of that city. Although the establishment was small at first, it was necessary for me to perform both as well as Security Officer, for there was no K-1 office further south than Siena until the beginning of autumn. In view of the trouble state of the district and the existence of a strong

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Particular emphasis in Sicily and its aftermath, this involved a number of rather elaborate and lengthy investigations, with elaborate checks on all sources of information. Consequently, personnel was severely restricted, and, with the increase of GI personnel at the time, the consequent increase of Italian help, this meant that I had to accept a great proportion of the available time. I was in contact with a number of Italian sources of information in Sicily, such as the questura and the Partisans, and with military sources such as AMG and the British FIC.

The greatest problem at Sicily was that of physical security; before I arrived, Company D had been set up in an open villa, "Villa A", a few miles outside the town. In October 1943, I wrote a report detailing the measures that should be taken to ensure physical security at this headquarters; but these measures were never applied to the demands. When I arrived, there were no barriers at all; and about the beginning of August, I learned that the Italian Carabinieri through the courtesy of the British (and so disposition they were), as what I supposed was an Italian measure. But all subsequent efforts to obtain military personnel, either from the Fifth Army or from Allied Armies in Italy, were unavailing, as were attempts to obtain American military personnel from the AMG and some offices.

Like Warren, the safeguarding of the classified records and material of Company D proved to be a difficult problem, because it was impossible to obtain an adequate number of safes or other secure physical containers.

With the increase of GI establishments in the Tuscany area, and at Major "Savoy's" area near Portofino, and Major Abrignani's Fifth Army headquarters near San Casciano and later outside of Florence, the matter of physical insulation increased, and I was often called upon to take care of personnel problems, especially among the Italian civilian help. This was also the case at Company D headquarters. The situation of the Italian civilians for the MG detachment, where German prisoners of war were kept for use on the other side of the lines, required a great deal of care, as did the supervision of these prisoners later on; and a few "problem children" among them.

At the time I returned to the prison-camp at Aversa. Before my departure, the functions of the Security Office, and the last of the assistance to Italian civilian personnel, were transferred to the other activities of the office will be found detailed in the history of the Security Office at Company D.

1. Florence, Italy, - May, 1945.

Company D moved to the site formerly occupied by the MG detachment near the village of Aversa, 1945, and that was the last of the activities of the office in the country.

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I continued to conduct the routine activities of the Security Office at Florence, and finally succeeded in relieving the guard situation by the employment of twenty-five additional Carabinieri and a number of Partisans who were used at our various places in the vicinity; but I found myself increasingly carried with other duties, of which two were noteworthy.

From the end of January, plans were afoot for the moving of the Italian headquarters of OSI from Turin to Florence. Delegations were sent north to look over possible sites for headquarters, and a knowledge of the district, acquired before the war, was called upon to assist in locating such sites and in making contact with the various officials, Italian, British, and American, who had information or control over them. Unfortunately, though many suitable places were located, the necessary British Army clearance for moving of headquarters into Florence could not be obtained.

In the middle of February, I was appointed Investigating Officer for January, in addition to my security duties. The investigation of a large number of accidents and claims, arising in almost all parts of liberated Italy, and the writing of reports, required a large proportion of my time during March and April.

3. The want of field conditions.

The scarcity of motor transportation has always proved a difficulty in the field, and this is especially so in the case of the Security Officer, whose duties, if they are to be properly discharged, require him not to sit all day in his office, but to make frequent rounds of the district for which he is responsible, often upon no more than a moment's notice. He should have a vehicle assigned to him and continually at his disposal. There was only a short period during which I had such a vehicle, with the result that I was often unable to perform necessary duties at outlying stations in the north-central Italian area under my jurisdiction. This was a daily case with the VII detachment on the Adriatic coast at Ancona, and later at Falconara and Ravenna, which, for lack of transportation or pressure of other duties nearer headquarters or in other directions, I was never able to visit.

Perhaps related to this difficulty is the shortage of personnel in the Security Office. During the winter of 1944-45, there were only twelve OSI detachments in the Company's area scattered from Turin to Falconara, with problems constantly arising in most of them, and personnel investigations had to be made upon short notice. It was practically impossible for one officer and one enlisted man to be called to proceed to one or other station called them. The no-

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tion and, therefore, are not Security Officer, and perhaps an enlisted man, assigned to the suballiant detachments of more considerable size, and, as the 1st detachment on the Adriatic coast, was called upon to solve the problems of that detachment and the smaller ones.

The Security Officer should in all cases be called upon to respect a no used location where it is possible, or not after-ward. This will prevent the taking of locations that are difficult or almost impossible to prove. From the security point of view, as well as the point of view of the guards is greatly restricted.

The difficulties of the guard situation will at very well be solved if there were a regularly or antiregular of limited-service Security Officer or a group of guards could be drawn at need.

The task of the Investigation Officer often assumes the options of a full-time job, and, if possible, at least in part is of a part-time job. These duties should be assigned to one officer who has no other duties to perform.

I. Personal Difficulties.

Perhaps the greatest personal difficulty in the field was the lack of training. It is also, to perform such fundamental tasks as the use of typewriter and keeping the office records and files in proper order. For a considerable period of time, I labored with the necessity of typing all reports, and even all letters, which, as it is necessary attention to minutiae often obscured and was not conducive to the proper appreciation of larger issues.

Herbert G. Lowenstein

Herbert G. Lowenstein
Lieutenant, JGR.

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SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : Acting Director
FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office
SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Lt. Harry G. Nickles, USNR
Security/MedIO

DATE: 11 July 1945
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100-100010002-1

Lt. Nickles had full responsibility for security at Athens headquarters from October 1944 to February 1945. Previously he was Security Officer in Istanbul and carried on personnel investigations in Cairo and London. During his last month overseas, he compiled an extensive documentation of data on Greek employees and organized files on Greek agents and members of their network.

S.P.K.
S.P.K.

Attachments

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: The Director

DATE: 7 July 1945

FROM: Security Office

SUBJECT: SECURITY OF THE AREA IN THE BY LT. H.G. NICKLES, USNR

1. It is my opinion that the attached report is excellent. Lt. Nickles' natural modesty has prevented him from saying as much as he should have about his own work. For instance, during the period January through March 1944, he was placed in complete charge of the ST Training School for Greek agents during the serious illness of Major Vassos. While these duties were completely beyond the scope of his assignment, he performed them in a superior manner and prevented a serious hiatus in the over-all training program.

2. By virtue of his Greek background and facility with the language, Lt. Nickles performed many services of great value to other branches in Athens and later in Cairo, where he correlated material from many sources in a successful effort to build up complete and adequately protective files on Greek agent and sub-agent personnel.

3. Particular attention is called to the suggestions under Section 3, for improvement of field conditions. Experience has shown that a stable cover story for an OSS mission in a neutral country is essential for effective security, and that far better results are achieved if a small Security Staff is provided at the time the mission goes into the field. The need for directives governing the release of native agent personnel has also become abundantly evident and remedial steps have been taken in other theaters to avoid the difficulties experienced in the Middle and Near East. Only in the WFO and WFO has provision been made for detention facilities for undesirable agents, and it is now obvious that such facilities should be a regular part of OSS installations in any theater.

4. In paragraph 5, Lt. Nickles refers to the difficulties caused by a lack of trained assistants. This complaint has been universal with the Security Branch since its inception in overseas theaters. The basic difficulty lies in the fact that sufficient personnel have never been provided. It is respectfully admitted that this has been due to a poor economy and has interfered with the effectiveness of the security controls of all field installations. In addition to the more obvious dangers arising from the lack of these controls, the resultant implication of insecurity has been reported to be a matter of comment by our allies, and in certain instances, has resulted in the breakdown of liaison.

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on high echelons. The number of additional slots necessary to correct this condition would have been very small and provision for them should have been made.

A. van Beuren
A. van Beuren
Security Officer

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO Director
via Security Officer *W. G. Nickles*
FROM Lieut. Harry G. Nickles, USNR
SUBJECT: Report on Field Activities

DATE: 23 June 1945

In accordance with General Order # 63 I submit
herewith a report on field activities and conditions.

Harry G. Nickles
Harry G. Nickles,
Lieut., USNR

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A. ACTIVITIES**1. London, November-December 1943**

My assignment in London, which lasted approximately five weeks in late 1943, was devoted primarily to personnel investigations. The London office was then in a phase of expansion, with new members being recruited in large groups, especially from the American forces in England. A beginning was made in the direct local vetting of these new recruits, to serve as a basis for preliminary security recommendations regarding their employment, but during my brief stay in London it was still necessary to rely heavily on the basic investigations conducted by the Washington Security Office.

2. Cairo, January-March 1944

In Cairo, where I remained on an interim assignment for three months, I was again placed in charge of personnel investigations. In this period a system of negative records checks for local recruits was begun, liaison with American and allied agencies was built up, and a considerable amount of direct vetting accomplished. Much of the ground-work was done toward systematizing files and office procedures, including liaison with the Washington office. For a few weeks in January 1944 I acted as head of a SI training school, which was being used mainly for break agents and radio operators. Much delicate personnel work had to be done with this group, some of whom had exceedingly difficult temperaments.

3. Istanbul, April-October 1944

In Istanbul I served as Security Officer for a period of six months. Since the mission had been operating there already for a considerable period without an officer trained in security techniques, it was necessary to undertake at once the investigation of members recruited locally and to make a series of recommendations regarding personnel security. Turkey's neutral status at the time presented several serious problems concerning both cover for our personnel and the safeguarding of our records. Both had to be protected from the Turkish secret police, the German counter-intelligence organizations, and the idle or purposeful curiosity of apocryphous outsiders, including many Americans. Physical security was guaranteed, so far as possible, by installing our headquarters in a well-protected building and posting a 24-hour alert watch. Cover security for staff personnel, who were jumbled together in one office under a number of inconsistent and sometimes

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badly prepared cover stories, had to be treated largely by patch-work methods, and there were several minor instances of compromise. Censorship problems were numerous and specially difficult. Personal adjustments of a difficult nature had to be made by some of our servicemen who found their artificial civilian status unusual, exciting, or downright bewildering. This was a threat to morale and consequently to security, and required constant attention. For a period of nearly two months I was designated Acting Services Officer and had to devote almost full time to details of this work. The break in diplomatic relations between Turkey and Germany, which occurred in this period, required comprehensive action by both Security and Services to insure protection of OSS papers, personnel and premises against the possibility of German attack, mob disturbances, conflagration, and failure of utilities and food supplies.

4. Athens, October 1944-February 1945

My assignment in Athens began shortly after the liberation last October and lasted until late February of this year. It was planned originally to cover only the release of Greek agent personnel, but as the emphasis of the Athens operation shifted from liquidation to the collection of intelligence, the job was expanded to include full responsibility for headquarters security. A special procedure had to be worked out for the release of agents, including formal clearance papers fixing appropriate responsibility on branch heads and on the agents themselves. Much intensive briefing had to be done, and again there were a number of Greeks whose individual problems required tactful handling. The greatest difficulty was experienced in the matter of formal certificates of service, which were demanded by all Greek employees and were definitely needed by some as proof that they had not collaborated with the Germans during the occupation. These were being prepared as I left WFO in May of this year, after all agents had been released already. A full report on briefing procedures devised in Athens has been included in my history of the Security Branch there. Headquarters security was handled in a routine way insofar as possible, with two noteworthy exceptions. The first was the wearing of civilian clothes, which involved many of our members in embarrassing inconsistencies, particularly after we were ordered into uniform at the outbreak of civil war in Athens. The second was the civil war itself, which necessitated a number of special measures designed to reduce the dangers of working in a battle area. It is a pleasure to report here that the personnel of OSS/Athens kept up excellent courage and morale in spite of the daily risks they ran. Our only casualties were sustained when Sgt. Joseph Rudas was killed, and I was wounded, by a British machine gunner who opened fire without warning.

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5. Cairo, March-April 1945

In this period I undertook an extensive documentation of data on Greek employees, organizing files on Greek agents and all important members of their networks. As a result, the records of nearly seven hundred individuals are available in Cairo and in Athens in an authoritative master list. This is not only an important record of past operations, but has already begun to function as an extremely useful check in verifying claims that may be made by Greek nationals against OSS.

B Improvement of field conditions

Since all the important phases of my work in field security are now closed, the following suggestions apply not to present field conditions but to future possibilities.

Consider security in a neutral country such as Turkey, if an OSS mission is to operate again with a staff and headquarters rather than through scattered agents, it should be covered with a single airtight story and preferably be housed together with some large, well-established American agency, with appropriate internal safeguards to prevent unnecessary contact between OSS and the agency's regular staff. A trained Security Officer should be assigned from the beginning, and other personnel selected with particular care, not only for their training or experience but for personal stability as well.

In setting up a headquarters in newly liberated territory, as was done in Greece, it is my opinion that administrative and services talent should be given a high priority on the original personnel list, to speed up organization and thus permit intelligence men and other specialists to go to work at once on urgent matters.

When native agent personnel are to be released, clear directives and policies should be provided in advance, so far as possible, covering clearance routine, awards to be made, and the handling of difficult cases. The question of awards, both material and moral, was complicated in Greece by promises made or alleged to have been made to agents at the time of their employment. For "trouble" cases, the lack of detention facilities has been felt acutely in the Middle East on several occasions.

C Personal difficulties

Aside from incidental difficulties mentioned in the first part of this report, my worst personal problem was in having to function as Security Officer in Turkey, and later in Greece, over


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a period of about ten months without a trained office assistant. In such "solo" assignments it is impossible to give adequate attention to either routine details or larger matters of policy, so that the solution of security problems, big and small, is sometimes less thorough than it should be in an organization such as O.C.

Harry G. Nicklos
Harry G. Nicklos,
Lieut., USNR

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SECRET**Office Memorandum****UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

DATE: 10 July 1945

TO : Acting Director

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: 1st Lt. George J. Kabat
SI/ETO

1. Lt. Kabat worked as instructor in London from February to August 1944. He then proceeded to Normandy where his work consisted of recruiting, infiltrating, and receiving agents. In October 1944, Lt. Kabat was appointed C.O. of Area B at St. Germaine, and from January 1945 on he was Administrative Officer for the OSS installation at Nice.

rk
S.P.K.

Attachment

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17, 2

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

23 June 1946

TO: Director, GHS

FROM: Whitney H. Shepardson, Chief, SI

SUBJECT: Field Report of 1st Lt. George J. Kabat

In his particular line of endeavor which included recruiting, training, infiltrating, and recovering agents, Lt. Kabat is reported to have turned in a workman-like job. He is to be commended for the operations he personally conducted in the Orleans-Viersen area in September, 1944.

WHS
W. H. S.

Attachment

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17, 18, 2

22 June 1945

TO: Chief, S.I.

FROM: 1st Lt. George J. Kabat

SUBJECT: Field Report

1. I was recruited as an Instructor in SI, OSS in February 1944, in London. After taking a nine day OB course on the German Armed Forces, I was assigned to train French officers in Area B, England, where I remained in such capacity until August 1944. The subjects which I taught during this period included Map Reading, Security, Patrolling, Reconnaissance, and infiltration, marksmanship in automatic weapons, chiefly 45, 32, 38 and the Tommy gun. During this time I also attended the OSS Parachute School in Ringway with one group of French officers.

In early August 1944, I proceeded to Normandy with 12 enlisted men where we helped set up an area to train newly recruited French agents and which also served as a center for recuperating agents overrun in the field. The recuperated agents were reprocessed and sent back to England for new assignments. During the months of August and September, my job consisted chiefly of recruiting agents and recovering the old ones. About the 10th of August 1944, Sgt. Bohner and myself ran through the German lines to supply the Maquis group with mortars and mortar ammunition to oust a group of Germans of approximately battalion strength which had been by-passed by an American tank column. This was in the vicinity of Roche-en-Terre in Brittany. The operation was carried on in a 2 1/2 ton truck. Area B was moved to St. Germaine-en-Laye on the 26th of August 1944.

The first week in September, a French Lieutenant and myself infiltrated 4 radio teams across the upper Loire River in the vicinity of Orleans. This group of radio operators were able to furnish the tactical information which made possible a surrender without resistance of the large part of Germans between Orleans and Vierzon. On October 1, I proceeded to Spertey, to which locality we moved Area B. At this time I was appointed Commanding Officer of Area B. We remained in Spertey approximately six weeks, where we attempted to recruit sympathetic PW's, with the assistance of Field Intelligence Division. A change in policy at a high level made it necessary for this project to be discontinued. From the beginning its success had been questionable, even by those willing to try it out. Area B was moved back to St. Germaine about 15 November 1944.

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...ing about 16 November 1944, we began a training program in St. Germaine to train special agents for infiltration missions. The program was a six weeks' course, set up for the Intelligence and Training Branch. However, all instructors in the program were SI instructors. On December 13, I accompanied the agents to London, where they were to be briefed on missions. On January 4, 1945, I was sent to St. Germaine as Administrative Officer for the OSS installation in that area. I remained there in that capacity until about March 15. I then returned to Area P in St. Germaine and acted as Administrative Officer while awaiting orders for reassignment to the United States. After a lengthy period of waiting, I received orders and was able to sail from England for the United States on 30 April 1945, and reported to Washington on the 15th of May 1945.

2. On the whole conditions in the field for OSS seemed to me to be superior to conditions in the field for other branches of the Army. Sometimes, due to small units functioning separately from any other detachment, it was difficult to obtain supplies and rations through channels. On the whole morale among men and officers was exceptionally high, and for this reason it was possible to get much more work done with very few men.

George J. Kabat

George J. Kabat
1st Lt., CE

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War Department

Special Branch, M.I.D.

6 May 1944

The "Boston Series"

1. The term "Boston Series" is used to designate what purport to be German Foreign Office messages from diplomats and attachés abroad. They are obtained, not through Special Branch sources, but through secret intelligence channels by the Office of Strategic Services in Berne. They are sent in paraphrased form by radio to London and by cable to Washington, and are reconstructed here from the paraphrases.

2. Because of the possibility that material received in this manner might include "plants," and because such material might be, in certain circumstances, of value for cryptanalytic purposes, the OSS furnishes copies of such messages to the Special Branch for evaluation and for such dissemination as may appear desirable. The responsibility for dissemination has been left with Special Branch because some of the messages were transmitted in cryptographic systems that are currently readable, and therefore dissemination

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involves the danger of compromising the security of valuable sources.

3. Over 200 of these messages have been received and examined. In instances where the same message has been obtained from other sources, as occasionally they have been, the authenticity has been confirmed. In other instances the messages can be rated from external evidence as probably authentic. Where authenticity cannot be checked, the messages (with a few possible exceptions) "sound like" what their originators might send home.

4. The following considerations have affected the value of these messages from the intelligence standpoint:

a. Because of the time lag between date of origin and date of receipt here, information that might have been of interest had either been obtained from other sources or had become stale.

b. As is usual with diplomatic communications, a good deal of the material is second-hand

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information upon subjects on which first-hand information is available, or it relays expressions of opinion made for diplomatic purposes or made by persons whose opinions on the particular subjects are of no great consequence.

Therefore the Special Branch has not heretofore disseminated any of the Boston Series and has not been requested by OSS to disseminate any of them.

5. A single message, purporting to state what Kesselring intends to do to Rome when he evacuates it, has been under study for some time. It has been puzzling Special Branch, and it has puzzled the British. Kesselring is said to have issued orders for the destruction of all electric plants in the Rome area except those supplying Vatican City, all industrial and railroad "plants" outside "the city", all bridges over the Tiber River and the gas and water ducts attached to five of those bridges. Because the Germans might have wished to convey such information to the Allies, and because the information conflicts to some extent with such other information as is available on the subject, Special Branch is not prepared to say

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that the message is authentic. The British have not yet expressed an opinion on the point.

6. In view of the limited number of sources of information from the Far East, in contrast to the many sources of European information, it was suggested by Special Branch that the OSS attempt to have its representatives in Berne obtain communications addressed to the German Foreign Office from its personnel in Japan and other Asiatic countries. A number of such messages have now been received, of which 3 purport to come from Attachés in Tokyo--2 from General Kretschmer, the Military Attaché, and 1 from General Gronau, the Air Attaché. Gronau's report, and 1 of the 2 from Kretschmer, purport to summarize information and impressions gathered by the two men during an inspection trip which they made through the southern areas during late January and the first part of February. Both of those reports are considered to fall in the "probably authentic" class, for the following reasons:

a. The reports are both dated 3 March. It is known that Kretschmer left Tokyo on 28 January for a tour of the southern areas, proceeding via Singapore, Bangkok and Rangoon to Mandalay, visiting

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the Arakan front, and returning via North Borneo, Makassar and Davao to Tokyo, where he arrived on 26 February. Gronau left Tokyo on a similar trip on 20 January and followed much the same itinerary; how long his trip lasted is not clear, but there is some reason to believe that he returned to Tokyo on 29 February. Under the circumstances, it is quite possible that both men sent in reports covering their trips on the 3rd of March.

b. The information given and the opinions expressed in the reports are in general of a nature which one would expect to find in such documents.

c. A good deal of the information given in the reports is quite accurate, and some of it must have come from a person who was familiar with the situation in the southern areas. For example, Gronau stated that the 9th Air "Corps" was being formed at Palembang. Actually the 9th Air Division was being formed at Palembang at the time (the word "Corps" could have crept in by mistake in one of the several revisions of the report); and that information was certainly

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not a matter of general knowledge, even in the Far East.

d. Some of the information reported was inaccurate, and some of the opinions expressed were wrong. However, such errors as have been found are not too hard to explain. For example: (1) Gronau stated that the Japanese had been operating against the "7th Army." No Allied 7th Army has been operating in the CBI theater. However, the Japanese are known to have picked up at least one report from a dubious source that the U.S. 7th Army had been moved to India last fall. (2) Gronau stated that a "second airfield" was being built at Davao. It is believed that there were already at least 3 landing fields in Davao and 3 more in adjoining areas at the time of Gronau's visit. However, the Japanese may have limited Gronau's opportunities for observation. (3) Kretschmer's report contains a number of references to divisions located in particular sectors of the Burma-Malaya-Sumatra area. Adding up all those references, a total of 13 divisions is arrived at. The report

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fails to identify the divisions, and the evidence is pretty clear that there were only 11 divisions in the area in question at the time of Kretschmer's trip, including such divisions as were in transit. Possibly Kretschmer was misinformed by the Japanese, or he may inadvertently have placed some divisions in 2 separate areas. (4) Kretschmer stated that supplies "needed from overseas" are ordinarily shipped to Rangoon, although, when the harbor at Rangoon is mined, alternative use is made of Saigon and Bangkok. Actually, it is clear that Japanese ships seldom put in at Rangoon, and that the great majority of both freight and personnel are transported by land routes from Bangkok and Saigon to Burma. Again the Japanese may have given Kretschmer some misinformation.

7. The other report from Kretschmer is dated 20 March and purports to summarize information received by Kretschmer in a lengthy talk with General Arisue,* head of Department No. 2 of the Japanese General Staff.

*The name is sometimes rendered: "Arimatsu."

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That report is also considered to be "probably authentic," because:

a. It is known that a short time before 28 March Kretschmer had a talk with General Arisue, during which Arisue discussed Japan's military position, and that Kretschmer sent in a lengthy report on the conversation to his Government.

b. The information and opinions attributed to Arisue are in general of a nature which would be expected from such a source.

c. Much of the information given, although not very specific, is accurate. Some of the statements made are believed to be inaccurate, but they can be explained on the ground that General Arisue was not completely informed as to details of operations in the field, or that he was deliberately coloring the facts either to stress the success of Japanese arms or to set up an alibi for possible future reverses. For example: (1) Arisue is supposed to have stated that the Japanese had succeeded in eliminating U.S. air strength based on Bougainville by

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capturing 2 airfields and bringing a 3rd under artillery fire. Actually none of the 3 Allied airfields mentioned was captured by the Japanese, although 2 were so seriously threatened for a while that they could not be used. (2) Arisue is said to have stated that there were 40,000 Japanese troops on New Ireland and New Britain, whereas it is believed that the number should have been about 60,000.

8. Taken together, the 3 reports from Kretschmer and Gronau are considered to be of appreciable value for intelligence purposes. They contain a certain amount of new information which, if true, is useful--notably the identification of a number of divisional commanders in Burma. In addition, they provide some evidence to confirm reports from other sources, and they are of interest for what they show about the things that the Germans were permitted to see and know, and the impressions that they formed.

9. Paraphrases of the 3 reports are annexed hereto as TABS A, B and C.

10. If further reports of the "Boston Series" prove to be of interest, they will be disseminated along with other material of the Special Branch, with the source clearly designated.

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3 MARCH REPORT FROM MAJOR GENERAL
KRETECHMER, GERMAN MILITARY ATTACHE IN
TOKYO, COVERING TRIP THROUGH THE SOUTHERN
AREAS DURING THE PERIOD 28 JANUARY--26 FEBRUARY

Japanese Army in Burma

1. Headquarters [evidently of the 15th Army] Maymyo,
70 kilometers east of Mandalay.

Lt. Gen. Mutagushi is in command of 5 divisions.* One of those divisions is commanded by Lt. Gen. Sato. Its sector extends from Lashio to a point east of Myitkyina; it opposes 15 Chungking divisions, which are unable to attack. Another division is commanded by Lt. Gen. Yanagita. It is located north and northwest of Myitkyina, opposite 3 relatively good Chungking divisions, with U.S. officers, which are located east of Dibrugarh. The other 3 divisions are in the Kandula [unlocated]--Imphal-Kohima region opposite 3 divisions of the 4th British Army.

2. Headquarters [evidently of the 28th Army] at
Prome.

Lt. Gen. Mantaro is operating southeast of Akyab with 2 divisions.** Lt. Gen. Hanaya commanded

*Presumably the 15th, 18th, 31st, 33rd and 56th.

**Presumably the 54th and 55th.

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one of those divisions in the counterattack against elements of the 14th British Army which, in February, had succeeded in breaking through near Maungdaw. Elements of the other division, under Lt. Gen. Katamura, participated in the counterattack, while other elements of that division were held at Akyab in reserve.

3. Reserve division.

There is 1 reserve division located north of Rangoon, charged with coastal protection from north of Sandoway to Rangoon. Aside from occasional shelling from naval vessels, it has had no contact with the enemy.

4. Coast Guard Brigade.

At Moulmein and to the south there is one Coast Guard Brigade.* It has had no contact with the enemy.

5. Reserve division coming up.

One reserve division is gradually coming into the area northeast of Rangoon.

6. Indian and Burmese troops.

One regiment of National Indian troops is in combat north of Akyab, and another is stationed on the

*The term "Coast Guard" appears to be a misnomer. The unit referred to is probably the 24th IMB.

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Maymyo west front. There are certain Burmese units in the area; they are weak and are used for antiaircraft installations and for duty behind the front lines.

Japanese Supply Lines

In all sectors great emphasis is placed on the decisive importance of supply lines.

The Japanese depend exclusively on manpower furnished locally for all labor, river, road and sea craft personnel, as well as for all supplies of building materials, gasoline and food. The people and the local government are giving their assistance willingly.

Usually any supplies needed from overseas are transported by ship to Rangoon and, when the latter is mined, alternative use is made of Saigon or Bangkok. The railroad is used primarily to transport personnel.

The principal supply line is from Rangoon to Mandalay via the Irrawaddy River (and also via the railroad, although to a limited extent), and from there to Maymyo. From Mandalay or Maymyo supplies are carried (a) northeast to Lasguy [Lashio?] by rail, (b) north to Myitkyina by river and truck, and (c)

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westward in the direction of Mandalay and Myitkyina over poor roads, generally by 2-wheeled ox-drawn vehicles.*

The Prome supply line is mainly via the Irrawaddy. From Prome to southeast of Akyab there are fairly good winding automobile roads. In addition, there are coastal vessels between Rangoon and Akyab.

Train and highway traffic, as well as coastal and river navigation, can only be carried on after dark and this makes the problem of supply more difficult. Ferries and bridges are in bad shape. On mountain roads and at the approaches to ferries an efficient system of blocks is in use.

Commanding generals for supply in Prome, Rangoon and Mandalay are all major generals. In villages and towns along the supply line there are all varieties of repair shops, hospitals etc.

Condition of Japanese Troops

Unbelievable absence of complaints about wants gives the impression of rigid discipline and good

*The meaning of (c) is not clear. The thought may be that supplies are carried west from Mandalay and Myitkyina by road, or that, instead of starting at Rangoon, supplies are sometimes carried westward across the Shan States to Mandalay and Myitkyina.

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officer and enlisted men relationships in all places. Only behind the region of the front is there a certain amount of resentment over the lack of field kitchens, the fact that combat troops are carrying an excessive load, and the fact that the older officers are provided with good quarters while the men still receive only primitive care.

The commanding general at Maymyo gave an interesting lecture about the training of troops in which he pointed out that it is more important to give troops moral training than to train them as fighters. The idea that the individual is of no concern while the family and the immortal Japanese race are all that matter is driven home to the Japanese soldier.

Bose's Indian Troops

The Japanese turned down, with good justification, Bose's demand that he be given his own sector on the Burma front.

It is said that there are 40,000 troops belonging to the Indian National Army still located in Malaya-Singapore. The Japanese adviser, Lt. Gen. Isoda, is really in command of these troops, to all intents and purposes. The chief officer is Colonel Yamamoto. Most of the training is in guerilla warfare.

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Maymyo and Prome each have one regiment of troops from different Indian divisions. During the middle of February a third regiment put in an appearance. It is scheduled for Maymyo.

The Indian troops appear to be well disciplined soldiers. Though the officers represent a variety of nationalities, and are of diverse rank and age, they present a good appearance. Bose greatly regrets that Sikhs and Gurkhas make up such a small proportion of the troops.

The Burmese and Japanese do not think Bose's propaganda will prove very helpful.

Help from the Burmese

Small industries and agriculture are still producing at top capacity, although the demolition of Burmese villages and towns by the English in their withdrawal and by air attacks since that time has been complete to a degree that was not anticipated.

The population and the government of Burma are willingly giving their assistance; scouts, guides and laborers are provided, as well as vehicles, timber and food. The chief of the government, Ba Maw, is making complaints about his inability to comprehend

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the Japanese mentality, and he desires to set up diplomatic relations with Germany immediately after the war.

The volunteer troops of the Burmese are intelligent but not hardy, and they are not a force to be reckoned with. They are commanded by Japanese officers, and commands are given in Japanese. Officer candidates receive their training in Japan, but there is a Cadet Academy at Rangoon, which gives three courses for non-commissioned officers.

Enemy Forces Ranged against Burma

East of the Salween there are 15 Chungking divisions, building roads far in excess of their requirements. They are not in shape to take the offensive.

The three Chinese divisions, mentioned above, which have American officers from the grade of Captain up, are also hardly in shape to take the offensive. Their supply lines are tenuous and transport aircraft have to be used steadily.

The Japanese do not molest the plane traffic between Chungking and India, which transports 10,000 tons of cargo per month. Seven-tenths of the cargo

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is for the use of the American Air Force in China. American planes stationed in South China seldom attack Burma.

Building of roads is proceeding actively, particularly work on a highway to Dibrugarh; it is planned to lay railway tracks alongside that road subsequently. An American brigade is said to be guarding mines, airfields and so forth.

The Japanese consider that 15 divisions of British troops on the entire Burmese front are ready for action. The Fifteenth Army with 3 divisions and the Fourth Army with 5 divisions are next to each other to the south of Dibrugarh, and are in fighting shape now that they have dismissed untrustworthy Indian troops and replaced them with Gurkhas.

The British Fourth Army is being held in reserve. They have better supply lines than the Fourteenth Army [sic], part of them being railroads, but along the southern sector the great number of bridges and viaducts make them vulnerable; also the highway to Imphal from Manan [Manipur?] by way of Kohima runs parallel with the front.

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In January two divisions of the British Fourteenth Army took the offensive, but the Japanese halted them south of Paletwa, west of Buthidaung and east of Maungdaw. However, the British threw back the Japanese February counterattacks against the 5th and 7th divisions north and west of Buthidaung.

English naval guns often bombard the region south of Sandoway, and also direct fire against Cheduba Island and Ramree Island. The Japanese believe that the possibility of an English invasion of the Nicobar and Andaman Islands, and of the mainland from west of Rangoon to south of Akyab, does not present great danger, because of insufficient shipping.

There was a slackening of enemy air activity against targets in the Akyab hinterland region in February. Enemy air strength stationed in India is estimated at a minimum of 450 American, and 350 British, first-line aircraft. Their targets include barracks, roads, munition dumps and supplies; recently airfields near the front lines have also been attacked.

The Japanese Offensive North of Akyab

On February 3 the division under Hanaya, with one regiment of Indian troops as reinforcement, attacked

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Buthidaung from either side athwart Kala Pass [the Kalapansin River?] in the Mayu area, proceeding to the north, with their forces massed on the east flank; the west flank was subsequently strengthened with units of the division under Katamura. The British lines on both of the river banks gave way, and the eastern column, moving ahead rapidly for 15 kilometers, swung west and southwest and crossed the river near Markttoung [Maunggyintaung?]. The advance patrols reached the strategic junction of Gwasintenkun [unidentified] northeast of Maungdaw, on February 15. A special detachment from Toung [Taung Bazar?] cut the road to Ngangyaung west of the hills on February 9, and demolished the bridges. The chief use the Japanese made of their air power was to bomb the enemy's lines of supply in the Gulf of Bengal and over the mountain roads. The Japanese asserted that they had annihilated or encircled 100 tanks and 5 battalions, and that they had isolated the central wing of the English 5th and 7th divisions. The British showed no especial reaction until February 20.

It is believed that this Japanese offensive was much overstated in the newspapers, probably in

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order to compensate for the enemy's triumphs in the Marshall Islands and on New Guinea. It was a wholly local counterattack on the part of the Japanese who did not have enough force and were soon halted. That permission was not given to inspect the division commanded by Hanaya can be attributed to the fact that this exaggerated propaganda was being spread. It is not likely that the English will counterattack in the near future in spite of the fact that the Japanese attack did not greatly harm them.

Japanese Defenses Along the Coast

A number of coastal areas and islands (including Ramree), and the region south of Akyab and south of Sandoway, were inspected. Defending that territory presents a problem, since the land is severed by inlets of the Gulf of Bengal, and since roads are lacking. The sea now provides the best means of lateral communication. Some highways and column paths are being built, Bataillon Section [sic], 25 kilometers wide; and for that reason the ~~Japanese~~ are organizing defenses only at those spots which might invite invasion. They have small detachments nearby, observations posts that are not well

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Prome area, although British scout planes were frequently seen, particularly in the latter region.

Quite obviously, Japanese antiaircraft is insufficient. The only fire is 2 cm and machine-gun fire.

The Japanese are emphasizing passive defense. Troops are not permitted to sleep in peace at night because every time a plane comes near, even if it is Japanese, the alarm must be sounded. Trenches have been provided, even for autos and horses, as protection against bombing. Ferries are used instead of large river bridges, which have not been rebuilt. There is no traffic on the railroad, on rivers, along the coast, or on roads, even in the vicinity of Rangoon, except at night. Some supply roads, which are travelled during the daytime, have been camouflaged for kilometers.

Likely Developments in Burma

Although the U.S. and British forces have greater strength in the air and although they undoubtedly might be able to set up bridgeheads, a British invasion of Burma in strength is out of the question for the time being. The reasons for this are as follows: the Indian units in the British army are susceptible to

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Bose's propaganda; the monsoon period is approaching; coordination between British, American and Chungking Chinese units is difficult; the Japanese troops are numerous and capable, and they are able to live on the country and operate on interior lines; thanks to the whole hearted cooperation of the Burmese and because of the rivers, the Japanese have adequate internal lines of communication; and, finally, the mountains on the frontier are virtually impassable.

November is probably the earliest date for a serious British attack on Burma. Nevertheless, the enemy is building roads on a wide scale and as quickly as possible, in the expectation of making a concentric attack to reopen the Burma Road. This is an essential objective if Chungking is to be revived and used as a base for air raids on Japan.

It is still possible for the Japanese to carry out purely local attacks with some hope of success. The supply line of the British 4th Army's south wing is extremely vulnerable, and the Japanese will make a strong, though also purely local, attack there in March. This they will do even if the enemy has by then invaded the Andaman-Nikobar group or the west coast of Burma.

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In every other respect, the fighting in Burma resembles nothing so much as colonial warfare.

Further Impressions

In the area between the Marshall Islands and New Guinea, the situation is regarded as being extremely grave. It is now out of the question for supplies to be sent to New Ireland, New Britain, etc. At the start they were stocked up for half a year, but bombs have destroyed part of the supplies. The Japanese air force in the area is being worn down, and reinforcements are not making any appreciable difference. The Japanese are also suffering heavy losses in freighters and transports there. It is no longer possible to defend New Britain, or perhaps even Truk, but the Japanese would gain time by hanging on. They are rushing through measures for defense against air attack, in the expectation that the Philippines, Celebes, and even Formosa will become a part of the immediate battleground very soon. There were at least 8 bombers and 50 Navy fighters on the airfield at Davao, supposed to be going to the southeastern front.

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Ship construction cannot keep up with serious losses. There is much anxiety on the part of the Japs about the growing interruption of communications between Japan and the southern areas producing raw materials, and also about the vulnerability of places of trans-shipment to mines and aircraft. A great many wooden ships are being built for trade within the southern area. Seventy of them were in Kuehing [Kuching, Borneo]7, a few of them 500 tons but most between 120 and 150 tons.

Because of the scarcity of bottoms, supplies of food and commodities are being distributed unequally in various parts of the southern regions. For instance, in the Philippines, particularly in Luzon, there is a serious shortage of food, while Celebes has a surplus.

Reports indicate that there are partisans and sabotage in the Philippines. However, in general the indigenous populations are collaborating.

A conference between the Chief of the Admiralty Staff and the General caused a rumor that Japan would be subjected to martial law.

Though it is said that the Army and Navy are cooperating more closely, there is a lack of trust between them.

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At present reported on the Andaman-Nikobar Islands are 8 reinforced battalions from Lt. Gen. Saito's Malay-Sumatra army, which itself possesses a strength of 4 field divisions, as well as more troops now in training.

It appears that Col. Gen. Anami has been in command of a new Mindanao army, with headquarters at Davao, since the middle of last December.

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3 MARCH REPORT FROM GENERAL GRONAU, GERMAN
AIR ATTACHE IN TOKYO, COVERING HIS TRIP THROUGH
THE SOUTHERN AREAS

Burma

1. Enemy Air Activity. At the end of 1943, the harbor and railroad yards at Rangoon were the focal points for enemy attacks. The center of the town has been evacuated and most of the traffic detoured, while there has been a notable increase in defensive fighter strength. Accordingly, the enemy is now giving most of his attention to Bangkok, where the air defense is far from sufficient. The raids are ordinarily carried out by 2 squadrons of B-24's from either Kunming or India.

At the start of this year, the enemy also began to concentrate on oil fields and refineries in Burma, interrupting production to a serious degree. In India, communication lines are the principal objective.

It is understood that, after the inspection party left the area, the enemy made a great many raids with incendiary bombs, causing fires in the dry vegetation and the camouflage. A successful raid was made on Mingaladon air field [at Rangoon], where five Japanese aircraft on the ground were destroyed by fire.

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2. Japanese Air Activity. The Army Air Force, being outnumbered two to one, has been put on the defensive and is conserving its strength, but it is fully used to support activities of the Army ground forces. All operations are carried out during the dark hours, and a good system of passive defense has been worked out. Only large enemy formations bring out the fighters, and at such times every available aircraft takes off. The planes are stationed far from the take-off. For instance, near Rangoon, at the Bandy Airfield, the planes are 5 kilometers from the runway. Generally speaking, only one flight per day can be made, because mobility is impeded by the measures already mentioned as well as by insufficient ground organization and communications.

The enemy has moved his air transport lanes to Chungking farther north outside the range of Japanese observation and has taken to night flying, thus making it far more difficult for the Japanese to interfere with that traffic. The day flights invariably are provided with heavy fighter cover. Transport planes carry an estimated 10,000 tons per month.

The development of night fighters has not

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progressed beyond the very early stages, and only the most experienced pilots tackle enemy bombers picked up by the searchlights.

While operating against the 7th Army, the 5th Air Corps [presumably the 5th Air Division] played the identical role that the Germans played on the Russian front during encirclements and mass attacks. The Japanese lost 22 aircraft; the greater part of the crews were reported saved. The enemy lost 50 planes.

The Japanese figures cannot be proved, but those claimed by the fliers are in all probability justified, since the range finders used by antiaircraft batteries are far from modern [sic].

At Rangoon the Army Command has direct control over ground defenses, and supply is under a special command. Communication and air reconnaissance appear to be good.

Sumatra

At Palembang, the 9th Air Corps [presumably the 9th Air Division] is being formed to protect the oil fields. Recently there was one squadron there with one group of Kawasaki destroyers [probably "Nicks"]. At Gerumban [Gloembang ?], 30 kilometers

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south of Palembang, there were 2 groups of pursuit planes. At Medan and Padang there are Army parachute troops and a group of fighters. At Bandoeng, the 9th Air Corps has antiaircraft formations, an AOR* reporting service, and Iavo* training squadron.

The whole area from Akyab to Soerabaja is covered by the Naval Air Forces CIUT* service, with a coverage of 263 kilometers. Occasionally scout flights are made to the east coast of India, including Ceylon. For the first time enemy flying boats were seen on the Kokos Islands.

Naval commands have now been shifted to Soerabaja because the time for monsoons is drawing near. The 13th Naval Air Fleet has strung combat and fighter formations all along the coast for defense. Likewise, naval aircraft are used to combat submarines in the Sunda Straits and the Straits of Malacca.

Manila

Present Army air fields are being extensively expanded and 4 new fields are being built, particularly for fighter defense. A large airplane office has been set up. There is a complex system of command. Air field construction is under the AOK Kommandantur. The

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airplane office is under the Army Air Office. The air field command is under AOK, and the Air Transport Group is under the New Guinea Air Fleet.

Takao /presumably Formosa/

A new Naval airplane office is functioning at Takao, with a staff of 12,000.

Miscellaneous

In Davao, a second air field is being built [sic], and a great deal of air transport activity has been observed there on the part of the Army and Navy, including the dispatch of one sentai mixed naval squadron [sic] with new planes to Rabaul. At Palembang, [oil] production is on a par with the peacetime level.

Summary

The southeast Pacific front is the principal focus of activity just now. In Burma, the Japanese position is not now threatened despite the superior numbers of the enemy. The Army Air troops have a clumsy ground organization which is below standard. The transfer of formations from one theater to another involves a great deal of lost time because ground crews must be shifted too. However, such changes are avoided as much as

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possible. Not enough advantage is taken of the central defense situation. Army-Navy coordination seems to be a lot better, but still not sufficiently so for the deployment to become more economical and concentrated. There is inadequate fighter defense for Indo-China and Thailand, because of the scarcity of material.

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20 MARCH REPORT FROM GENERAL KRETSCHMER,
SUMMARIZING INFORMATION AND IMPRESSIONS
RECEIVED DURING A CONVERSATION WITH
GENERAL ARISUE, HEAD OF DEPARTMENT NO. 2
OF THE JAPANESE GENERAL STAFF

The Far East: The principal long range objective of the United States and Britain is to cut Japan off from the plentiful raw materials in the south. They aim to accomplish this by a concentric attack on Luzon from the east, and, following the reopening of the Burma Road, on Thailand, Indo-China and South China from the west. Japan is still in a completely defensive position. Sizeable increases in Japanese armaments, particularly in sea transportation and in her air force, are in the process of being developed. In the autumn, definite results will be evident.

The Pacific Area

A. Central Pacific. Japan's defense suffered a severe setback in the loss of the Marshall Islands. The loss of the islands was due to the fact that many of the islands were difficult to defend, and they did not possess sufficient garrisons. The defense was badly coordinated; a further reason was Japanese inferiority in the air, especially the shortage of torpedo planes. In spite of newspaper accounts to the contrary, there have been no landings to date on Nauru or the Eastern

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Carolines, particularly Truk. The present opinion of the General Staff is that Marcus is in imminent danger of attack, after which Wake Island is menaced. Numerous troops are active at present in the defense of the Marianna Islands, which are close to Japan. In addition, natural conditions are more advantageous, thus rendering the Mariannas easier to defend.

A minimum of 35 American submarines are continuously active between the southern regions of the Pacific and Japan. Since the Japanese defense is not adequate, the loss of tonnage is grave, and complicates the jobs of troops as well as command.

B. East New Guinea. Following severe losses, a Japanese division which was cut off between Astrolabe Bay and Finschhafen was able to fight its way back to Madang. There it was received by weak forces. At this time, the enemy is not exercising any pressure along the coast. However, it is likely that they will undertake new landings in the rear, possibly to the west of a Japanese division.

At least for the time being, the Japanese have succeeded in eliminating the enemy air force which is based on Bougainville. The purpose of this is to relieve the forces defending New Britain. The Japanese

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achieved their success by capturing two airfields and bringing a third under the fire of their artillery. However, the enemy was able to get reinforcements through to Bougainville following this development and it is likely that they will try to make new landings on the northeast coast. Consequently, the Japanese situation as far as Bougainville is concerned is still in a critical stage.

Following an enemy landing on Cape Hollman, the Japanese gave up the western third of New Britain. There are 40,000 Japanese troops on New Ireland and New Britain at this time. They possess plenty of supplies for a long period and hence it is likely that they will be able to prevent enemy landings for several months, even though the enemy has an overwhelming superiority in the air. Due to obstacles imposed by the terrain and Japanese blocking measures, an enemy attack by land is out of the question. Supplying New Britain, etc., is scarcely possible, because the enemy captured several of the Admiralty Islands and the particularly valuable Los Negros Airfield. The Japanese Command plans to hold Tiawomu [sic], the principal Admiralty objective, in view of the possible relief of their forces on New Britain.

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C. The Dutch Indies. At this time, no enemy preparations can be discerned for an invasion of the West New Guinea front, Timor or Java. The Japanese defense forces in these areas are sufficient.

Burma and Chungking China

A. Burma. In the middle of March, the Japanese began an attack on the 4th British Army's south wing, along the western border of Burma. The Japanese made a surprise crossing of the Manipur River on March 17, to the north of Fort White, crossed the Indian frontier for the first time with Indian and Japanese troops, and put the British 17th Division in a difficult situation. All this gave Subhas Chandra Bose a very fine basis for propaganda. However, this attack, just as the attack in February north of Akyab, is only important locally. The British cannot engage in any large scale counter-operations or make their long prepared attempt to open up the Burma Road until after the monsoon in November, and then they are destined to be unsuccessful.

B. Chungking China. It is not believed that there will be any intensification of activity by either the enemy or the Japanese. The American Air Force in

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China is not strong enough or well enough supplied at this time to attempt any important air attacks outside of China.

The Soviet Far East

It is the firm opinion of the Japanese General Staff that they need not expect at this time a Soviet attack or more intimate U.S.A.-Soviet cooperation. Soviet Forces in the East have not been changed. Even the normal removal of cadres has not been apparent after November. Japanese land forces in Manchukuo have not been diminished; however, young troops have been used to replace elite garrisons and a number of Army air units have been withdrawn.

U.S. Methods

Strong air support is employed in landings, together with rocket and artillery fire from landing boats or warships. (To date, the Japanese have not seized any rockets or rocket throwers.) Fog protection is frequently used for landing vessels and for beachheads also, particularly beachheads of parachute troops. Airplanes drop fog cans to indicate targets for naval artillery. As a consequence of the very fine training of pioneers and the abundance of technical equipment,

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American landings are amazingly smooth and fast. The soldiers who land possess formidable fighting power and are equipped with a large number of mine and flame throwers and with light tanks. Whenever it is required, they are speedily supplied by planes.

The accomplishments of U.S. units in construction, terrain coverage and combat are surprising. Their fire is concentrated and they frequently find their way into the flank of the Japanese forces opposing them. The concentrated fire of American mine-throwers is extremely alarming. The other side of the picture is that English and American troops are greatly disturbed by surprise raids and night attacks. The principal conclusions to be drawn from American landings made recently are: (1) the torpedo plane is a highly valuable weapon against warships and transport vessels, and (2) it is necessary to make the greatest effort to throw back the initial landing operations. As soon as the beachhead is established in depth, it becomes extremely difficult to make counter-attacks.

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Field Report,
Vol XIII

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SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**TO : **The Director**DATE: **31 August 1945**FROM : **Secretariat - Reports Office**SUBJECT: **Returnee Report: Lt. Henry J. Anderson, USNR**
R&D/ETO

Lt. Anderson's report describes his activities in detail which consisted largely of liquidating R&D in London. No suggestions or criticisms are made and the Branch Chief feels that no comments are necessary.

Thomas Victor
Cpl. Thomas Victor
Reports Office

CONFIDENTIAL**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

28 August 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO: General William J. Donovan
Director, OSS

THROUGH: Lt. Col. John M. Jeffries
Chief
Research and Development Branch
and
Secretariat

FROM: Lieut. Henry J. Anderson
Research and Development Branch

SUBJECT: Report on Assignment in ETO

With reference to General Order No. 63, I am submitting the following report on my activities while assigned to the Research and Development Branch in London.

On 8 April 1945 I reported to OSS Headquarters in London and immediately began my duties with the Research and Development Branch.

Some time prior to my departure the Documentation Unit of R&D stationed in London, including Lt. Col. W. G. Reddick who was serving as Chief of R&D in London, had been transferred to Services. It was intended, upon my arrival in London, that I take over the responsibility for the remaining activities of the R&D Branch which included special weapons work and the outfitting of agents with clothing and special equipment.

Upon my arrival I found that R&D had been instructed to begin liquidation proceedings and after consultation with Colonel Forgan, Captain Armour, Lt. Col. Bruce and Lt. Col. Reddick, it was decided that the best interests of OSS would be served by not disturbing the setup which then existed in the R&D Branch. As a result, Lt. Col. Reddick remained as Chief of the Branch during the liquidation period and I replaced Captain W. G. Crocker who returned to Washington after introducing me to the various people with whom I was to deal and generally acquainting me with my duties.

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General William J. Donovan

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28 August 1945

My duties in London consisted of the following:

1. Liaison with S/E Headquarters.
2. Liaison with SOE Station IX to obtain information on their research and development projects and report this to Washington. Also to advise Station IX on the progress of OSS R&D projects.
3. Assist other Branches of OSS in various technical matters and provide information and instruction on R&D special weapons and equipment.
4. Liaison with groups in the British War Office and Admiralty to obtain information on their various projects.
5. Provide such assistance as would be required by the OSS group dealing with countermeasures.
6. Obtain information on the use of R&D special weapons and equipment in the field.

One month after my arrival in ETO Germany capitulated and as a result requirements for R&D weapons and equipment ceased to exist. Liaison with the various British groups, however, continued as there were quite a few projects under way which had bearing on activities in the Far East and other projects were in their final stages of completion. The progress of these projects was reported to Washington and the British in turn were informed on the status of various developments being carried on in Washington. Several days each week were spent at Station IX working with the Trials Committee and other groups.

The countermeasures work which was under the direction of X-2 had an exhibit of R&D special weapons and examples of various German and British types set up in Paris. Prior to my arrival in ETO R&D had assisted in setting up this exhibit, but after VE Day no further assistance was required on the part of R&D as there was very little sabotage on the part of the Germans.

The use of R&D special weapons and equipment in ETO was investigated thoroughly. I searched all records and interviewed personnel of various Branches to obtain information of this type. It was learned that fresh information on sabotage activities could be obtained by interviewing members of the Underground in Denmark and Norway, and I was instructed to go to those countries and obtain facts on the use of the weapons and sabotage techniques. I left London on 14 June 1945 and was in Denmark until 28 June. I proceeded from Copenhagen to Oslo on 28 June and remained there until 4 July 1945 on which date I returned to London. My findings on this mission are recorded in my report to Lt. Col. John M. Jeffries, dated 10 July 1945, subject, Use of R&D Special Items in ETO.

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CONFIDENTIAL

General William J. Donovan

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28 August 1945

Upon my return from Denmark and Norway I received instructions to liquidate the remaining R&D activities in ETO and did so. I left London on 3 August and reported to Washington on 14 August 1945.

In summary, it can be said that the Special Weapons Division of R&D provided helpful assistance to other Branches of OSS on technical matters and in the potentialities of R&D weapons and equipment. In addition, useful information was provided on the use of demolitions and other weapons not of OSS origin or issue. It was found that R&D special weapons had not been used to the extent they might have if they had gotten over to the theater in quantity at an earlier date. If it had been possible to get them into ETO sooner, in my opinion, it would have been essential to provide adequate instruction in their use and to send R&D representatives into the field with operational people to further instruct in their use and proceed to assist in carrying out operations. By having such R&D representatives in the field, it would also have been possible to a greater degree to transmit the requirements and needs of operational personnel for any weapons and equipment to the Washington Headquarters.

Henry J. Anderson
Henry J. Anderson
LIEUT, USNR

CONFIDENTIAL

Date 25 AugustGeneral Donovan

1. The directive which Mr. Sheperdson mentions can be issued only by the War Department or Theater authorities. Colonel Nelson, to whom the matter has been referred, informed the Secretariat that appropriate memorandum to the War Department had been sent out in the latter part of May, but that no reply had been received as yet. He will look into the matter further.

2. Should you desire to raise the question of such recognition in the Theater, the Secretariat has drafted for your approval and signature the attached cable requesting Col. Nelson to look into the matter.

Alfred D. Hughes
 ALFRED D. HUGHES
 Captain, AUS
 Office of the Secretariat

our 454 cable sent

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director
 FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office
 SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Capt. Charles B. Grimm
 SI/MedTO

DATE: 20 August 1945

1. Like many previous reports, Capt. Grimm's report states that personnel at the base were shifted too rapidly, and that field men did not receive the proper recognition or awards due them. Mr. Shepardson suggests that a directive be issued authorizing such personnel to wear battle stars, ribbons, etc.

2. Without detailed discussion Mr. Shepardson approves Capt. Grimm's criticisms regarding immature desk hands (p.4), inadequate handling of money (p.5), lack of care in screening officers and interpreters who are to represent U.S. interests in their native countries (p.6), and lack of knowledge of what American equipment is being used in the area (p.6).

Thomas Victor
 Pvt. Thomas Victor
 Reports Office

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General

DMOS

Yes, it would be possible to
get Hudson's + Olson's reports
into one collection. But
since there are several hundreds
of reports, SI will not start
assemblage until certain that
you definitely desire same.

OSG Form 301a
(1966)

Director's Office

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

17,399
Field Report
XSI X Hudson, Alf.
X Persian Gulf Command

22 August 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: Director, OSS
FROM: Chief, SI

The attached field report is that of one of the two officers assigned to the Persian Gulf Command for SI activities a year ago. Both officers have performed admirable jobs for OSS. One is continuing with the P.G.C. in his SI capacity while Major Hudson has reluctantly been withdrawn because of an urgent need for him in Cairo and the fact that his cover duties with the P.G.C. are being terminated with the liquidation of that Command.

I consider this a clear, concise report of a job well done. The ideas and observations are sound and clearly expressed.

W. H. Shepherdson
W. H. Shepherdson

*✓ Season.
Hudson is he possible to get
in my collection and the
report is made
submitted by them
2. H. H.*

SECRET

20 August 1945

FIELD REPORT1. ITINERARY

The undersigned officer departed Washington 9 August 1944, spent a week in consultations and briefings at the Cairo office and arrived in Teheran on 21 August. He was stationed in Teheran, attached to Headquarters, Persian Gulf Command, until 16 July 1945 when he was recalled to Washington for consultations preparatory to assignment in Cairo. During October 1944 a trip was made covering all principal PGC installations from Teheran to the Persian Gulf, including visits to Basra and Bahrain. In December 1944 a week was spent in Isfahan, and in May 1945 a journey of ten days duration was made to Meshed in the Russian zone of occupation. Various other shorter trips took place in the vicinity of Teheran.

2. MISSION

a. Background: Arrangements for having two OSS officers assigned to the Persian Gulf Command were completed in the spring of 1944 between General Donovan and General Connolly, CG, PGC, and their representatives. These officers were technically transferred completely out of OSS and came entirely under the jurisdiction of the Persian Gulf Command. Their relation to OSS was known only to the Commanding General, his Chief of Staff, and their respective chiefs in their cover jobs. Communications were maintained with Cairo entirely through Army channels. This arrangement, which was regarded as experimental at its inception, proved highly successful, due largely to the cooperative attitude of the PGC authorities; the OSS representatives on their part were always most careful to avoid embarrassing the PGC by their activities. It is suggested that consideration be given to the possibility of using similar procedures for SI personnel in other theaters.

b. Objectives: At the time the above arrangements were made it was believed that Teheran would offer favorable opportunities for reporting on conditions within the USSR itself. This belief proved a fallacy. Apart from interviewing returned travelers, which might be equally well done anywhere, there was little opportunity of reporting on internal Soviet affairs. Contacts, other than formal and official ones, were difficult to establish or maintain with Russian sources. It did prove possible to obtain Russian publications in Teheran and forward them to Washington much more rapidly than could be done from Moscow.

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Field Report - 2.

As the mission developed, its major objective became more and more the reporting of Soviet activities and intentions within Iran itself. This objective was, of course, closely related to problems of British interests and aims and to internal Iranian affairs.

3. FIELD ACTIVITIES

There was nothing exotic, esoteric or particularly romantic about procedure in the field. Information was obtained wherever and whenever it could be found. The principal types of sources, in approximate order of value, were as follows:

a. Persian Gulf Command official sources: Information pertinent to OSS interests reaching the Commanding General or Chief of Staff through military channels was frequently passed on to one or the other of the OSS representatives. Such information came chiefly from the CIC, the Public Relations Officer, or the Fiscal Division. Since G-2 had been abolished in the FOC, the OSS representatives functioned as G-2 in passing on intelligence to Washington.

b. American civilians: These sources, attached to one or another of the American missions to the Iranian government, proved very useful in their particular fields.

c. Iranian sources: These proved valuable in offering suggestions for further investigation, but were nearly always prejudiced or inaccurate.

d. British, Polish and other sources: The same remark applies as in "a" above.

e. Personal observation: In relation to specific events observed and to trips through the country, this is naturally of first importance.

4. PROGRESS AND ACHIEVEMENTS

It is the opinion of this officer that a reasonably good, routine intelligence job was done. There were no sensational achievements. It was possible to supplement and enlarge the flow of intelligence to Washington.

5. SUGGESTIONS AND DIFFICULTIES

No major suggestions. Various minor ones have been, or will be put, into effect through the Cairo office. No serious difficulties were encountered. This officer had a hell of a good time.

SECRET

Field Report - 3.

6. CONCLUDING REMARK

It is the personal opinion of this officer, without at this time going into the fairly obvious reasons, that Iran and Turkey are the most critical areas in the Middle East and that it is highly desirable to maintain there adequate and sound sources of intelligence.

Alfred E. Hudson
ALFRED E. HUDSON
Major, A.C.

SECRET

17,392
SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: 24 August 1945

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Mr. James A. Brammell
R&A/ETOFull Report
X Brammell
X R&A

This office checked with R&A as to the lack of a branch chief's covering memorandum for this brief returnee report. The Chief, R&A, considered comment unnecessary.

Thomas Victor
Pvt. Thomas Victor
Reports Office

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

17,391
SECRET

TO : The Director

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

DATE: 24 August 1945

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: 1st Lt. Everett M. Greaser
SI/YugoslaviaFixed Report
Greaser
x SI
x 4 upo.

1. Lt. Greaser brings up the familiar complaints of too little rank in the field, and of too frequent change of Desk Heads, two problems which, as Comdr. Katz states, have been considered many times. Lt. Greaser also mentions that most OSS radio equipment does not meet the operator's requirements. Comdr. Katz has taken this up with the Communications Branch.

2. Attached is a detailed operational report of the Deposit mission into Yugoslavia.

Thomas Vietor
Cpl. Thomas Vietor
Reports Office.

17,391
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PIB

SECRET

The Director

24 August 1945

Secretariat - Reports Office

Returnee Report: 1st Lt. Everett M. Greaser
SI/Yugoslavia

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2. Attached is a detailed operational report of the Greaser mission into Yugoslavia.

Cpl. Thomas Viator
Reports Office.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SECRET

17 August 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO : Director, OSS
FROM : Chief, SI
SUBJECT : Field Report of Lt. Everett M. Greaser

1. The field report submitted herewith is rather typical of those which have been previously turned in by men whose field experience was similar to that of Lt. Greaser. The only different comment, and it is not particularly new, is the criticism of the OSS radio equipment which, as will be noted, has already been considered with the Communications Branch.

2. The above comments are not intended to disparage the justice of Lt. Greaser's remarks. The comments he makes refer to basic problems which have been considered on a number of occasions. Efforts should be made to correct the faults in any operation which might take place in the future.

MK for
A. H. S.

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

200-420,400-500 19 02

Subject: Report on Field Conditions -- Deposits in Area

1970-1971

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NOTES ON THE HISTORY OF THE ...

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DATE 07-11-2001 BY 60322 UCBAW

to determine whether the defendant was a member of the group. The defendant was not a member of the group.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 05-15-2010 BY 60322 UCBAW

NOTES ON THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

SENSITIVE INFORMATION

• **SECRET** •

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

POWELL POWERS: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES

1990

ALVIN KARPIS WAS A CONSPIRACY DEFENDER

1971

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RECEIVED

- 2 -

1. Transmit battle order of enemy and Partisan forces.
2. Economics
3. Political
4. Air targets, dumps, gun positions, etc.

2. Specific Personal Difficulties:

A. Lack of Rank

When entering Yugoslavia, I was a Second Lieutenant, having under my command a Flight Commander representing the British. This, of course, reflected back inasmuch as to say "What kind of people are these Americans -- putting a Second Lieutenant in charge of a mission to Marshal Tito? Why they are the guys who hold the General's horse."

In Yugoslavia, the British never had less than a Captain, nor did the Russians have less than a Major. This definitely gave them the upper hand and more power. It is my belief that, even though it be "bravot", we should rank our men in the field at least equal to the other representatives of foreign countries.

B. Radio Equipment

Being my own operator for sometime, I found that most OSS radio equipment, though well engineered, does not come up to an operator's requirements. First, the exterior needs remodeling, changing key positions, dials, etc., for the operator's convenience, and not for the fellow who designed it. This difficulty has been discussed with Communications.

- 3 -

C. Frequent Change of Desk Heads

While in the field, I had no less than four different Desk Heads, each having his particular policy. It was found that you no sooner get to know your Chief and accustomed to his policy when he was changed and the operator started anew. Too few men under whom I served had field experience, making it quite difficult for them to fulfill their duties as Desk Heads. Why? Because they did not realize the conditions under which an operator may be working and his personal feelings and needs.

It is my personal belief, as well as the belief of many others who have worked in the field, that all men holding desk jobs, where they have men operating in the field, should have had at some time or other some field experience.

3. Report J/PB-804 Attached:

Attached for more detailed information regarding the Deposit Mission is my narrative report J/PB-804 which was completed in the field before my return to Washington.

Everett M. Greaser

Everett M. Greaser
1st Lt., Signal Corps, AUS
Deposit Mission

U.S. SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
2677th REGIMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (PROV.)
APO 512

J/FS/604

4 June, 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Lt. Everett ^{M. Greaser}
TO : Commanding Officer, 2677th Regiment, OSS (Prov.)

1. Attached are three copies of the operational report of 1st Lt. Everett M. Greaser on his intelligence assignment with the Fifth Corps, Yugoslav Army, from 19 February to 14 May, 1945.
2. It is suggested that OSS Washington be requested to obtain Lt. Greaser's signature. Typing of the report had not been completed when he left this headquarters.

Wm P. Maddox
WILLIAM P. MADDOX
Lt. Colonel, AUS
Chief, SI, MEDTO & Acting S-2

1st. Ind.
HQ 2677TH REGT. OSS (PROV), APO 512, U. S. ARMY, 6 June 1945.
TO: Captain Byron Kantack, OSS, Washington, D. C.
Please obtain Lt. Greaser's signature and forward the attached report to the Director.

For the Commanding Officer:

Reid M. Denis
REID M. DENIS
2d Lieutenant, AO
Secretariat

U.S. SECRET

U.S. SECRET**Subject: Intelligence Mission Fifth Corps, Tagulay Army;**

The report was received on 11 November 1945. It was a mission report from the Tagulay Army, Fifth Corps, dated 11 November 1945 while the mission was being conducted. The mission was conducted by the Tagulay Army, Fifth Corps, and was a reconnaissance mission.

3673-2777

On 11 November 1945, Capt. Edward M. Papieraki, ASW, and I, were assigned to the mission. The mission was conducted by the Tagulay Army, Fifth Corps, and was a reconnaissance mission. The mission was conducted by the Tagulay Army, Fifth Corps, and was a reconnaissance mission. The mission was conducted by the Tagulay Army, Fifth Corps, and was a reconnaissance mission.

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SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : The Director

DATE: 22 August 1945

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Mr. Henry H. Harjes
Security/CBI and IBT

1. Mr. Harjes, Theater Security Officer for CBI and later IBT, believes that security personnel should be more numerous, and better trained, should have greater freedom of action in the field, and should arrive in an area before the location for a clandestine organization has been decided upon.

2. Mr. Van Beuren approves these criticisms and states that they are typical of those of all Security Officers in field stations. No remedial action, however, is indicated.

Thomas Viator
Pvt. Thomas Viator
Reports Office

SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : The Director
FROM : Security Officer
SUBJECT: Report of H. H. Harjes, Attached

DATE: 14 August 1945

1. Transmitted herewith for your information is the report of Henry H. Harjes, civilian, formerly Security Officer, OSI, and later I-5 T.

2. In the opinion of the Security Officer Mr. Harjes performed his duties in a superior manner. He is a conscientious, intelligent and hard-working person who takes his work very seriously and approaches an assignment with full realization of its long range implications. If one is to be critical of his work, my criticism would lie in the fact that sometimes Mr. Harjes is inclined to be somewhat too theoretical in his approach and that in certain instances obvious practical solutions of problems may have been overlooked in an effort to provide a sound over-all policy for the avoidance of future difficulties.

3. The difficulties encountered are typical of those of all Security Officers in field stations. The report serves to underline and accentuate the desirability of providing more numerous, fully trained Security personnel at earlier stages of OSS overseas operations. It is sincerely hoped that the lessons learned and the difficulties pointed out by our Security Officers returning from the field will be borne in mind should similar operations be undertaken in the future.

A. van Buren
 A. van Buren
 Security Officer

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

10 August 1945

TO: The Director, thru Mr. A. van Beuren *MB*
 FROM: Henry H. Harjes
 SUBJECT: Report requested of Returning Personnel.

I. DUTIES AND ACTIVITIES. The undersigned was Theater Security Officer. Originally for C.B.I.-T and later for I.B.-T.

II. PROGRESS AND ACHIEVEMENTS.

- A. During the period from the early part of 1944 until June 1945 Security Offices were established in the following places: -
 Kanay, Ceylon.
 Colombo, Ceylon.
 Trincomalee, Ceylon.
 Calcutta, India.
 Nazira, Assam.
 Kunming, China.
 New Delhi, India.
 Shamo, Burma.
 Arrakan, Burma.
 Rangoon, Burma.

At the present time the only Security Offices in I.B.-T. are located at Kandy, Colombo, Rangoon and Calcutta.

- B. Largest number of persons ever under the direct supervision of the Security Office were twenty-six (26) persons.

At the time of the undersigned's departure there were seventeen (17) persons in the Security Office, in I.B.-T. This included Army, Navy and civilian personnel.

- C. The progress in establishing sound security and security practices was slow owing to the original trouble of Security personnel having arrived in the Theater "too late and too few."

It is felt that now, however, even though the Office is still handicapped by lack of personnel, Security in the I.B. Theater can be called good. Any further reduction in personnel would seriously handicap the future security of the mission.

- D. As far as achievements are concerned it should be borne in mind that a great deal of help was freely given by the various British Security Agencies and Controls. Originally, some difficulty was encountered with them because certain individuals in the original C.B.I. and SEAC Missions did not appear to want to "play ball" with the British. On several occasions they caused the Security Office unnecessary embarrassments. Fortunately, this situation did not last long.

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Page 2 - Report.

SEC

III. CONDITIONS.

- A. Conditions for maintaining the security of a clandestine organization in the Far East are not very favorable unless adequate personnel and funds are available. Security Offices in the Far East were continuously frustrated in their efforts to maintain security because of lack of personnel.
- B. The success, and the very existence of a clandestine organization is dependent on the soundness of its own security. Its security cannot be partial, or spasmodic; it must be complete and constant. There seems to appear occasionally a tendency to settle for what one might term "bargain-basement" security. This is not compatible with one of the main functions and duties of a clandestine organization, namely that of obtaining intelligence by undercover methods and disseminating it in a secure and efficient manner.
- C. Another reason for the necessity for adequate personnel is that in the Far East an insufficiently staffed Security Office becomes completely dependent on other than American citizens for vetting and other forms of investigative work. Without a Security Office being able to do its own investigative work the danger of a "plant" continues to exist.

IV. DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED.

- A. It is important that a Security Officer arrive first in an area before the location for a clandestine organization has been decided upon, and before any building program has been started. The setting up of Security rules and regulations by which personnel will automatically abide on their arrival is also considerably facilitated by a Security Officer's arrival before the members of a clandestine organization.
- B. Security personnel should be assigned in sufficient numbers in order that the Branch may efficiently and constructively perform its responsibilities. This is especially desirable for assistance in investigative work.
- C. ALL OES personnel, before departure from the States should receive better and more detailed Security training. This is especially applicable to persons who have remained only a brief period of time in the home office and have had little opportunity to observe and absorb Security practices.
- D. Washington should attempt to do a better screening and assessment job on persons destined for the Far East.

SEC

Page 3 - Report.

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- E. Security Officers should be given greater freedom of action. They should be directly responsible to the Theater Security Officer, who, in turn, should be responsible only to the Chief of Mission and the Security Chief in Washington. Security personnel sent overseas should not be handicapped, if in the Services, by lack of rank. The branch should consist of Army, Navy and Civilian personnel. If a person of sufficient rank is not available for the position of Theater Security Officer, then a civilian should always fill this position.
- F. Although the Security Office is a Staff function, it should be permitted certain Command functions. This applies to such matter as guards, transporting, housing and billeting native operators, students, rejectees and other functions that have to be handled in a highly secure manner.
- G. Before a mission is set up, it should be certain that it has available personnel who have a sound and proven knowledge of the native race with whom it intends to operate.
- H. A clandestine organization such as ODS should be furnished its own operational transportation, such as airplanes and submarines.
- I. When operating in the Far East, it is considered important that ODS have its own courier service between detachments, other theaters and the United States.
- J. The Branch responsible for the planning and execution of operations should have within it persons who have had extensive operational experience. Planning, and the execution of the plan are, it is considered, two completely separate functions.
- K. It is important for the Washington Office to realize and appreciate the difficulties under which an organization such as ODS is apt to have to contend with in the field when, in theory, it comes under the direct orders of the Theater Commander. The mission's directives should clearly indicate not only to the Chief of Mission himself, but to the Commanding General as well, the exact scope and freedom of action that the organization has been granted, in order that it might operate smoothly and securely.

7. CONCLUSION.

Security must always bow to practicability. Practicability can, however, be too easily twisted into meaning convenience. The implementation of Security recommendations is only practicable when consistent with local facilities and conditions. Security, unfortunately, is only too frequently sacrificed for either convenience or theoretical labor and/or money-saving reasons. Should a recommendation seem too drastic, and the resultant implementation impose too inconvenient a change from previous comfortable

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Page 4 -Report

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habits or practices, a Security Officer is often faced with a "veto" and the necessity to be patient, and "give enough rope" so that eventually an incident will occur and prove the wisdom of his previous defenseless recommendations. Security measure do not produce spectacular results. They are primarily of a defensive nature, and whatever good they may accomplish is neither known nor appreciated. A Security Officer is a specialist and his judgment and opinions, though only based on a hunch or feeling, should be accepted and relied upon completely. Bargain-basement Security is non-existent, and without complete security, a clandestine organization cannot operate.

To summarize the security situation in the Far East, the following story is considered not only pertinent, but also of interest. A high ranking general officer of a British clandestine organization, recently arrived in FETO from Europe, remarked during the course of conversation that he was becoming exasperated with how hard it was to maintain security for his type of outfit in the Far East. He further explained his difficulty in making London appreciate his troubles, and amplified them by stating that he was forced to summarize his reports thus: "The Security ramifications out here - Oh God!!"

H. H. HANJES
H. H. HANJES
Theater Security Officer

11512

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

TO: Director, OSS.
FROM: Chief, SI.
SUBJECT: Report of Chief, Labor Division SI/ITO.

DATE: 8 August 1945.

The attached field report from Lt.(jg) Devos touches only the highlights of the work of his Division. He was fortunate in taking over a going concern, into which a great deal of careful planning had gone. Both Mr. Pratt and Mr. Wilson had contributed constructive thought to methods of operation that were put into effect under Lt. Devos's able direction. However, with the exception of mentioning jurisdictional difficulties the report adds nothing in the way of constructive criticism or suggestions for future operations.

WM
W. . .

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Field Report by Lt. (jg) Carl Devos, Labor Section, SI

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Description of Duties.....	Page 1
Operations.....	Page 2
Twilight.....	Page 3
Liquidation.....	Page 4
General.....	Page 4

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5 August 1945

FIELD REPORT BY LT. (JG) CARL DEVOS, LABOR SECTION, SIPERIOD OF DUTY

After concluding my duties as Chief of the Labor Division, Cairo, I was dispatched to London to serve under Mr. George O. Pratt. I arrived 30 December 1944 and was on active duty in the European Theatre of Operations until 15 June 1945 when I was returned to the United States.

DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Mr. Pratt, formerly Chief of the Labor Division, ETO, had been recently appointed head of the Division of Intelligence Procurement. In addition, he also acted as Coordinator of Labor Division Activities in ETO and MEDTO. Mr. Pratt first delegated to me his duties as Coordinator which substantially involved supervision over the various Labor Division offices in London, Paris, Field Base "C", Berns, Cairo and Caserta. He was also called upon by the field offices to furnish guidance and facilities for their projects. "Mission Hofer", which was a real achievement of the Labor Division in Paris, is an example in point illustrating the role of London in pulling together an operation in which Paris, Caserta and London were involved. During the first week of February 1945, Mr. Pratt assigned Mr. Thomas S. Wilson, then Chief, Labor Division, London, to Paris and I took over his

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duties as Acting Chief. This was in addition to the duties mentioned above. I served in these capacities until my return to the States.

As part of the continuing responsibilities of the Chief, Labor Division, London, I maintained the necessary liaison with the entire trade union and political personalities with whom we were collaborating in our basic projects.

I was also charged with the supervision of a fairly large group of officers and enlisted men who were assigned to the Labor Division, London, in both staff and agent capacities.

OPERATIONS

When I took up my duties in London, the greatest emphasis was being placed upon the job of penetrating Germany. Up to that time the only active agent in Germany was "Downend" who had been dropped blind in the area of Jochum in the early part of September 1944. He was operating pursuant to a project which had been worked out in cooperation with the British. He had no communications and the only contacts with him were by overland courier operating out of Switzerland. To my knowledge the intelligence procured from this source was the only direct intelligence coming from Germany at the time.

Fortunately, the Labor Division had made substantial progress in preparing for the priority task of getting our teams into Germany. The principal job as I saw it was to exploit what we already had begun and to be sure that we were ready in time. Thereafter, under my direction and supervision, the Labor Division in London successfully dropped "Hammer" and "Bullet" teams in Berlin. The "Hammer" team which went in in the February-March 1945 period, and which was on the air

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- 3 -

with its J/S equipment on the first contact after its successful drop, was the first SI team to be dropped successfully after DIP got under way. "Hammer" and "Mallet" were the only teams of SI to be put into Berlin. The "Pickaxe" team was dropped successfully in Landshut and the "Faro" in Plauen. We suffered the loss of our "Chisel" team which was destined for the Ruhr but was never heard from, nor has there been any trace of the plane or the crew. We successfully dropped our "Bussaw" team in Leipzig but to date have not had any contact with them. The "Mallet" team mentioned above is also unaccounted for. All teams which were recovered produced valuable intelligence during the period of our operations. In addition to the above teams, the Labor Division had a team operating in Holland which had been successfully dropped under the sponsorship of Mr. Wilson. After Mr. Wilson's departure I continued to look after this mission called "Tyl Mission". The agent, "Bobbie", was the "guinea pig" for the J/E equipment and early demonstrated its effectiveness under field conditions.

INWILIGHT

The Labor Division had done some preliminary planning and preparation for the period of occupation of Germany. However, the pressure to marshal all resources to further the penetration of Germany made it necessary to shelve such plans at the time I assumed responsibility for activities of the Labor Division, London. It became apparent that unless we were prepared to undertake SI operations in occupied Germany as the Armies moved ahead, we would be at an extreme disadvantage when Germany as a whole capitulated. Under my direction and with this in mind we prepared the Potomac mission which moved into Cologne and

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- 4 -

Sonn in early March and prepared the groundwork for the subsequent and wide scale clandestine operations now being conducted by Captain Richard F. Watt as part of the OSS Mission Germany.

LIQUIDATION

Following V-E Day my principal efforts were directed towards liquidation and as part of that process the recovery of our agent personnel operating in Germany and Holland and debriefing and separating them from our organization. I made two trips to the Continent in furtherance of this program and also for the additional purpose of assisting the Labor Division, Paris, to liquidate its affairs and assisting Captain Watt in working out his scheme of constituting Field Base "C" as an operational area in anticipation of its absorption by OSS Mission Germany.

GENERAL

Working conditions in London were ideal. Speaking only from the point of view of the Labor Division, I would say that the principal problem which faced us during the entire period of my duty arose from the numerous jurisdictional difficulties. The Labor Division, because of its established policy of operating as a single unit in all of the theatres in which it was engaged, probably felt this more keenly than other sections of SI. The Paris Office jealously coveted the Labor Division personnel operating from both Paris and Field Base "C". It was cumbersome administration to have to contend with the many clearances before we could undertake operations. The almost complete severance of the Labor Division in Caserta from working contact with

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London made it practically impossible for us to be of much help to them. I am of the opinion that had the original relations between the Labor Division, Caserta, and London as contemplated when Mr. Pratt was appointed Coordinator of Labor Division Activities, ETO and MEDTO, remained undisturbed, the Labor Division personnel in Caserta would have been substantially more effective.



Carl Devoe
Lt.(jg), USNR

SECRET

340
SECRETMEMORANDUM

4 August 1945.

TO: Director, OSS.

FROM: Chief, SI. *thc LTV*

SUBJECT: Field Report of Captain Rex D. Deane, GMC.

This excellent report with its accompanying supplement follows a pattern which has proved to be almost standard as regards teams operating with Partisans in Yugoslavia. Captain Deane and his mission did a much better than average job although they operated under handicaps which were customary during the latter period of their cooperation with the Partisans. With reference to Captain Deane's comments in Paragraph 2, concerning conditions in the field which might be improved, one finds a repetition of certain oft-repeated criticisms. These may be summarized as, (a) poor service of supplies, (b) lack of stability at the base, (c) lack of rank, (d) insufficient training of all personnel. Such criticisms were usually valid in large degree and efforts have constantly been made to improve the situation.

It might be added that the practice of changing desk personnel at frequent intervals was a subject of criticism on the part of our British allies who never knew the proper person with whom to deal. The situation as regards personnel being handled by the desk in the field was, however, much more serious for it created a morale problem of no mean proportion.

One further comment might be made concerning the paragraph in the middle of Page 2 of the attached Durand Report concerning the use of a Partisan girl as secretary to Major Arnoldi in Sari. There can be little question but that Major Arnoldi was badly misguided in his too close association with the Partisans and his insistence upon giving them free access to all information concerning our operations. It is to be hoped that any similar operations in the future will avoid such naive trust of temporary allies, trust which in the intelligence business is almost certain to be misplaced.

W.H.S.

Attachment

SECRET

REPORT ON FIELD CONDITIONSby
Captain Rex D. Deane, QMC

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2. <u>Conditions in the field that might be improved</u>	3
3. <u>Specific personal difficulties</u>	4
A. Lack of rank	4
B. Training of radio operators	5
C. Frequent changes of Desk Chiefs at Base	5

Attached report J-OSO-702, giving detailed narrative account
of activities of the DORAND TEAM.

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

100-200000000-2

Subject: Report on field conditions -- DONALD TRIN

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100-20-28100

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One such source contacted a "Barbary" military informant, who provided information on movements of enemy troops. At this time, the informant was working from Baghdad into Austria and Hungary. They had organized the division of the "Barbary" forces, commonly known as "Barbary", into 11 divisions in order to protect their interests. They were organized about 12,000 (thirteen thousand or more) troops. They were organized into 11 divisions and provided the following information to the informant: "Barbary" and owing to the fact that these troops were moving somewhat, and owing to the fact that the informant was working from Baghdad into Austria and Hungary. They had organized the division of the "Barbary" forces, commonly known as "Barbary", into 11 divisions in order to protect their interests. They were organized about 12,000 (thirteen thousand or more) troops. They were organized into 11 divisions and provided the following information to the informant: "Barbary" and owing to the fact that these troops were moving somewhat, and owing to the fact that the informant was working from Baghdad into Austria and Hungary.

- 2 -

constant requests from Caserta (AFHQ), and Bari (IV USAF), for bombing and strafing targets, we were kept extremely busy sending in intelligence on our radio link with Italy.

Another extremely important part of the mission's work was the care and orientation of American flyers who had been shot down or who had bailed out over enemy territory. During the period, February to May, we fed, clothed and evacuated 168 members of the USAF.

All Yugoslav newspapers were translated by us, and reports on political trends both local and national were sent to Caserta by post.

As Yugoslavs, we worked in close collaboration and on the most friendly basis with the British Military Mission under the command of Major Randolph Churchill (son of the Prime Minister), and the USM Mission under command of Colonel Rao.

We moved from Tuzumov to Zadar in Dalmatia on April 10. We landed a house and set up our headquarters on the waterfront. The British Navy was operating strong patrols from the Port of Zadar at that time and also landing supplies for the impending Partisan drive on Trieste and Istria. While at Zadar, frequent trips were made to Split, Tuzumov and Makarska. Political crises were occurring at all these points, elections were being held for the first time in five years, and the underground wished to be an eyewitness to the proceedings.

SECRET

unavailable results.

and it took several weeks needed parties to transport it over the
 mountain for the most part since the Germans wouldn't distribute it.
 We were also plagued with propaganda literature by the --

enough for a regiment.
 powder in large cans enough for sixty men or canned spinach and beans
 did come, invariably they would be the wrong kind -- such as egg
 for our changing engine or batteries without results. If supplies
 service of supplies. Time and time again, we would request gasoline
 needed by the British, it was extremely mortifying to see our bad
 as a solitary American mission in an area completely com-

Fascists.

surrounded by German and Czech troops plus roving bands of Italian
 There were no airfields available as the territory was completely
 the conditions were extremely bad for the reception of supplies.
 The writer was dropped in Montenegro, May 1944. At that

2. Conditions in the field that might be improved

Landay in Belgrade.

By air on 21 May, following receipt of orders from Lt. Colonel
 accompanying report. The Durand Mission was evacuated from Zagreb
 Conditions in Zagreb have been fully explained in the
 then to Karlovac and finally arrived in Zagreb 11 May.
 advancing on Istria and Zagreb. From Zadar, we moved to Gospić
 Partisan Fourth Army, aided by heavy Allied air support, was
 On 23 April, we packed up and started to move north. The

- 4 -

It is suggested that all operations officers be recruited from personnel who have at one time or another been in the field. Thus a feeling of confidence would be created between the base and the field and one would have some assurance that back at the base there is someone who understands problems like change of climate, the need for right wearing apparel and equipment, food and supply, financial and medical difficulties.

3. Specific personnel difficulties:

A. Lack of rank:

In all Balkan countries, in fact all of Europe, the military caste system is very strong. Nowhere is it more apparent than among the Partisans or officers of the USSR. It is a common sight to see a local Partisan leader jump from captain to full colonel over night. In my territory in Croatia, the Russian newsreel photographer was a full colonel.

The British Missions never have less than a major at their head. Most of the time the rank is merely "brevet" but it carries weight with local authorities.

The writer was dropped into Montenegro to take charge of the American Mission there, known as Redwood, with the rank of Second Lieutenant. This was in June 1944. In October 1944, I was promoted to First Lieutenant. Apparently my work was extremely satisfactory on all times, as I had high commendations from my superiors; and upon return to Caserta, Italy, in February 1945, I was cited for the Legion of Merit. It is impossible for an American officer in the field to represent the United States with the dignity and authority which his

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difficulties on procedure and intelligence demands. This is the most difficult because signed their names to radio messages containing radio the writer was in the field no fewer than nine

5. Presenting changes of radio radio at the base:

obtained. between officer and enlisted men on a field station, no results can who is temporarily unstable. Unless complete harmony exists to an actual thing to be copied up on a mountain top with a person the officer in charge will get to know his men and vice versa. It a unit for some period of time before leaving on a mission. Then because he couldn't read. I suggest that each team be trained as other clerk who couldn't do a simple double transposition cipher Most of them couldn't speak English. The writer was given a Russian back-back OSS ally, then dropped into an enemy-occupied territory. recruited from POW camps and given a few weeks' training in some the most part, OSS radio operators in the Middle East Theatre were shaggy, hard shaggy all must be used in case of emergency. For over practices, shaggy engine stripped and repaired. Wind tops in the pouring rain or amid snowstorms, morale must be strong more than that. Contacts with the base have to be made on mountain speed in tapping a radio key, but conditions in the field demand anybody with normal intelligence can be taught a certain

6. Training of radio operators:

practice demands under conditions such as these.

- 6 -

depressing experience that can happen to anyone stationed in the field who has no knowledge of what is happening at the Base. A parade of strange names across radio signals gives one the impression that such a constant change means everything in one's Section is all haywire and that nobody at the base is there long enough to understand one's problems.

Rex D. Deane

Captain Rex D. Deane
Chief, INTRAND Mission

Written in Washington, D. C.
24 July 1948

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J-090-702

REPORT OF THE DURAND TEAM

Attached to HQ, Croatia
20 February to 20 May 1945

(Note: This report was written under extreme pressure. As the undersigned arrived from the field four days before leaving for the United States, there was no time for full research; and reference to files, which were all burned in Zagreb, was impossible.)

Rex D. Deane,

REX D. DEANE
Captain, GNC
Chief, Durand Mission

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SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

DATE: 17 August 1945

TO The Director
FROM Secretariat - Reports Office
SUBJECT Field Report: Lt. Col. James H. Angleton

Administrative officer of X-2, Naples, Lt. Col. Angleton, because of his excellent prewar contacts served OSS in a liaison capacity with AMG and SIM. This field report details his activities in various positions between December 1943 and July 1945.

Thomas Victor
Pvt. Thomas Victor
Reports Office

wbr

CONFIDENTIAL

4 August 1945

SUBJECT: Duty Assignment Completed as of 2400 hours
29 July 1945

TO: Commanding Officer, Hqs., 2677th Regt., OSS
(Prov.), APO 512, U.S. Army

FROM: Lt. Col. James H. Angleton, O-117,023

1. On 5 December 1943 I arrived in Naples from the North African Theatre. In Naples I took up my duties as Administrative Officer of X-2 Branch. Having lived in Italy for a number of years prior to the war as owner of the National Cash Register Company and President of the American Chamber of Commerce for Italy, I naturally had a very wide acquaintanceship among members of the Italian government and industrialists. I therefore handled the liaison with AMG and HIM (Col. Agrifoglio, Col. Rivetria, Major Detti, etc.) During this period I renewed my acquaintanceship with Marshal Badoglio and General Messe while they were stationed in Brindisi.

2. General Order No. 6 from the Commanding Officer of OSS Caserta transferred me to the Headquarters Staff as Chief of the Liaison Section, with liaison duties covering Italian high officials, the Lieutenant-General of the Realm, AMG, State Department, and members of the Allied Control Commission. On several occasions I was able to bring Italian and AMG officials together and help foster a better understanding of the various problems involved.

3. On 27 May 1944 I received orders directing me to report to Colonel George Smith, Commandant of "S" Force, and entered Rome with "S" Force accompanied by Lieut. Robert J. Hoff.

4. Through information gathered from my former agents in Rome, I, with Lieut. Hoff and three Italians, raided the German Radio School on the outskirts of Rome. A card file revealed certain names of agents whom we had previously apprehended in the Naples area. Several members of this group were later arrested. Among the documents we obtained a partly-burned code and cipher book.

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5. During my liaison work in Caserta I had been associated with Major General Harry H. Johnson, and at his request I was attached to his Rome Area Command Staff, where I acted as adviser in matters dealing with Italian civilians. During this period I assisted OSS in obtaining billets and a location for Headquarters in Rome, and I was able to foster a better spirit and understanding between OSS and Rome Area Command. I was sent to London on a confidential mission during this period.

6. Also during this period it became necessary for me to arrange the security and transference from the outskirts of Rome to The Vatican of the Japanese Embassy Staff accredited to The Holy See.

7. Through my previous acquaintance while on "S" Force with Lt. Col. John Pollock who had become Chief of Police for Rome Area, I was called in at the outset of the Allied investigation of the explosion which killed 32 German soldiers and resulted in the retribution murder of 320 Italians in the Ardeatine Caves. I afterwards called Lieut. William Callanan and Major John Ricos to visit these Caves, where photographs were taken. A joint report covering the full story was submitted. In this connection I interrogated Pietro Caruso, former Rome Chief of Police, who was held in Regina Coeli Prison during his trial. (Please see Major General Harry H. Johnson's letter of commendation dated 3 November 1944.)

8. On 9 September 1944 an order issued by North African Theatre of Operations (AG 201-P) attached me to G-5 Section, Headquarters, 5th Army under Brigadier General Edgar Brakine Hume. Through former associates I was able to compile information for AMG on location of merchandise dumps and was able to make confidential reports on persons whose names were submitted for investigation. I acted as liaison officer in instances such as the arrival at Fifth Army Headquarters of the Lieutenant General of the Italian Realm; on one occasion I arranged a special dinner for him at the No. 262 Ordinance Battalion located just outside of Florence. At various times I did considerable work in connection with the arrival of Mr. Myron Taylor and other officials to the Fifth Army area. Also, I kept in close touch with supplies coming from Siena and Southern District to the warehouses in the Florence area and checked the amount of flour eventually needed to feed Bologna.

- 2 -

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9. I followed the advance of Fifth Army into Northern Italy and assisted by obtaining facts on economic intelligence and statistics on textiles in the hands of wholesalers. Through my connections with Dr. John Carloni of Milano I was put in touch with the heads of the various confederations of textiles. Within six days after the arrival in Milano of IV Corps, I was able to furnish Lieut. General Willis D. Crittenberger a detailed report covering the quantity of various types of textiles in the wholesale warehouses, in bonded warehouses on the Swiss Frontier, and textiles and manufactured articles held for the account of the R.U.K. (German Commercial Corporation) in the S.I.A.M.A. warehouses in and around Milano. On May 9 (1945) I submitted a plan to use this merchandise to kill the black market in textiles and wearing apparel throughout Italy.

10. On the order of General Crittenberger I visited heavy industrial plants as well as various textile mills throughout the Lombardy Region to determine the extent of their bomb damage, the present production and needs of factories in order that they may be put on a production schedule that would give full employment to their workers, and to examine the labor situation and difficulties the management encountered in relation to employees. Having personally known a number of these industrialists* before the war, I was able to gather valuable information on these points as well as to obtain a fairly accurate estimate of the amount of manufactured textiles on hand with the various mills, plus the amount on hand of last year's crop of raw silk and other raw materials such as rayon and fiocco yarns. All information gathered was covered in full reports to the IV Corps Command.

11. At various times I was detailed by General Crittenberger to conduct notables over the Milan area; among them were General Mark W. Clark and Robert D. Patterson, Undersecretary of War.

12. I cooperated with Major Percy Coxhead, Chief of AMG Police for Milano, in early morning tours of the outskirts of the city to count the bodies of those murdered

* Mr. Giovanni Falck of the Falck Steel Mills; Mr. Guido Vassetti; Mr. Guido Ravanti (silk mill); Mr. David Haug of Itale Viscosa; Dr. Paolo Cicogna, President of the Chatillon Viscosa; Mr. Camillo Livi of the Anderson Clay-ton Co., Milano; Mr. Paolo Clerici, Director of Fratelli dell'Acqua Textile Factories at Legnano; Engineer Moron-dutti, President of Consiglio dell'Amministrazione del F.I.S.A.C., who operate 10 textile mills between Monza and Como.

CONFIDENTIAL

and to assist in their identification. Because of information supplied by various agents I was able to inform headquarters of IV Corps of activities of certain agitators, hidden arms, etc. I made a full report on the activities of the Camere di Lavoro in various projects which were damaging to the efforts of our Command. I made various reports to Colonel Wells, G-3, IV Corps, covering individuals and societies such as the Austrian Liberation Committee which was made up of former members of the German Chamber of Commerce. For instance, Dr. Martens of the Austrian Liberation Committee was a former secretary of the German Chamber of Commerce; a certain Baroness Possener, formerly connected with the German Intelligence Service before the war, was also a member of this Austrian Liberation Committee. (She had been closely connected with a German intelligence officer named Captain Oscar Reichel.) Also on Colonel Wells's order I gave him information of commercial activities of certain British officers who were engaged in making commercial contacts and soliciting business for the British Board of Trade.

13. To Colonel Hamilton Walker, G-5, IV Corps, I submitted various reports of a confidential nature covering names of stockholders of industrial plants, information concerning the R.U.K. warehouses where they had merchandise stored near Bolzano, as well as the S.I.A.M.A. warehouses in and near Milano. I submitted a report on the importance of obtaining the files of the R.U.K. These were later found and revealed the names of textile plants where the Germans, through R.U.K., had placed raw materials or paid for textiles not delivered which could be confiscated. I compiled statistics on the hemp situation showing Italy's total production and the amount taken by the Germans, the greater part believed to be stored north of the Po River. Later a telegram received by IV Corps revealed that several thousand tons of this hemp covered in my report was found and saved. Various other reports were submitted on the textile industry covering their total capacity, number of looms, spindles, workmen, etc.

14. I investigated black market prices, making a trip to Rome in this connection, and submitted a full report to Brig. General Larry LaDue. During the last few weeks of my work with the IV Corps I was detailed by General LaDue to investigate the many rumors that the so-called line across which no merchandise should pass from North to South Italy was an instrument for graft. Since a substantial quantity of merchandise had arrived in Southern Italy clandestinely, this investigation covered the giving of permits illegally and the refusal of the Allied Commission of the Lombardy Region to allow legitimate concerns to move merchandise south.

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The Lombardy Region had refused various requests for permits to bring Sicilian cotton north, and yet trucks loaded with Sicilian cotton began to appear on certain highways and were found in one textile mill. Two OIC investigators from Fifth Army were detailed to assist in this matter. For a certain period we arranged to station MP's at the Po River crossings to ascertain if merchandise were carried on Army vehicles. We investigated the work of the 22 Comitati which were designed by the Allied Commission to control all industry and commerce in North Italy. This resulted in many accusations of graft.

15. This covers my services up to 29 July 1945, when a telegram from Colonel Edward J. F. Glavin and an order from the Adjutant General of Fifth Army were received, ordering me to report to Caserta. Upon arrival in Caserta I received a letter dated 30 July 1945 signed by Colonel Glavin releasing me from duty in this theatre and ordering me to report for duty to the Deputy Director of OSS in Washington, D.C.

16. A commendation letter from Brig. General Edgar Erskine Hume dated 17 June 1945, as well as a letter from Colonel Hamilton Walker, G-5, IV Corps, with first indorsement by Lieut. General Willis D. Crittenger, Commandant of IV Corps, second indorsement by Lieut. General Lucius E. Truscott, Commandant of Fifth Army, cover the period of my attachment to the IV Corps and the Fifth Army.

17. During my stay in the 34th General Hospital in October and November 1944 I met for the first time General Mark W. Clark and Major General Grunther. While in the hospital I had as a room mate General W. C. McMahon, G-1 of 15th Army Group. This association ripened into a lasting friendship. General McMahon is a former room mate of General Mark W. Clark at West Point.

18. I believe that during all my service in this theatre I have been able to bring about a better understanding and appreciation of OSS.

James H. Angleton
JAMES H. ANGLETON
G-117,023
Lt. Col., GMP

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SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : Acting Director

DATE: 6 August 1945

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: T/Sgt. Robert C. DeWeese
Medical Services/MedTO-PETO

1. T/Sgt. DeWeese, who served in Greece and Burma states that living conditions in the field were deplorable, that greater emphasis should be placed on prophylactic treatment of diseases and that only men with previous experience should handle all supplies going into the field.
2. Major Bruzger notes that supply personnel for PETO are being procured from returning personnel from MedTO and ETO.
3. Colonel Missal indicates that progress is being made in correcting the unfavorable field conditions mentioned.

file
one

Thomas Victor
Pvt. Thomas Victor
Reports Office

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201 - 1/Sgt Robert C. DeWeese 1st Ind.

CRC/sla

Area Operations Office, SO-WE, 2173 Qm Bldg.

30 July 1945

TO: Office of Chief, SO

Noted.


 C. R. GORCORAN

Captain, AGD

Area Operations Officer, SO-FE


201- 1/Sgt Robert C. DeWeese

2nd Ind.

VWB/od

Office of the Chief, SO, 30 July 1945. TO: The Director (through Reports Office of the Secretariat.

1. Noted.
2. SO supply personnel requisitioned by Far East theaters are being processed as much as possible from returning personnel from MTO and ETO.
3. Recommend this report be referred to the Chief, Medical Services for whatever action he deems advisable.


 VERNON W. BRUGGER
 Major, Cavalry
 Deputy Chief, SO
SECRET

SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

26 July 1945

TO: Captain C. E. Corcoran
FROM: E. C. Deane
SUBJECT: Report of Careless Duty

1. I first saw field duty in Greece under the command of Captain Myers. The work at first centered around routine medical and surgical treatment for the guerrilla forces actively participating in open conflict with the Germans. With an increased impact in the resistance movement, our duties became more diversified, including eventually, medical relief, sanitation and distribution of food to the entire population in the territory under our jurisdiction.

2. After seven months in Greece I proceeded to Burma, where working under Captain Franklin in the field during the summer, was less and less a campaign. My specific duties consisted of organizing and maintaining, continuously, a hospital for advanced headquarters.

3. Living conditions in the field, as a rule, were deplorable. Greater stress should be brought to bear on preventive treatment of disease common to that particular locality. Greater care and better management should go into the planning of roads purchased into the zone. Men with actual previous experience in the field should handle all supplies going into the field.

4. The greatest difficulties I personally experienced in the lack of organization between rear and advanced echelons in expediting really needed supplies in times of dire emergency.

Paul C. Deane
SUBJECT: E. C. Deane
7/26/45, Hqd. Services

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 3 August 1945

TO : Acting Director
FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office
SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Donald King
SO/Medro

1. Mr. King, instructor in weapons and demolitions in Algiers and France, suggests that instructor personnel be secured who are familiar with the native language and can speak it with reasonable fluency. Major Brugger notes that this has always been the policy of SO.

2. Further recommendations are made on p.2 regarding liaison with Army units in the field on which Major Brugger contemplates no further action as they are not applicable to PHTO.

Thomas Victor
Pvt. Thomas Victor
Reports Office

5761 AIR ST OAKMONT, CALIF 94641
MEX/AM
BOSTON, MASS

[illegible]

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

11/31/45
SECRET

TO : Acting Director

DATE: 7 August 1945 ✓

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Dr. Robert B. McLeod
SI/ETO

1. Dr. McLeod, Intelligence Officer, SI, ETO, and Chief of the Division of Intelligence Direction, describes organizational inadequacies p. 6, and explains in detail the proper function of Intelligence Direction with relation to operational planning, (p. 3 - 5).

2. Mr. Shepardson notes that these opinions correspond to the conclusions reached by the SI command in the theater and in Washington and have been reflected in the organization of SI/Germany. Progress has been made toward establishing smooth relations between the Steering and Production Divisions in recent weeks and Mr. Shepardson is confident of the outcome.

Thomas Victor
Fvt. Thomas Victor
Reports Office

*Handed for Gen. [unclear]
There is [unclear]
information [unclear]
[unclear] [unclear]
[unclear] [unclear]*

17

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Acting Director

DATE: 3 August 1945

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Lt. Henry R. North, USNR
SI/ETO

Lt. North's report contains another example of lack of top echelon advance planning and coordination. Mr. Shepardson suggests that the chaotic times just prior to V-E day may have been responsible. No specific suggestions or criticisms are made.

Thomas Victor
Pvt. Thomas Victor
Reports Office

1945
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17.313
 OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
 WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Edmund M. Burke
See the, Edmund M. Burke

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MEMORANDUM

27 July 1945

TO: The Director, OSS
 FROM: Whitney H. Shepardson *W.H.S.*
 SUBJECT: Field Report--Lt. (JG) Edmund M. Burke, USNR

As Assistant DIP Operations Officer for the Mission based in HTO, Lt. Burke is reported to have turned in a highly commendable performance, as usual.

Paragraph 3 of Lt. Burke's field report, attached, points once more to the fact that one of the serious OSS faults was being left at the post. "Had this mission been laid on a month (60,90 days, or 5 minutes) sooner our record would have been more impressive". is a form of wishful thinking recurring constantly in field reports submitted by those who actually participated in the operations.

W.H.S.

Attachment

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**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 20, N.Y.**

10 July 1945

TO: DIRECTOR

THROUGH: CHIEF S.I. *M*

FROM: LT. (J.G.) E. W. BURKE, USNR

SUBJECT: FIELD REPORT

1. In January 1945, after leave and brief duty in the United States, I received instructions to return to the STC and report to Colonel Verrill's unit which was attached to the 18th U.S. Airborne Corps. Orders were out in accordance with these instructions and on 7 February 1945 I left the United States, arriving in London, England two days later.

After reporting in to 12th Fleet Headquarters as ordered, I checked in with Mr. William Casey, Chief S.I. London. Mr. Casey informed me that I was not to join the unit attached to the 18th Airborne Corps, but would be assigned to the Division of Intelligence Procurement under Mr. George Pratt.

On February 15, an Operations Office was created in the Division of Intelligence Procurement and made responsible for the preparation, mounting, dispatch and servicing of all agents and agent teams parachuted in to Germany. Captain E.E.S. Thompson was appointed Operations Officer and Lt. Burke Assistant Operations Officer.

A detailed account of the activities of the J.I.P. Operations Office is set forth in the "Report of Operations Office, Division of Intelligence Procurement, S.I. Branch, STC", of which both the Director C.S.G. and Chief S.I. have copies.

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2. This was the best O.S.S. show with which I have been associated. The most important factor, I believe, in its being successful (100 teams dropped or infiltrated into Germany) was that several of the key personnel had had considerable field experience and, because of it, possessed the right attitude, tempo, and sense of values which kept the whole show on the target all the time. By field experience I mean that these few men had either operated themselves behind enemy lines or had spent considerable time in front line combat. It was their perspective which made the difference between just another good try and an exceptional field job - that, plus the whole-hearted, clear cut, encouraging support of Mr. Casey.

3. The one specific difficulty was the relatively small amount of time. A great deal was accomplished over a short period by budgeting every minute and making every move an emergency measure. Had the Operations Office had their O.I.P. personnel assembled as a team only a few days prior to the date when they did get underway, an infinitely more impressive record would have been made for the O.S.S.

Sam R. H.

3. M. Burke

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 2 August 1945

TO: DIRECTOR, OSS

FROM: Chief, E

SUBJECT: Report of Lt. A. B. Moley

17,312
Field Report

x Moley, A B

Via Requisition Office

To Alvin Cullum
Alvin - O'Malley
see thismhead
OCT

As Lt. Moley himself describes his operations, it is apparent that they were not really secret intelligence. It was undoubtedly true that in the French zone the Germans were eager to cooperate with Americans, but it would require an individual in full possession of various critical facilities to secure anything other than short information. To be sure a great deal of such short information was desired at the period of Lt. Moley's operation. But it was hardly the sort of thing to which an SI operative could be devoted his whole time. A successful operative would need to be very carefully and constantly briefed on the latest situation of interest to SI if he were to have anything more than a reputation for uncoordinated opinion. This is not to say that Lt. Moley's reports were of no value, but it does imply that his style of operation would be of use for only a very limited period as regards the production of real secret intelligence.

The volume of reports from the Stuttgart area which Lt. Moley reports is of considerable though chiefly historic interest. From the standpoint of the War Crimes Division, Lt. Moley's work is of interest and importance and it is to be hoped that his talent and experience may be usefully employed by the Division. His work is relatively small as regards the future development of secret intelligence in the area.

M/S
A. B.

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CONFIDENTIAL**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : Director, OSS, Administration Building
 Via : Reports Office, Secretariat, 200 South Building
 FROM : Acting Deputy Chief, Field Photographic Branch

DATE: 2 August 1945

SUBJECT: Overseas Returnee Report of Lt. John W. English, USNR

1. No comments.
2. For your information and file.

Encl. 1-Report dated 2 August 1945 and
 two enclosures thereto.

GUY V. THAYER, JR.
 Chief W/Photo. USNR

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

TO: Director, OSS, Administration Building 2 August 1945

VIA: Reports Office, Secretariat, 209 South Building
Chief, Field Photographic Branch

FROM: Lt. John W. English, USNR

SUBJECT: Overseas Returnee Report

Enclosures 1 and 2 are reports of my activities in the ETO from 24 June to 19 July 1945. I left the theater on 22 July 1945. These enclosures still set forth progress of work as well as achievements in this work in that theater.

In the field, closer working liaison must be maintained between OSS and the Office of Chief of Counsel. There are many administrative difficulties which have unnecessarily slowed up Office of Chief of Counsel work. It is believed, and hoped, that administration will be improved in the Office of Chief of Counsel in the future due to the recent appointment of able officers in that field.

Specifically, the questions of billeting and messing continually arise for personnel on the Continent. OSS has refused to billet Office of Chief of Counsel personnel and that organization has been unable to make other arrangements for them. It is recommended that until this question is clearly decided, instructions should be given to OSS personnel in Forward Areas to billet any Office of Chief of Counsel personnel who are in the area.

Encl. 1-Report dated 16 July 1945
2-Report dated 20 July 1945

JOHN W. ENGLISH
Lieut., USNR

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TO : DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES DEPT. OF DEFENSE
FROM : THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT : [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

On 30 June Lt. English flew to Paris and proceeded to Mogens and various headquarters for the Field Photographic Branch. Conferences were held with Mr. David Pugh, Lt. Robert Higgins and 4th Colonel on the work which had already been done on the photographing of these targets and instructions of the JAF office. It was reported that about 20,000 feet of film had already been shot or investigated and of course in July 1945. In addition preliminary contacts had been made with General Bates, and his staff.

From 30 June to 2 July conferences were held with Colonel Latham and Colonel Lind of the Signal Corps, Lt. Col. Stewart of the Signal Corps, Lt. Col. Hinkle, Colonel Stacey, Major Hargrave and Major Baldwin of the Office of the Chief of Counsel, and Colonel Gault of OSS. At these conferences the full support was stated that they wished us to continue with our photographic program of these investigations and trials and promised to assist us in the procurement of these facilities. It was not possible to contact Colonel Newman, the Staff Photographic Officer, General Bates, or Colonel Hill. It was also determined that most of the members of interest in Paris had moved their offices to forward

*JUNE 1944 ON PAGES 119 OF PHOTO COPY OF THE DOCUMENT

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76. * Reproduction of documents and photographs of the same, and the use of the same for the purpose of the investigation, shall be made in accordance with the provisions of the law.

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• 1972-1973 was the first year that the number of students enrolled in the program was less than the number of students who graduated. This was due to a number of factors, including a decrease in the number of students who applied to the program and a decrease in the number of students who were accepted.

The following is a list of the names of the persons who have been appointed to the various committees of the House of Representatives, for the session of 1890-91:

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DATE 08-14-2010 BY 60322 UCBAW/SJS

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the entire program with him and ask his assistance in any clearances that might be required. Colonel Wentworth stated that if orders were obtained from USPT permitting the procurement of film, he felt no further clearances were necessary. A conference was also held with Colonel Cameron of LG AG SO to determine whether any raw stock was located in the theatre.

On 11 July Lt. English and Lt. Max Loeb proceeded from Wiesbaden to Bayreuth where they remained during the 12 July. On 13 July they proceeded from Bayreuth to Kitzbach and Lichtenfels and Wiesbaden. A report of their findings made by Lt. Max Loeb is a part of this report.

On 14 July and 15 July Lt. English remained at Wiesbaden and took care of various administrative matters.

On 14 July Lt. English proceeded from Wiesbaden to Paris and conferred with Lt. Armistead, Major Schulgen, Major Martlein, Major Patterson and Major Hamilton on the War Crimes Program.

On 17 July Lt. English and Lt. Armistead attended to Field Photo Administrative matters.

On 18 July Lt. English, Lt. Armistead, Major Patterson and Major Hamilton held conferences with Col. Storey and Major Baldwin on documentary material which had been discovered, and conferred with Colonel Hill on the War Crimes program. A conference was also held with Lt. Colonel Newman USPT Photographic Office and with Lt. Col. Kenneth Downs GSC on the War Crimes program.

On 19 July Lt. English proceeded to London where he conferred with Commander Demovak and Lt. Down on the War Crimes Program.

1. The first part of the document is a letter from the President of the United States to the Congress, dated January 3, 1862. It is a message of condolence to the people of the State of California, who have been afflicted by a severe drought and famine. The President expresses his sympathy for the suffering people and offers them the aid of the Federal Government. He also mentions the recent discovery of gold in California, which he hopes will bring relief to the people.

[illegible][illegible]

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DATE 08-14-2010 BY 60322 UCBAW

It has been my preliminary opinion, etc., to set up a system for the improvement of photographic evidence for the trial of major and minor cases and to arrange for the photographing of each subject and other persons connected

-2-

100	Section of the United States Civil Service Commission
101	State of New York, Albany, N.Y.
102	Department of State, Washington, D.C.

SECRET
NO DISSEM

CONFIDENTIAL

DIVISION OF NORTH
 MEDICAL SERVICE, NO. 100
 NORTH DISTRICT, CHINA

14-00000
The following information was received from the Ministry of the Interior, Department of the Interior, on the subject of the above mentioned matter:

CONFIDENTIAL





SECRET ✓**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : Acting Director

DATE: 1 August 1945

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Major Jewell G. Haynie
China/Services

Major Haynie recommends that:

- 1) "paper work" be reduced to an absolute minimum. Mr. Ream has asked Lt. Ed Wilson to look into this on his present trip.
- 2) with the present ceiling of 2000 for CT only the most efficient personnel be sent to the theater. As noted, Administrative Services policy is to send only personnel with exact capabilities required.
- 3) each man sent out be fully equipped to perform his mission. This is, according to Mr. Ream, carefully checked and has become S.O.P.
- 4) personnel in the continental U.S. traveling on official OES business be issued meal tickets. Mr. Ream indicates that this is being done.

Thomas Victor
Pvt. Thomas Victor
Reports Office

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Secretariat - Reports Office
 FROM : Mr. Louis M. Ream
 SUBJECT: Returnee Report - Major Jewell O. Haynie

DATE 25 July 1945

1. "Paper Work": Lt. Ed Wilson has been requested to determine if paper work is in excess or not and to report on same during his present trip.

2. "Need for Most Efficient Personnel Due to Personnel Ceiling": No personnel is being recruited for Services - Far East unless the personnel have the exact abilities and meet all the specifications requested by the theater. This procedure will remain in effect if the contemplated increase in the personnel ceiling is granted.

3. "Personnel Arriving in Theater not Fully Equipped": This situation has been corrected since the Transportation Branch has become a part of Services. The Transportation Branch has prepared an adequate "check list" of all supplies needed in each theater by enlisted men, officers and civilians. Each person is instructed to read same, told how to get the items, and must sign the "check list" stating all items are in his possession before leaving OSS-Washington for overseas.

4. "Meal Tickets": These are issued to all enlisted men and in addition upon request to officers. As the meal ticket gives people no selection of what they are to eat the majority of officers do not desire them.

5. The undersigned regards the report of Major Haynie as excellent.

L. M. Ream
 Louis M. Ream
 Deputy Director
 Administrative Services

WBR
 ana

∴ ४२।

25 JUL 1945

Reference Report - Major General O. Haynie

[illegible][illegible]

IT SUITS TO REMOVED OUR WE STRONGEST POSITIONING FOR

1. PRODUCE ATTORNEY JOHN JACOBSON AT 1015 W. 12TH ST. 22

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

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17,289

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

10 July 1945

SUBJECT: Report Required by G.O. No. 63 OSS dated 14 March 1945

TO: The Director, OSS (Thru Channels)

1. Pursuant to instructions contained in Travel Orders, Ship-ment 13-519-1F issued at Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment OSS, Washington, D. C. and dated 20 January 1945 the undersigned pro-ceeded from Washington, D. C. by rail on 27 January 1945 to Miami, Florida and thence by air to APO 627, reporting for duty thereat 4 March 1945.

2. Upon arrival at APO 627 the undersigned was assigned as Supply Officer, China Theater and on 8 March was appointed Survey Officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, China Theater as an additional duty. On 11 May the undersigned was given the addition-al duty of Executive Officer, Services Branch, China Theater and on 22 May the additional duty of Procurement Officer, China Theater was awarded the undersigned.

3. The following observations and recommendations are sub-mitted for your consideration:

- a. On the whole the China Theater, OSS is well organized, is an efficient, smoothly running organization and is producing good results. In the past there have been instances which would indicate duplication of effort, overlapping agencies etc., but these details are appar-ently being ferreted out and corrected as fast as possible.
- b. The overpayment headache of "paper work" is evident in the China Theater also. It is suggested that every report, memorandum, piece of paper, etc., etc. etc., be eliminated to the very minimum consistent with efficient operation and control.
- c. The personnel ceiling for China Theater has been set at 1000 which means that everyone must carry his share of the load. It is suggested that we reduce our efforts to maintain only the most efficient personnel and make sure that only the best men are sent overseas. Men of a variety of skills of course are preferable and especially men capable of the specialty for which he was recruited. With the various and sundry

The Director, OSS

-2-

10 July 1945

functions and duties which the Services Branch, China Theater is called upon to perform and taking into consideration the several bases they are called upon to establish and operate it is believed that the Services allotment of personnel is entirely too low - even with an overall ceiling of 2000. It is recommended that serious consideration be given to raising the Services Branch personnel ceiling by 100 even if some of the allotment must be drawn from other branches since without the Services Branch the other branches are at a loss to operate.

- d. There have been numerous instances of personnel arriving in the China Theater not fully equipped to perform the mission for which they were sent out. In almost every instance the items which these men were short were available in the supply room in Washington but someone neglected to draw the items. The supply section cannot ascertain what each man needs and it is suggested that the Branch Chief concerned be charged with the responsibility of seeing that each man he sends out is equipped to perform the mission for which he is being dispatched. This will lift some of the burden from "the longest supply line in the world" and will insure that the equipment reaches the theater of operation at the same time as the man who is to use it. This paragraph refers more especially to special or unusual equipment more than to common used items.
- e. It is suggested that personnel traveling in the continental United States on official OSS business be equipped with meal tickets. These meal tickets insure priority service in most dining cars and in many instances will determine that the man is fed.

Jewell O. Haynie
 JEWELL O. HAYNIE
 Maj. Gen., Ord. Dept.

SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : Acting Director

DATE: 1 August 1945

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Capt. Howard P. Hall
SO, ETO

1. Capt. Hall suggests that a consistent policy be set up to:
 - a. Unify and centralize administrative work.
 - b. Insure that a man's rank be in keeping with work performed.
 - c. Fix definite responsibility with any job assignment.
2. Major Brugger in his covering memorandum states that such a policy is now being followed by the SSO's in the field.

Thomas Victor
Pvt. Thomas Victor
Reports Office

WCH

SECRET

1st Ind.

HTB/ewp

Operations Officer, ESO, OSS, Washington, D.C. 27 July 1945

TO: Chief, SO

1. Forwarded for your information.

Harrison T. Harrow
 HARRISON T. HARROW
 Capt. Ord.
 Operations Officer, ESO.

2nd Ind.

VWB/ed

Office of the Chief, SO, 30 July 1945. TO: The Director (through the Reports Office of the Secretariat).

1. Noted.
2. As to the suggestions recommended in Paragraph 2, basic communication, it is desired to make the following comments:

(a) The responsibilities for members within this Branch are definite.

(b) The coordination between this Branch and other Branches is being continually improved.

(c) It is the understanding in this office that in the field, the assignment of duties to military personnel comparable to their rank and grade is the policy of the Strategic Services Officers in so far as it is consistent with the Mission and the duties to be performed. The paramount consideration is always given to the Mission. The qualifications of available personnel must be utilized to the greatest extent possible.

Vernon W. Bruggen
 VERNON W. BRUGGEN
 Major, Cavalry
 Deputy Chief, SO

SECRET

SECRET

19 July 1945

TO: Captain William B. Kantack
THROUGH: Captain Harrison T. Barrow
FROM: Captain Howard P. Hall C.E.
SUBJECT: Report of Activities in the ETO.

1. Chronological report of assignments during the months of October, November, and early December, 1944. I was a trainee stationed in London, and attended group B intelligence school near Southampton, and British Parachute school at Ringway.

From the middle of December until late February, 1945, I was assigned to the OSS Field Detachment with the Seventh Army, then operating in Alsace. Work involved recruiting, briefing, and infiltrating agents into enemy territory to obtain tactical intelligence.

During March and April I was assigned to the Field Detachment under Col. Verrill with the First Allied Airborne Army. Mission was as before infiltration of agents to provide tactical assistance to the Allied Armies advancing.

2. Suggestions: One of the most difficult shots in golf is pinning the responsibility for anything onto anybody in this organization. The trouble in my opinion, lies in the fact that civilian and military personnel are intermixed all the way up the chain of command, so that each tends to pass the buck to the other at whatever level a question comes up; and the coordination between branches leaves a lot to be desired. Since it is on neither a completely military, nor a completely civilian basis, the result is that administrative details frequently delay action in the field. The condition could be corrected by unification and centralization of administrative work, which would eliminate a lot of duplications; and by the adoption of a consistent system of assignment of duties, whereby a man's rank would be in keeping with the work he does, and men of different ranks would not be doing the same thing; and finally by definite assignment of responsibility along with any job.

Howard P. Hall
HOWARD P. HALL,
Captain C.E.

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64
Office Memorandum**SECRET**

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Acting Director
FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office
SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Capt. Albert H. Hill
 REA/ETO

DATE: 3 August 1945

Capt. Hill, Senior Intelligence Analyst with the Ministry of Home Security and Air Ministry, notes the uncooperative attitude encountered at 59 Grosvenor. Mr. Kent makes no comment.

Thomas Viator
Pvt. Thomas Viator
Reports Office

17,274

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

26 July 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO: Director
VIA: Reports Office, Secretariat
FROM: Sherman Kent

The attached report of Captain Albert H. Hill is forwarded herewith by the Acting Chief of the R&A Branch without comment.

Sherman Kent

Sherman Kent, Acting Chief
Research and Analysis Branch



REPLY REFER TO

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

RESTRICTED



Joint Target Group
3D-165, Pentagon

7 June, 1945

SUBJECT: OVERSEAS REPORT OF DUTIES

TO: DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Period in England - January, 1944 to April, 1945.

Duties: Senior Intelligence Analyst on special studies with RE/S, Ministry of Home Security and Air Ministry, Princes Risborough, England.

Studies included special industrial targets, Marshalling Yards, and Oil Plants. A report was prepared for the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet on the work of the Research and Experiments Department.

The entire period in England was spent with the British - O.S.S. thru F.E.W. to M.H.S. Only contact with O.S.S. was thru monthly orders, supply, finance and administration.

I am reluctant to put into report form criticism of O.S.S. Thru the independence of action and freedom from 'military control' the period of accomplishment was possible. In detail, the brief 'official' contacts with O.S.S. Military Hdqtrs. were on the whole unsatisfactory. There was an obvious reluctance to perform routine duties - even in Standard Procedure. Specific description is unnecessary. It breaks down to instances of plain rudeness, inertia, and an incredible waste of time. Suggestions at this time of eliminating 'annoyances' met with at 59 Governor seem futile.

Again, thru O.S.S. I have felt that I have been able to contribute in the total effort in a way that would not otherwise have been possible.

Present assignment with J.T.G. is highly satisfactory.

Albert H. Hill

ALBERT H. HILL
Captain, C.E.

OFFICIAL COPY OF THIS DOCUMENT IS TO BE KEPT IN THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR, ARMY AIR FORCES, WASHINGTON, D. C.

17-274

RESTRICTED

Joint Target Group
3D-188, Pentagon

7 June, 1945

SUBJECT: OVERSEAS REPORT OF DUTIES

TO: DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Period in England - January, 1944 to April, 1945.

Duties: Senior Intelligence Analyst on special studies with RE/S, Ministry of Home Security and Air Ministry, Princess Elizabeth, England.

Studies included special industrial targets, Warshipping Yards, and Oil Plants. A report was prepared for the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet on the work of the Research and Experiments Department.

The entire period in England was spent with the British - C.S.S. thru F.S.W. to M.E.S. Only contact with C.S.S. was thru monthly orders, supply, finance and administration.

I am reluctant to put into report form criticism of C.S.S. Then the independence of action and freedom from 'military control' the period of accomplishment was possible. In detail, the brief 'official' contacts with C.S.S. Military Hdqrs. were on the whole unsatisfactory. There was an obvious reluctance to perform routine duties - even in Standard Procedure. Specific description is unnecessary. It breaks down to instances of plain rudeness, inertia, and an incredible waste of time. Suggestions at this time of eliminating 'unresponsiveness' met with at best Orevencor seem futile.

Again, thru C.S.S. I have felt that I have been able to contribute in the total effort in a way that would not otherwise have been possible.

Present assignment with J.T.G. is highly satisfactory.

ALBERT M. HILL
Captain, C.S.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

13 July 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO: Director, OSS
FROM: Chief, SI Branch
SUBJECT: Field Report of Captain Ray Brittenham

Attached herewith is a report which has been submitted by subject officer. It is quite brief and covers Capt. Brittenham's activities in connection with the Espinette Mission to Belgium. It does not indicate the outstanding service which Capt. Brittenham performed in this assignment. He was almost entirely responsible for planning and carrying out the mission in the face of many difficulties.

You are doubtless aware of the large amount of intelligence which was furnished to the American Forces as a result of his work.

W. T. Harrison
W. T. Harrison
H. Shepherdson

SECRET

2nd Ind.

17-76
Fuller
Palmer, Lm H
VNB/ed

Chief, SO 13 July 1945

TO: The Director (Through Reports Office of the Secretariat)

1. Noted.

2. There is no information in basic communication which is believed would be of any value to the Strategic Services Officers in the Far East theater. Therefore no further action is contemplated in this report.

William E. Duggan
WILLIAM E. DUGGAN
1st Lt., USMCR
Chief, SO

W. E. Duggan

SECRET

SECRET

2nd Ind.

17271
 Field report
 X Church, E.L.
 X C. X. X. X.
 VHB/cd

Chief, SO 13 July 1945

TO: The Director (through Reports Office of the Secretariat)

1. Report considered comprehensive as to the operational functions of an Air Resupply Detachment at Brindisi, Italy. However, as such functions vary in different theaters, the observations contained in the basic communication are not considered applicable in the Far East.
2. No further action is contemplated on this report.

William E. Duggan
 WILLIAM E. DUGGAN
 1st Lt., USMC
 Chief, SO

(9C10)

reps office has seen

18 July 1945

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

2nd Ind.

Office of the Chief, SO, 21 July 1948. TO: The Director, OSS (through Reports Office of the Secretariat).

1. Noted.

Vernon M. Brugger
VERNON M. BRUGGER
Major, Cavalry
Deputy Chief, SO

17.2.70

Final report
1. General, 1. Kader

VNB/od

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET26
Field Report.

x Picich

file

J. D. W.

22 August 1945.

Colonel Doering:

Herald Miller is no longer with us. He may return to town briefly in several weeks.

I talked with Colonel Embury about the attached. He doesn't have detailed information but substantiates my own knowledge.

The statement that the planning and training of the Jedburghs was initiated by themselves is loosely written and inaccurate. As you know the Jedburghs were in a school run jointly by SO and SOE. It was one of the largest and best schools in the whole training system in England (I spent several days there in 1944). The Jedburghs who went into Denmark had been trained in that school. However, the school was disbanded after the liberation of France.

According to Embury the decision to send some Jedburghs to Denmark was taken by the appropriate staff organization in the SO-SOE Headquarters. Moreover the activity of the Jedburghs who went in had to be coordinated with that of the military units who had responsibility for that area. All of this, of course, would be accomplished through the SO-SOE staff channels.


I imagine that Captain Pietson is referring in his statement to the fact that no Jedburgh school existed when he undertook his operation and he and his fellow officers organized their own further training course including that portion which required their obtaining a detailed knowledge of the area into which they were to go.

J. D. W.
John D. Wilson.

Attachment.

SECRET

Top ↑



[Expt 15 1/2 018.6.3]

SECRET**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

2 July 1945

TO: Captain William B. Kantack

THROUGH: Captain Harrison T. Barrow

FROM: Captain William M. Pietsch, Jr.

SUBJECT: Overseas Report

I returned from overseas duty where I had worked as a Jedburgh in France, on 5 February 1945. While I was on leave following my return from Europe, a request was received from the ETO for me to return to Europe for a mission that had just arisen. On reporting to London I was informed that a plan was being formulated to send six Jedburgh teams into Denmark, three of these teams to be British and three to be American. The plan called for coordination between the British organization, SOB and CMB/30. Since Denmark was considered in the British area, SOE was more active in the planning. The three American teams were organized mainly with the view to provide American representation in Denmark as it was planned that no American troops were to enter Denmark.

The planning and training of the Jedburghs was initiated by the Jedburghs themselves. Inasmuch as every one of the Danish Jedburghs had already seen action in similar work in France, these men were qualified and experienced in the type of work to be done in Denmark. Conferences were held frequently with Brigadier Mookler-Ferryman, Mr. Miller, and other high ranking officers concerned with Special Force work. At these conferences the exact duties and requirements of each Jedburgh mission were formulated.

It was decided that each Jedburgh team be provided with civilian clothes and false identification. Due to the fact that Denmark was extremely densely populated and policed by many German troops, it was considered impossible to operate other than in civilian clothes. Although each man concerned was a military person and desired to wear his uniform, every man agreed to wear civilian clothes when it was explained that the mission could not be accomplished in uniform.

The object of the Jedburgh missions was to establish contact with the underground, to impart the instructions of the Supreme Allied Command, to direct the underground in specific missions contemplated by the Allied Command, and to accept the surrender of German units who would not surrender to the underground but who were likely to surrender to representatives of Allied Command.

SECRET

SECRET

2nd Ind.

Chief, SO, 18 July 1945

TO: The Director (through Reports Office of the Secretariat)

1. Subject report is descriptive of details involved in the planning, training and dispatching of team on a Jedburgh mission.

2. Since no problems are mentioned or recommendations offered for improvement, no further action is contemplated on this report.

William C. Duquoin
WILLIAM C. DUQUOIN
1st Lt., USMC
Chief, SO

*+10 - 70006 Sub. 4000
I would be glad to
be in command
of the team to be
sent to the
Jedburgh mission*

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

7, 265

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: 25 July 1945

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Lt. Edmund D. Wardrop
SI/FETO

1. Lt. Wardrop, a member of the air office at Det. 404, mentions the difficulties involved in dropping supplies, and states that operating personnel were not given enough information on a specific job.

2. Mr. Shepardson considers these criticisms valid and has written the Field suggesting that steps be taken to correct these faults.

Thomas Victor
Pvt. Thomas Victor
Reports Office

WAK

17,265
SECRET

13 July 1945

TO: The Director
FROM: Chief, SI
SUBJECT: Attached field report of Lt. Edmund D. Wardrop

The subject officer apparently did excellent work in the Field and it is our opinion that the statements made in his report are valid. The difficulties in dropping supplies appear to be the same as those encountered in the previous similar operations at IOL.

We have written to the Field suggesting that steps be taken to correct the faults, of which the Field is undoubtedly already conscious. Very little more can be done from here.

W. H. Harrison

SECRET

OF 1944

10-10-68

2. The entire document is the U. S. G. 10 (MAGNETIC)

7. Comparison between findings in Kandy seemed no better than elsewhere. It appeared that the majority of the people in Kandy were not aware of the situation in the country and that the majority of the people in Kandy were not aware of the situation in the country.

1. The first of these is the fact that the United States has a large and growing population of Negroes, who are being educated and are becoming more and more conscious of their rights. This has led to a demand for equality of treatment and opportunity, which is being met by the Government and the people. The second is the fact that the United States has a large and growing population of immigrants, who are being educated and are becoming more and more conscious of their rights. This has led to a demand for equality of treatment and opportunity, which is being met by the Government and the people. The third is the fact that the United States has a large and growing population of people of other races, who are being educated and are becoming more and more conscious of their rights. This has led to a demand for equality of treatment and opportunity, which is being met by the Government and the people.

[illegible]

1. The writer is a member of the Air Force of the United States and is stationed at the Air Force Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C. He is a member of the Air Force of the United States and is stationed at the Air Force Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.

SECRET

10-11-68

302-30111-101

DATE: 12 JUL 1975

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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
SECRET

2nd Ind.

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Field Report
x Cassin, Gene
VWR/lltChief, SO, 18 July, 1945. TO: Director, OSS (thru Reports Office of
the Secretariat).

x SO x huc TO

1. Noted.

2. Since there is no information in this report considered
applicable to the Far East theaters, no further action is contemplated.

 WILLIAM E. DUGGAN
 1st Lt., USMC

1 encl: a/s

PAW

SECRET

14/8

17,264

Report:

Gino Casolini
S O Branch

July 15, 1945

I left Washington September 3, 1944 and flew to Naples, via Casablanca and Algiers. Reported at 100th Regiment S.O. on September 15th.

On September 28th I was assigned to S.I. by request of Lt. Col. Van der Hof, S.O. of the 100th Detachment. For three weeks I helped Lt. Col. Van der Hof in reorganizing the motor pool and to iron out a few difficulties.

Following this period I was asked by Lt. Col. Van der Hof to work under cover as S.I. agent in Rome. Within this group I met a definite opposition, due to the fact that I was Lt. Col. Van der Hof's son, since they had opposed his policies.

I stayed and I reported to M.G. and on January 14th I was assigned to Company B, S.O., where I remained until May 10th, when Company B was demobilized.

During the above period, I worked in the Operation Group with Major Jason B. Smith as evaluator and translator.

I arrived and reported in Washington, June 2nd, 1945.

Gino Casolini

SECRET

RESULTS

100-443887-1

1. The first part of the document is a letter from the President of the United States to the Congress, dated January 1, 1861. It is a formal address, and it begins with the words "My Countrymen," and it is signed by Abraham Lincoln.

It is hereby stated that the above mentioned person is not a member of the Communist Party of the United States of America, and is not a member of any other organization which is known to be a front organization for the Communist Party of the United States of America.

It was found that at least two different cables non-
existent in the inventory prior to his arrival there.
He was transferred to SI because the SO operation
was not ready to be closed. The files indicate that
the transfer from branch to branch was in each covered
by the proper papers signed by the Branch Chief.
Inventory of files, and theater of office concerned.
It is more doubtful he was still held on the table
as indicated in the communications, SO, and SI
Inventory of the matter later.

15. The training was one of several officers transferred to Middle West Base, SO, in September, 1945. He was used as staff officer with 50 missions to the Salinas. The training at Area A-3 and A-4 took place in November and early December 1945. Lt. Hugh-
ton was awarded 25 days fifty days not three
months after completing training, including the
thirty-one days in exercises.

The following is based on investigation of the Security Commission's file, and it is recommended that the Bureau be advised of the results.

Reference is made to the report of the 1st Lt. Henry Montenegro, SN/KN010

105-1014205 - 10000

Page 10

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director
 FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office
 SUBJECT: Returnee Report: 1st Lt. Henry Lichtenberger
 SI/MSDTG

DATE: 25 July 1945

Lt. Lichtenberger writes a detailed report of his activities with OSS both in Washington and in the field. His is a story of complete confusion and frustration, and while he makes no specific criticisms or suggestions, as noted by Mr. Shepardson, the report in itself reflects a deplorable lack of coordination and planning within the organization.

Thomas Victor
 Pvt. Thomas Victor
 Reports Office

TO →

WOK

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

19 July 1946

MEMORANDUM

TO: Director, OSS
FROM: Chief, SI Branch
SUBJECT: Field Report of Lt. Henry Lichtenberger

This report is of no practical value in that it is merely a record of frustration of an officer who was sent to Cairo by SO, transferred to SI and later went to Italy and Yugoslavia.

It offers no constructive comment or criticism.

Henry H. Shepherd
Henry H. Shepherd

Attachment

SECRET

in 1946. This was the first time I had been in the United States since I left in 1941.

When I arrived in 1946, I reported, as instructed, to the

Office of the Director.

My first assignment was to the Office of the Director, where I was assigned to the

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DATE: 17 July 1946

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

17243

- 2 -

to them, and didn't know what to do with me. I was sent to the Communications Branch where someone remembered SI needed communications officers. I then found myself in the SI Branch. Eight months later, I was still held on the tables of organization of the Communications, SO and SI Branches.

C. Assignment Overseas:

Shortly after my arrival, not knowing what assignment I would have, but having been told I could refuse an assignment I didn't want, I volunteered for parachute training. After I returned from such training, I was interviewed by Major Richard Weil (now Lt. Colonel) who wanted a communications officer to establish lateral communication between a main team, which would be at Tito's headquarters in Yugoslavia, and all other teams in Yugoslavia. We were to go in, possibly by parachute, to Tito's headquarters where I was to set up my station. I then proceeded to Bari, Italy, where this idea met with "great disapproval" with the Communications Branch.

D. Time in Italy:

I arrived in Italy approximately 4 April 1944. I was preparing to go "in" when some difficulties caused Major Weil's departure for the States. I was instructed to wait for his return. Until he returned in late July 1944, I did odd jobs for the Yugoslav Section, SI, in Bari. After the Major's return the plan for lateral communications again met with "great disapproval" from the Communications Branch. The American Military Mission to Tito was formed, and I was retained to go along as a communications officer in the hope that I could get authority

- 3 -

to do my job.

2. Time in Yugoslavia:

I arrived on the Island of Vis, where in one day I set up a small radio station to maintain communications with Italy. I had two radio operators with me and had nothing to do but wait and hope for authority to go ahead. Tito moved inland and so did we, and I arrived in Belgrade after it fell to the Russians. I set up another radio station and worked as a radio operator for awhile, but the plan was still not approved. Finally the plan was approved by Communications, and another officer and three enlisted men, all of Communications Branch, were sent in to put the plan into effect. By this time, it was too late for the lateral communications to be of any importance. I then worked as general Services Officer with the mission and remained in Belgrade until my return to the States in May 1948.

3. Conditions in the field that might be improved

No comment.

4. Specific difficulties of which I personally became aware

No comment.

Charles L. Lichtenberger
1st Lt. Major Lichtenberger

SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**17, 26 /
DATE: 24 July 1945
X 50 140

TO : The Director
 FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office
 SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Hans Erichsen
 SO/STO

In a clearly written report, Mr. Erichsen, Chief of the Norwegian Section of the Westfield Mission, lists the results achieved by the Sepals parties (pp 2, 3), and makes concise recommendations in connection with the work of an SO mission in a neutral country (p. 5). His criticisms (p. 4) according to Lt. Duggan's memorandum have already been worked out by the Strategic Services officers.

Thomas Victor
 Pvt. Thomas Victor
 Reports Office

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
Chief, SO, 18 July 1945

TO: The Director (through Reports Office of the Secretariat)

1. Report is considered complete and comprehensive as to subject's duties, activities and accomplishments.

2. Recommendations are excellent as to need for liaison and cooperation with proper officials while operating in a neutral country.

3. The problems enumerated in this report as applicable to War East theaters are believed to have been already worked out by the Strategic Services Officers. No further action is contemplated.


WILLIAM E. DUGGAN
1st Lt., USMCR
Chief, SO

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SECRET**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

4 July 1946

TO: Captain William B. Kantack
 THROUGH: Captain Harrison T. Barrow
 FROM: Hans Eriksen
 SUBJECT: Overseas Report

A detailed final report has been submitted to the SO Branch of OSS through the Westfield Mission to SO Headquarters, London. The following paragraphs will merely bring out some of the points requested in the outline.

A. Description of Duties and Activities.**1. Duties and Responsibilities.**

My duties were in brief to act as Chief of the Norwegian Section of the Westfield Mission, and in that capacity to organize resistance groups to carry out sabotage and other activities designed to hamper the German military war effort. In carrying out this directive, I was also to maintain liaison with the British SOE representatives in Stockholm and with the Norwegian underground military organization (Milorg) who, together with Westfield, formed the Stockholm Branch of Special Forces, London.

2. Activities.

These are all described in detail in the other report, but it may be mentioned here that a total of four resistance bases were established and approximately 80 men were regularly attached to them and under our orders. In addition to these 80, there were other underground units within Norway which were recruited through the various bases.

The Westfield "B" Section cooperated with the operations of the Norwegian Group under Major Galt by preparing the reception of the party and arranging for the movement of supplies to it after it had been dropped.

Another major operation was carried out in cooperation with the Supply Section under Captain Hansen. This operation, known as "Twinkle", moved over 200 tons of military supplies to the underground movement.

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SECRET

Captain Kantack

- 2 -

4 July 1945

In Norway. These supplies were shipped from England by ATC, were received by our Supply Section and distributed by the Norwegian Section. After January of 1945, not a single British, Norwegian, or American resistance party left Sweden for Norway without having been armed from American stocks.

In cooperation with other agencies represented at the American Legation, Stockholm, the Norwegian Section carried on a number of activities such as the distribution of both white and black propaganda within Norway, the procurement of specialized intelligence for ATC among others, and the provision of reports on public opinion in Norway for the State Department.

As the American representative of SFHQ in Norway at the Stockholm post, it was also my responsibility to cooperate in the dispatching and equipping of all parties, whether or not American. Very close touch was therefore maintained with the SOE and the Norwegians, and tri-weekly conferences were held in order to coordinate our joint activities as much as possible.

B. Progress and Results of Activities.

Neither progress nor results can be noted during the period between my arrival in Stockholm on 28 March 1943, and the arrival of Colonel Brewer in November of the same year. From November 1943, until the establishment of the Sepals bases in August 1944, the work was made extremely difficult by the fact that no directives delimiting the operational responsibilities of the Westfield Mission were given us by London. This was a difficulty of the entire mission and not only the Norwegian Section. Subsequent to Colonel Brewer's visit to London in July 1944, a directive was given us granting authority to proceed with operations and intelligence. As a result of this, the Sepals bases were established.

During the fall of 1944, the Sepals parties were restricted to intelligence work by orders from London. This was unfortunate because it was later found that the fall was the best time of the year to carry on active operations in the area where they were located. Later, despite extremely difficult terrain and very difficult weather conditions, the parties managed to do the following things:

1. Demolish on regimental supply depot filled with valuable highway construction machinery;
2. Demolish approximately 10 German border guardhouses and barracks. The result of this action was to force the Germans to withdraw their guard lines some forty miles and to detail approximately two additional companies of men to guard key border areas (weather conditions);

SECRET

SECRET

Captain Kantack

- 5 -

4 July 1945

3. The destruction of one highway ferry with a capacity for 17 army trucks, and the putting out of use of one additional smaller ferry and one Finnish steamship of approximately 1,500 tons. The party involved in this operation also demolished two snow ploughs needed for clearing the mountain roads;

4. The organization of the resistance movement in North Norway was completely in the hands of the Sepals parties and the Zone Commander for North Norway stated after the capitulation that the occupation could not have been carried out without the help of the underground. This is understandable in view of the fact that one month after VE-Day the German troops numbered 130,000, the ex-POW's 45,000, and Allied troops 1,200. The entire resistance movement in the area in question was directly under the control of the officers dispatched from the Sepals parties and Captain Kyllingmark, who was our field Commanding Officer, had been made District Leader of all the resistance forces in the area. These numbered approximately 8,000 men.

5. Valuable intelligence was provided SPHQ by the Sepals units both by a courier and by direct radio transmission to London. This intelligence was particularly useful during the fall of 1944 when the German armies were evacuating North Finland and Norway.

The exact figures regarding the part played by Westfield in supplying the Norwegian resistance movement will be found in Captain Damm's report on the Supply Section. It may merely be stated here that without the movement of supplies provided by this field, the activities of Norwegian resistance in the last five months of the war might very well have been considerably reduced.

Westfield also maintained Major Colby's group with food, arms, clothing and other equipment until approximately two weeks before VE-Day, when the condition of the snow in the mountains made it impossible to transport any further material. A total of approximately three tons of material were sent to the Morse Group from Stockholm during the period they were in operation.

Roughly one-half ton of white and black propaganda were distributed to the Oslo area of Norway during the last three months of the war. A unit of approximately 400 men and women worked in Oslo to distribute this material. These, although not OSN recruited, spent most of their effort in distributing the products of MO and OWI.

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Captain Kantack

- 4 -

4 July 1946

C. Possible Improvements.

My possibilities for constructive criticism are somewhat limited by the fact that I spent the entire period of my service in the field and have not had the opportunity to visit London or Washington since my departure. The following points have struck me, however, and they are submitted for consideration.

1. Without criticism of the personnel in London, it was my very definite opinion that the American side of SFHQ should have been considerably strengthened. It was obviously impossible for two men, despite obvious ability to enter upon operational details in a large headquarters. The solution to this problem would seem to me to have been the recruitment of between five and ten staff officers who would have worked in the various operational sections of SFHQ in order to enter into the work completely. It is my understanding that this was the way the French resistance was handled and I believe it should have been the same in the case of Scandinavia. It is obviously impossible to have a truly joint headquarters if one partner is outnumbered by the other by approximately twenty to one.

2. Related to the previous suggestion is the fact that liaison between London and Stockholm could have been much greater. This again was not a purely American illness, the SOE suffered in exactly the same way and it may be almost impossible for the field and Headquarters to see eye to eye on all matters. Nevertheless it became apparent that personal contact between the staffs of Headquarters and the field were extremely necessary and extremely useful. The problems which can be settled quickly in conversation may necessitate long interchanges of memoranda and letters. For the field to operate efficiently, it must be fully informed of all matters pertaining to its activities, and this is impossible without a free flow of information from Headquarters than was true in our case.

3. My own personal experience made it very clear to me that it is extremely desirable for Headquarters personnel to go into the field with operational groups from time to time. They need not necessarily go into action but they should at least be in a position to appreciate the difficulties of movement, transport, and living under field conditions. In my own case, I now realize that I many times underestimated difficulties purely because I had no real idea of what they consisted and was then disappointed when a desired project was not carried out.

D. Recommendations for Activities in a Neutral Country.

There are several points which I feel should be emphasized in connection with the work of an SO mission in a neutral country. These are as follows:

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SECRET

Captain Kantack

- 5 -

4 July 1945

1. First and foremost, the cooperation and goodwill of the Minister or Ambassador must be obtained. The cooperation of the Legation can be of very great assistance and if not obtained, it is only a question of time before a controversy will arise which in all probability would injure the work of the mission.

2. The same is true of cooperation with the Military and Naval Attaches who are both very often in a position to render great assistance to a mission of this type. The extent of their assistance will of course vary from country to country, but it will normally be found that they do have facilities at hand which can be of great value.

3. One reason for obtaining the assistance of the Department of State or the Legation is that they are in a position to inform the mission of the temper of the neutral government. It is then relatively easy to judge the attitude of the government and to estimate just how close to the line one can go. It must be assumed that any extensive SO operation based in a neutral country will very shortly become known to the intelligence service of that country and their attitude must therefore be carefully gauged.

4. If at all possible, enlist the cooperation of the Secret Service or Military Intelligence of the neutral power. Tell them enough so that they will be in a position to bail you out of difficulties, but attempt to avoid giving them sufficient information to incriminate you in case the political wind should change.

5. In general, avoid doing anything which might cause embarrassment to any official organization such as the representatives of the State Department, the service attaches or the neutral government.

Hans Kricksen
HANS KRICKSEN

1st Ind.

CPF/od

Operations Officer, EEO, OSS, Washington, D.C. 5 July 1945

For Chief, IO

1. Forwarded for your information.

Charles P. Frank
CHARLES P. FRANK
1st Lt, PA
Asst. Operations Officer, EEO

SECRET

SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : The Director
 FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office
 SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Thomas J. Manning
 30/ST5

DATE: 24 July 1945

1. Mr. Manning was chief of CE-30 from December 1944 to June 1945. In this capacity he acted as SO liaison with the British SOE German Directorate.

2. His main criticism is concerned with the inability to plan long term operations ahead, for numerous reasons including the rapid advance of the Armed Forces. Lt. Daggan contemplates no further action.

Thomas Victor
 Pvt. Thomas Victor
 Reports Office

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
2nd Ind.

WBR/ed

Chief, SO 16 July 1945

TO: The Director, (through Reports Office of the Secretariat)

1. Subject's overseas report is considered excellent.
2. Since there is no information in this report considered applicable to the Far East theaters, no further action is contemplated.


WILLIAM E. DUGAN
1st Lt., USMCR
Chief, SO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

17,260

12 July 1945

TO: Captain William B. Kantack
THROUGH: Captain Harrison T. Barrow
FROM: Mr. Thomas J. Manning, Acting Chief, CE-SO Section
London
SUBJECT: Overseas Report

a) Description of duties and activities while on assignment in London

1) Reported for duty in London on 1 August 1944. The intended assignment was SO liaison work from ETO to and with MED/TO SO. This assignment came up for discussion on several occasions, and as a result of inter-theater OSS decisions, the plans for its execution were dropped during October 1944.

Pending this decision, I was occupied with matters of an administrative nature, and in particular with those pertaining to SO penetration of Germany from its southern extremities, namely through Austria, with especial attention on infiltration possibilities from Switzerland.

Four agent candidates were available, and plans were laid for their penetration of Austria.

On the insistence of MED/TO, two of these agents were eventually transferred to them (Croesus Mission). The third agent was transferred to the POWN Mission (Provisional Austrian National Committee). The fourth agent was transferred to SI.

2) On the 13 December 1944, I replaced the Chief of CE-SO who returned to Washington, and I carried on in that capacity until my departure from London on 5 June 1945.

3) In November 1944, it was the intention of OSS to send me on SO matters to Zurich, Switzerland. The commercial cover suggested, was deemed adequate by Washington. In January a diplomatic cover was suggested, but the project was abandoned in view of the replacement undertaken by me on 13 December 1944, (see 2 above).

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4) From 13 December 1944 to 5 June 1945, I acted as SO liaison with the (British) SOE German Directorate, and fulfilled all functions pertinent to this assignment.

5) The liaison with Stockholm, SO German Desk, was carried out in the CH-SO Section, London, and the matters pertaining thereto were referred to me in a supervisory capacity.

6) From 17 March 1945 to 17 April 1945 I was on Temporary Duty with SO Paris. On this assignment I assisted in the setting up of plans for the penetration of Austria by CALPO bodies.


b) Progress of the Work and Achievements

The penetration of Germany for classical SO purposes presented many difficulties, some of which are enumerated below:

1. Lack of safe houses and sure contacts inside Germany.
2. The inadvisability of arming or promising like assistance to resistance groups, if they could be found, inside Germany.
3. The personnel recruited, while of excellent caliber, did not possess any contacts inside Germany and had not been inside that country for periods of five years or more.
4. Short term penetrations with "blow" jobs as objectives were not considered in view of the most effective work done by the Army's Strategic Air Forces.
5. The time element, which thanks to the rapid advances of our Allies, made specific planning difficult. The scratching of the Paris CALPO project is cited as a case in point.
6. The target (Germany) was approached too quickly by the Armed Forces, thus precluding long term forward SO planning, which would have been necessary had a prolonged stubborn resistance been encountered.

In my opinion it is a moot question whether classical SO operations inside Germany would have been as successful as were those effected in Axis occupied and controlled territories. My opinion is based on the German's inherent respect for authority and for

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- 4 -

Although the SO Branch never accepted the interpretation placed by the Intelligence Procurement Branch in respect to their authority for taking personnel from us, it was, nevertheless, agreed that as CE-SO had no immediate assignments for the personnel picked, that the selected men should be put on temporary assignments with IPB, but carried on the SO roster.

Two of the men thus picked were assigned to duty with the Back Unit and became key men of that organization. Others were sent to OCS field units at advanced army bases.

When men were needed by SO several months later to mount the CALPO project, it was not possible for SO to obtain their release from IPB, as it was found the men had worked themselves into positions from which they could not be transferred.

There were no plans in December 1944 for SO work inside Germany, and even if the men referred to above had been held for future SO operations, they never would have had the opportunity to get into the field, for when the SO CALPO project was completed, VE day had practically arrived.

The essential difficulty encountered was the inability to plan forward, and the remarks made under heading b), explain the reason for this.

Had the resistance, once the Armies approached their target (Germany), been of a prolonged stubborn nature, CE-SO was prepared, and had the staff on hand, ready to plan and put on any operation that would have been called for.

Thomas J. Manning
THOMAS J. MANNING

Acting Chief, CE-SO Section, London

1st Ind.

Operations Officer, ESO, OCS Washington, D. C. 12 July 1945

TO: Chief, SO

1. Forwarded for your information.

Charles P. Frank
CHARLES P. FRANK

1st Lt. FA

Asst. Operations Officer, ESO

TJM/tmb

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“三、四”级：指在“一、二”级基础上，进一步对“一、二”级进行深化和拓展。

Keywords: child sexual abuse; disclosure; legal system

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CONFIDENTIAL

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There are some conditions here which, and there are also some conditions of which.

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS FOR THE USE OF THE
 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 AND IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC

12. On the 11 December 1962, I received the ORDER of 01-20 and proceeded to Washington, DC. I arrived on 13 December 1962. I was assigned to the position of Assistant Secretary for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and I remained in that capacity until 15 December 1962.

[illegible]

In my opinion it is a most serious question whether at least 50 persons could be assembled and controlled together. My opinion is based on the fact that a number of persons for security and law

1. Lack of safe houses and safe contacts in the country.
2. The inability of arms or providing the necessary to resistance groups. It they could be found, inside Germany.
3. The persons) recruited, while of exact time, could not be seen inside the country for periods of five years or more.
4. Most persons with "black" jobs as employees were not considered in view of the most effective work done by the army's resistance air forces.
5. The time element, which thanks to the rapid movement of our units, made specific plan-ning impossible. The recruiting of the party could be done in a case in point.
6. The change (Germany) was approached too late in the armed forces, was pre-paring long term forward to planning, which would have been necessary had a prolonged resistance movement been envisaged.

The penetration of Germany for at least 50 purposes pre- sented many difficulties, some of which are enumerated below:

Penetration of the West and East Germany

- 4) From 13 December 1944 to 5 June 1945, I acted as SM (Station with the British) SOG (German Directorate, and FBI- allied all questions pertinent to this assignment.
- 5) The Liaison with Stockholm, SO (German Desk, was carried out in the SO-50 Section, London, and the matters pertaining thereto were referred to me in a supervisory capacity.
- 6) From 17 March 1945 to 17 April 1945 I was on temporary duty with NO (Nazi). On this assignment I assisted in the set- ting up of plans for the penetration of Austria by (ALPO) bodies.

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10

* 1941-1942
 1. The first part of the report is devoted to a general survey of the work of the organization in the field of international relations. It is divided into two main sections: the first section deals with the work of the organization in the field of international relations, and the second section deals with the work of the organization in the field of international relations.

Since the war is. It was the enemy of Germany, with the
 extent policy of complete destruction of its domestic and
 state power. In this complete annihilation of its domestic and
 its power, could come on the enemy or attempting to
 of the majority of the oppressed populations. This was not the
 one in Germany.

[illegible]

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APPROXIMATELY 10:00 PM, 10-20-70, JAMES EARL RAY
ARRIVED CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

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Although the 30 Branches never accepted the interference of the Intelligence Programme Branch in respect of their activities for taking personnel from us, it was, nevertheless, noted that as the 30 Branch had no immediate assignments for the personnel placed, that the selected men should be put on temporary assignments with IIR, but carried on the SO roster.



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director
FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office
SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Capt. Alston H. Chase
SI/ETO

DATE: 25 July 1945

1. Capt. Chase, who served within the Reports Division, ETO, criticizes the policy of few promotions for enlisted men and many promotions for officers. He further criticizes Captain Rositske, Chief of the Military Section.

2. Mr. Shepardson's covering memorandum notes that this is the first adverse reflection on Captain Rositske yet received.

Thomas Victor
Pvt. Thomas Victor
Reports Office

Wax
WBK

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7E-231924718

Office Memorandum**UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : Director, GDS

DATE:

18 July 1945

FROM : Chief, SI

SUBJECT: Field Report of Alton H. Chase, Captain, Air Corps

Captain Chase's record in the field is one of great usefulness and achievement within the Reports Division, ETO, and in the maintaining of liaison with Air Intelligence. For this task he was peculiarly well equipped by virtue of his earlier assignment to A-2, Washington.

This is the only reflection on Captain Nesbitt received in Washington. There is no question of Captain Nesbitt's able handling of military SI reports, of which he had full charge under the immediate direction of Mr. Philip Norton.

W. H. Harrison
W. H. Harrison

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

16 July 1945

TO: Director, OSS
THROUGH: Chief, SI
FROM: Alston H. Chase, Captain, Air Corps
SUBJECT: Field Report

1. I joined the Office of Strategic Services in London, where I had been serving as a Target Intelligence Officer with USSTAF. I was assigned to SI on my day of joining the organization, 16 August 1944. I worked in London as assistant to the Chief of the Air Section of the Reports Board. I was transferred to the Paris Office on 16 September 1944, and served there as Air Intelligence Officer in the Military Section until 5 May 1945, when I went on D.S. with the OSS Detachment at 6th A.G. under Lt. Col. Griswold. I remained at this post until 28 May 1945, when I closed out the Detachment, Colonel Griswold having already left. I left Paris on 4 June 1945 for London and left London on 15 June 1945, arriving in the United States 24 June 1945. I have now been declared surplus and have applied to be relieved of active duty.

2. My duties during most of my service with OSS have been those of a reports officer, processing and evaluating intelligence on hostile air forces, economic targets, secret weapons, and naval matters. I also was in charge of translation in the Military Section in the Paris Office.

3. In general, I was favorably impressed by the work done in OSS. I felt that it was valuable, with a high degree of accuracy, and highly important. It compared favorably with the work in AIJOL of the RAF with whom I had worked, and more than favorably with that in Air Force Headquarters in Washington where I worked nearly a year.

4. I have two adverse criticisms, chiefly matters of morale. There were far too few promotions among enlisted personnel and company grade officers, far too many among officers of field grade. There was much adverse comment among the personnel upon the cases in which several Lieutenant Colonels of somewhat dubious usefulness were advanced to full Colonels and then released.

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Page Two

In the second place, there was much feeling against Captain Harry Resitake, Chief of the Military Section. Intelligent and industrious, Captain Resitake was yet so ambitious, so selfish, and so jealous of any possible rival that he blocked all advancement for his fellow officers. We knew how constantly, though pretending friendship, he tried by arrogation of power, by sly criticism, by covert sneers, to undermine the position of his chief, Mr. Philip Horton. We knew how he frowned upon superiors to their face and sneered at them behind their back. Knowing how completely selfish he was, we wondered that he was able to deceive his superior officers so long and so successfully as to his true character and his real motives, which are solely his own advancement at whatever cost to others.

ALSTON H. CHASE,
Captain, Air Corps.

SECRET



SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

DATE 25 July 1945

TO : The Director
FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office
SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Lt. (ig) Timothy Pfeiffer
Si/Medto

1. On duty with the military mission to Tito, Mr. Pfeiffer cites instances of unreliable supply, complex command, and an inability to fulfill commitments made to the Yugoslav Partisans. Mr. Shepardson states that much has been done to alleviate these conditions and warns of the danger of allowing leaders of small OSS teams to pass on promises to commanders of units to which they are attached.

2. On p. 9 paragraph E, Mr. Pfeiffer lists the limitations placed on commitments by OSS officers. Mr. Shepardson notes that such limitations were wisely ordered.

Thomas Victor
Pvt. Thomas Victor
Reports Office

CCD
Ans
W&K

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
DATE: 19 JULY 1945

DATE: 19 JULY 1945

Office Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-11-2001 BY 60322 UCBAW

Page 2 of 2
Mr. Ketter explains

... and received in the previous...

100-443887-100

[illegible]

IT IS BELIEVED THAT SUCH HAS BEEN

IN REPLY TO THE ABOVE, THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS FURNISHED:

TO COMRADES, STATE DEPT. OFFICIALS

[illegible][illegible]

...the following ...

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

- 2 -

specific requests for such support should have been made by the responsible commanders.

As listed in paragraph E, page 8, the limitations placed on commitments by OES officers were wisely ordered. The unfortunate results from informal verbal promises of air support, described above, support the wisdom of such prohibitions.

W. H. Shepardson
W. H. Shepardson

REPORT ON FIELD CONDITIONS
by
Lt. (j.g.) Timothy Pfeiffer, USNR

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 16 July 1945

TO : Director, OSS
 FROM : Timothy McElfer, Lt. (j.g.) USMC
 SUBJECT: Report on Field Conditions

1. What I did in the field

A. Primary and Duties:

This report commences with an indication of the various dates, locations and duties of my assignments overseas. In a few instances the dates may be taken as being a few days removed from the exact.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Duties</u>
2 August '43 - 4 Jan. '44	Cairo and Desert Training	C.O. of Training Camp and OSS/ME Training Branch Adjutant.
6 Jan. '44 - 20 March '44	Bari	Training Officer, Bari Base and Ass't. Reports Officer.
20 Mar. '44 - 4 May '44	Nocce and Brindisi Italy	In training status - railway sabotage - joint American-British school at Nocce; Parachute jump training at Brindisi.
4 May '44 - 23 June '44	Caserta	Operations training officer.
24 June '44 - 13 July '44	Bari	Services Officer, proposed U. S. Mission to Marshal Tito.
14 July - 20 Aug. '44	Via, Jugoslavia	Services Officer and Adjutant, U. S. Mission
20 Aug. '44 - 10 Oct. '44	Via, Jugoslavia	Assistant Intelligence Officer, U. S. Mission.
10 Oct. '44 - 1 Dec. '44	Dobrovnik, Jugoslavia	Intelligence Officer over land detachment, U.S. Mission to Tito.
1 Dec. '44 - 15 May '45	Balaton, Croatia, Jugoslavia	Liaison Officer, Yugoslav VIII Corps - IV Army.

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B. Activities and Accomplishments in Yugoslavia, 24 July 1944 - 23 May 1945:

Sections 2 and 3 of this report are very nearly entirely concerned with events and developments which took place during the ten months of my duty in Yugoslavia; therefore, the remarks of this paragraph make brief note of the activities and accomplishments of the same period.

(1) Report Written May 1945:

*Submitted
Report*

Upon return from Yugoslavia to Italy, late in May 1945, a twenty-six page report of some detail was submitted at Caserta entitled "Account of Duty in Yugoslavia". This is currently available in Washington, its accession number being J-090-702. Further, for purposes of extended clarification, it is attached to this report as appendix "A". Contents of this report are as follows:

I	Account of Personnel	<u>Page</u> 1
II	Account of Duty	2
	Appendix A: Map with routes taken	
	Appendix B: List of OSS reports resulting from duty.	8
	Appendix C: Report on Yugoslav IV Army	12 - 26

(2) Intelligence Transmitted:

As the primary reason for our assignment to Yugoslavia was to obtain and transmit intelligence concerning the enemy and in-

- 3 -

telligence concerning internal conditions, it seems well to view whatever intelligence was transmitted and used as a measuring stick of accomplishment. Thus, note is made that, from October '44, to May '45, the Caserta Hq., upon processing of our radio signals and pounced material, issued approximately one hundred fifty OSS "13" reports.

(3) Personal Evaluation of Intelligence Transmitted:

While in Yugoslavia, I frequently attempted to evaluate the work we were doing with something like the following result: we are here ostensibly to obtain military intelligence concerning the enemy. To do this we must largely rely upon Partisan sources. Partisan sources, in this area appear better than average - therefore the intelligence is probably of value; however the British are doing a similar job with far more personnel and equipment, therefore our work is duplicating that of a far greater commitment of one of our powerful Allies. This position, which always seemed to carry a good deal of weight, lead to the conclusion that our most vital concern should be with the Partisans themselves and the general internal condition of Yugoslavia. I felt that in this field there was far less duplication; some of the reasons being that the British were inclined to retain such information for their private use, and further that through local Yugoslav good will to Americans and our well qualified enlisted men, our position in regard

FT

- 4 -

to these matters was perhaps superior to that of the British. As information concerning internal matters was less tangible than that concerning the enemy, great care was taken to arrive at what seemed proper selection and evaluation of such information we obtained regarding the Partisans and conditions within the country. The economic material was probably quite accurate, whereas political information tended toward the pro-Partisan.

(4) Washington G-2 and Broadway London Evaluation of Intelligence Transmitted:

As the final days of the war in Europe approached, the Yugoslav army to which we were attached was in increasingly broad and successful contact with the enemy, with the result that the volume of intelligence we transmitted in March, April and May was far greater than had previously been the case. In May, we received a radio message from the Caserta Hq., stating that Washington G-2 and Broadway, London analysis of OSS Balkan reports showed that reports from our team had received the greatest number of superior and excellent ratings. Reference to this radio message is made with full knowledge of the contribution of the members of the team under my command, and also of the efforts of the Yugoslav Partisans to transmit the intelligence they secured to us.

3. Conditions in the Field that might be improved

a. Emphasis of this section

It is assumed that virtually all field conditions are

SECRET

- 5 -

subject to improvement, and further that certain specific conditions continue to be noted with perhaps unseemly regularity by men returned from overseas. Therefore, in an attempt to avoid undue repetition and to offer a few constructive paragraphs, this section is largely concerned with brief examples of conditions normally subject to improvement, but upon which progress appears to have been made.

B. Supply:

The results that we received from the supply program appeared most notable for their ups and downs. Thus, while at times, our food and equipment supplies were considerably more than adequate, at other times the reverse applied. On one occasion, my personal food supplies for a month were a white shipping sack entirely filled with similar sacks, none of which contained food. This type of incident can be avoided by more careful planning and work at the base.

C. Command:

It appears that the Hq., command functions, such as the ones at Caserta would gain the most benefit from simplification. The question is further discussed in section 3 of this report, but this is the place to note that as far as our work was concerned, the Hq., command functions were simplified in the spring of the current year with considerable benefit resulting to us. Perhaps in the future, this tendency will continue.

SECRET

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D. Delimitation of job vis a vis Partisans:

Although our work was particularly with the Yugoslav Partisans, I believe the point of this paragraph could be applied to similar work in other geographical locations. In the early spring of 1944, we learned that liaison officers in Yugoslavia had had their functions in the country redefined -- that Tito through his field commanders had undertaken new obligations to liaison officers and finally that we were in a position to require that the obligations be kept. This was of great benefit to the work at hand, though I felt that Maximum advantage was not taken in Belgrade or Caserta, and that this was in unfortunate comparison to the British policy which as usual exploited the Yugoslav obligation to its entire limit.

E. Insurance of information to Field personnel:

A single example will perhaps suffice to make this point. As the war in Europe was ending and events were leading us to Trieste, it became increasingly clear that if we were to be of use in the Istrian area, we must have both a clear directive as to our own policy and that great advantage would accrue from our having some knowledge for our own private use as to what was likely to happen. As the Trieste incident took form, I considered our position weak, while in that it failed to improve very noticeably, I concluded that OAS had failed to take best advantage of an important situation.

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17. Training and briefing:

These two matters have no doubt improved in the last year, however, whatever increased use is made of information and experience gathered by field men will be of benefit to future operators.

3. Specific difficulties

A. Emphasis of this Section:

This section is purposely written from the point of view of the man in the field, the criticism being the type I have already made in direct conversation with several of the persons concerned.

B. Relations of Base Hqn., and field:

These presented fairly constant difficulties, the most notable of which appeared to stem from a multiple chain of command. It is not exaggeration to state that at one time we were acting upon orders of the Theatre Intelligence Officer, the Balkan Political Officer, the Yugoslav Desk Head, and the Commanding Officer of the Belgrade Mission. Nor is it exaggeration to state that these orders were at times in direct conflict with one another, the greatest variance appearing in orders coming from Belgrade and those from Caserta. The immediate result was confusion and an ensuing lack of confidence in our superiors. Further we considered direction from the Desk Head weak in that it appeared rather unrelated to the field situation. We felt this

- 8 -

was aggravated by the Desk Head's unfamiliarity with the country and lack of authority within the headquarters.

C. Brief returns to Headquarters denied:

The fact that, as time went on, it became next to impossible to obtain authority to leave the country for rebriefing and orientation was an actual deterrent to accomplishment of what we thought was the best way of doing the job.

D. Difficulty in activating headquarters' commitments:

Two cases are cited here, both of which demonstrate headquarters' difficulties, which had a direct effect on the field. First, in the fall of 1944, Tito's Chief of Staff was presented with a signed memorandum which clearly and in detail outlined an important supply commitment. The bulk of these supplies were subsequently diverted to another country; this, as it seemed, being the result of politics within the OSS. The Yugoslavs were definitely aware of the loss to themselves and very probably aware of the cause as well as the final destination of the supplies. This is an example of a pattern of events that had ill results both as to those within the OSS and as to our relations with persons outside the organization. Second, in January of 1945, we were verbally advised that an increased program of U. S. air support to the Yugoslavs could be expected. Shortly following these conversations on our support, the Partisans became involved in a tactical situation which required close air

- 9 -

support. For this support, they requested operations along the lines I had outlined to them. This failed to appear, and never did appear during that week-long action. As this again made a poor impression on the Yugoslavs, and as Headquarters in Italy was unable to guarantee future operations, I sent no further air targets. Although Balkan air force dislike of purely American operations, and not our own headquarters, was very probably the cause of U. S. failure in this field, I feel the above demonstrates a very ill-advised commitment.

2. U. S. Limitations to "Business" with Partisans:

The fact that in effect U. S. liaison officers could normally undertake no discussion with the Partisans on (1) military tactical support, (2) economic supply and political matters and (3) military supply, closely limited our official sphere of activity. The chief resulting difficulty was in maintaining broad enough contacts with the Partisans to cover both the headquarters' desires for information of types other than purely military, and also to cover what appeared to us locally as good intelligence opportunities. As the causes of the limitation appeared to be high level decisions, we accepted them as such. However, it appears clear that a broader basis of business with the Yugoslavs would have produced a greater and broader intelligence return to the Caserta Headquarters.

Finley Ruff
 Finley Ruff, Jr. (J.G.) USNR

EURET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

19 July 1945

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Director, OSS
FROM: Whitney H. Shepardson
SUBJECT: Bayard L. King--Field Report

Bayard L. King, whose field report is attached, is 23 years old and classified 4-P. Prior to being recruited by the French Bank, SI, Mr. King had served with distinction with the American Field Ambulance in Africa. His performance of duty while with OSS in Algiers and France was characterized by those with whom he worked as "superior".

The attached report merely recounts King's personal activities connected with the recruiting and briefing of agents. It offers no suggestions and adds nothing to the curriculum which might be useful in future operations.

Whitney H. Shepardson
W.H.S.

Attachment

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Office Memorandum

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director
 FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

DATE: 24 July 1945

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Capt. Winthrop Rutherford
SO/NEOTC

1. Capt. Rutherford who served as chief of the "Proust Team" and C.O. of the Para-Military School in Algiers, suggests that all SO field personnel have SI training and that SO operations should be planned in cooperation with SI. He particularly criticizes the mishandling of reports and records, stating that in his own case neither the Office of Naval Command nor the SO file in Washington had any record of his field service.

2. Lt. Duggan, in his covering memo, states that the above criticisms have been taken care of.

Thomas Victor
 Pvt. Thomas Victor
 Reports Office

SECRET

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

WVB/ed
13 July 1945

TO: The Director (through the Reports Office of the
Secretariat)

SUBJECT: Overseas Report of Captain Winthrop Kutherford, USMCR

1. The following action has been taken on the subject report:

(a) Although it has been a consistent policy of this branch that officers in charge of recruiting not to make promises as regards promotions and duties, this matter has been brought to their attention. The resulting lowering of morale is fully understood and appreciated.

(b) At present it is the practice that the officers in charge of the Area Operations Offices personally interview not only officers but enlisted and civilian personnel who have returned from, or are going into, the field. In any instance where the returnee or the recruit has information or should receive instructions which could best be handled by the Branch Chief, an interview is arranged for that purpose. This practice has proven very satisfactory in the past.

(c) The matter of handling records and reports has been repeatedly brought to the attention of our representatives in the field. The present handling of reports is considered satisfactory. Reports of the operations engaged in by subject officer have been located and extracts are being made to be forwarded to the Commanding Officer, Naval Command for inclusion in his jacket at Marine Headquarters.

(d) Branch activities are being closely coordinated and whenever it is desired that JO personnel have SI training, requisitions of the field so indicate. An

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SECRET**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

5 July 1946

TO: Captain William S. Kantack

THROUGH: Captain Harrison T. Barrow

FROM: Captain Winthrop Rutherford, USMC

SUBJECT: Overseas Report

I.

Left Port of Embarkation 1 February 1944. Arrived Algiers 25 February 1944. Attended Para-Military School under Lt. Walter Taylor, USMC. In March began parachute training at OSS school in Algiers, but injured leg in making first jump. In April was appointed Commanding Officer of a new Para-Military School which we set up at Chrea, Algiers. The school trained about 88 agents and saboteurs per month for the next three months - and from this school the men went into the field as organizers, instructors, and members of French Commando units. Courses were given in:

- (1) Weapons (American, British, French and German small arms;
- (2) Map reading and field craft;
- (3) Security
- (4) Demolition - including communications and industrial sabotage.

In June I was detached from the school to attend the U.S. Army Intelligence School in Duera, Algiers preparatory to debarkation with Strategic Services Section of the 7th Army under Colonel Gamble.

In July I volunteered for parachute missions into France and completed parachute training (4 jumps) and air-ground communications training at OSS and British schools respectively.

On August 19, was parachuted into the Department of Ariège in the French Pyrenees, together with Lt. William Underwood and S/Sgt. Adams, radio operator. Our mission was to form the American section of an Inter-Allied Mission to the VPI. We were to assist a team already in the field (British major, French major, and radio operators), in matters of organization and supply of resistance units, and in the strengthening of mountain patrols attempting to prevent the escape of Germans into Spain. We found the area cleared of enemy troops, as reported, and the further recruitment of operatives was made impossible by the discontinuance of supply drops from Algiers shortly after our arrival. The Bordeaux pocket was the remaining natural objective, but transportation and political

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Captain Kantack

- 2 -

5 July 1945

obstacles finally broke down our efforts and those of other Allied officers in the Pyrenees section to re-organize and move Maquis troops in that direction.

At the end of September, on orders from HQ, we reported to Arignon and subsequently Caserta for reassignment, together with other teams and missions which had been working in Southwestern France.

About October 20, I reported to Colonel Gamble, G-2, SSS, at 7th Army HQ in Espinal. After a brief period of indoctrination I took over Lt. Colonel Booth's "Proust Team", working with the 117th Reconnaissance Squadron (including Lt. Gauss, Sgt. Bush, Captain Cornu of the French Army, and 9 French lieutenants). In November we replaced Captain Justin Green's team, when he was wounded and captured near Bruyere. We remained with the 35th Division through the Vosges to Riebauville near Colmar. In December the division teams were withdrawn, reorganized and split into small sections, to meet the growing need for German-speaking personnel and the servicing of an increasing number of divisions. I operated in the 79th Division sector, as part of "C" Team. It was during this period, about January 3, that the 7th Army made its withdrawal from the Lauterburg-Rhine corner to the Maginot Line without notifying SSS. Army HQ's failure to give SSS warning provided some of us with a few exciting days of junkets into villages in evacuated territory in front of our lines, setting up "sitters" (local people briefed on securing and transmitting intelligence) before the Germans should sense the vacuum and reoccupy. But the perfect opportunity for effective organizing had been missed. On January 23, I was injured in a jeep accident. After discharge from the hospital in March, I was still in poor condition, so Colonel Gamble decided to return me to the U.S. for leave.

II.

I am leaving OSS with a sense of having completed a very interesting and, on the whole, a useful tour of duty. I like the organization and do not like to hear it criticized on the outside. I believe that it has done a big job and that it is important that it continue to exist during and after this war. Following are some observations that may be of interest.

It seems that persons responsible for recruitment in the branches have frequently been unscrupulous in their promises, as regards promotions and duties, resulting in unnecessary bitterness and criticism of the organization and a lowering of morale. I have never personally been the recipient of such promises but can testify to the quite general reaction of others.

I believe that the branch heads should make a practice of interviewing officers going into and coming from the field. Reports can never serve as a substitute for direct personal contact, either as a means of gaining first-hand information of conditions in the field and operations generally, or as a means of exercising effective leadership by the branch head.

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Captain Kantack

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5 July 1946

It seems to me that both the reputation and operations of OSS have been somewhat hampered by the recurring flurries of amateurism which so many persons have encountered. Adjutants have frequently failed to forward records and reports. Lack of coordination between adjutant section and the branches as to the location and activities of personnel, where such an interchange of information was consistent with security. Inefficiency in administrative and liaison matters was commonly attributed to a lack of field experience. It would be well to break up the clannishness and inertia of HQ units by the rotation of personnel from administration to field duties, and vice versa.

I think all SO personnel should have military intelligence training, and that SO operations should be planned in cooperation with SI. In Colonel Gamble's 7th Army unit, branch affiliation seemed to have practically no bearing on the nature of the duties performed. This was particularly so with the division teams where everyone had to perform all functions (HQ liaison; planning; recruitment; briefing; infiltration of agents; and reporting) at one time or another. There seems to be a general feeling among OSS personnel that branch activities should be more closely coordinated. This is also my opinion.

The mishandling of records can cause a lot of waste motion, irritation and criticism. The SO file here has no record of my field service, and neither has the Office of Naval Command. In consequence my record at Marine Headquarters, which is important to me, carries no suggestion whatever of my having performed duty in the field. I believe that Naval Command should be enabled to get such information from the field currently and should transmit same to Naval or Marine HQ for their personnel in a form and manner consistent with security.

In the case of my field operation, under SPOC command, some- one neglected to send the SPC signal the night of our departure - as a consequence there was no reception committee on the ground. However, in my opinion, the operation record of SPOC was outstanding. They were a hard working group and sent a lot of people and material into France, with good planning and results.

It was a great privilege to have been able to serve with the 7th Army 7-2, 328. Under Colonel Gamble's splendid leadership, waste motion was at a minimum and morale high. Harry Hyde and Major Crosby did splendid work on the planning end, and Major Wentworth kept the team working well after Colonel Gamble left.

Winthrop Rutherford, Jr.
WINTHROP RUTHERFORD, Jr.
Captain, USMC

1st Ind.

Operations Officer, BIO, OSS, Washington, D.C. 5 July 1946

20. Chief, SO

1. Forwarded for your information.

Charles P. Phank
CHARLES P. PHANK, 1st Lt. FA
Asst. Operations Officer, BIO

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Lieut. E. R. Kellogg, USNR
 Lt. Colonel Deering

17,253
 Field Report
 10 August 1945
 x B.I.T.
 x FETO
 x Field plants

I read John Bott's report of 18 July 1945
 of his tour of duty.

I think he did a good job particularly after
 a bad start which was no fault of his own. I was
 there when he arrived, and it was a great shock to
 Lieut. Hoge to know that Bott was reporting for
 duty as his Executive Officer, because he had never
 heard about it.

May I suggest that before assigning an Exec.
 to one of your chiefs in the field, the latter might
 like to hear about it in advance; in addition to which
 it makes things much easier for the poor traveler,
 when he reports to his chief in the field for duty.

G. C. D., Jr.

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director
FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office
SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Ens. John I. Bott
FP/ETO - FETO

DATE: 25 July 1945

Ens. Bott, after making a survey of the IPDP program in Europe, acquainted Kunming with this information and then set up a photo laboratory at the advanced base at Hsian. No criticisms or suggestions offered.

Thomas Viator
Pvt. Thomas Viator
Reports Office

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CONFIDENTIAL**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.****MEMORANDUM**

TO: Director, OSS, Administration Building 19 July 1945
 VIA: Reports Office, Secretariat, 209 South Building
 FROM: Acting Chief, Field Photographic Branch
 SUBJECT: Overseas Returnee Report of Ensign John I. Bott, USNR

1. The report submitted by Ensign Bott is, I believe, a clear and concise report of his activities.

2. Although I had assigned Ensign Bott as Lt. Hogo's (Chief of Branch in China) Executive, my plan evidently didn't work out since Lt. Hogo has his set up working smoothly. However, Enn. Bott's trip was very beneficial to this Branch and me, in particular, since the information as to personnel whereabouts and activities he has been able to impart to me has enabled me to formulate plans here before I depart for that area.

3. Report forwarded for your information and files.

E. R. Kelloso

E. R. KELLOSO
 Lieut., USNR
 Acting Chief
 Field Photographic Branch

Encl. 1-Report of Ens. Bott,
 dated 18 July 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

18 July 1945

To: Director, OSS
Administration Building

Via: Reports Office, Secretariat
209 South Building
Lt. E. R. Kellogg, Acting Chief
Field Photographic Branch

From: Esigra John I. Bott, USNR

Subject: Overseas Returnee Report

1. Subject officer departed Washington, D.C., 7 March 1945 and arrived Paris, France on 12 March 1945. From 12 March to 14 April, a comprehensive survey was made of all activities pertaining to operations, both field and administrative, of the IPDP program within Europe. Three weeks of the above period of time was spent shooting terrain and installations within general confines of the Normandy sector of France. The balance of the time was spent at Field Photographic's Headquarters near Nogent developing, printing and processing film, and learning the mechanics of indexing and distributing of photographic material.

2. On 14 April, subject officer departed ETO for China, arriving at Kunning on 27 April 1945. After acquainting Lt. Ralph Hoge with information relevant to the operation of IPDP within ETO, subject officer departed Kunning 2 May with portable photo laboratory for Hsian, arriving that point 13 May. As per orders Mr. Hoge, a photo laboratory at the advanced base at Hsian was set up and was in full operation on 1 June 1945.

3. On 1 June, subject officer departed to a guerrilla training area under the command of Albert G. Rogers and there shot 16 mm still pictures of the training of Chinese guerrillas.

Summary

Subject officer received only the greatest cooperation from OSS and attendant organizations and was restricted only by the universal lack of equipment and supplies within China.

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- 2 -

Messing, bill-fair and equipment as furnished by OSS
was excellent; as a personal observation I would remark that they
are superior to any other organization within China.

John I. Bort
JOHN I. BORT
Ensign, USNR

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: 25 July 1945

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: "Eliot Grant"
SI/MSDFO

1. Agent "Eliot Grant" served with the intelligence mission in Iran.

2. He states that the value of spot material was lessened because of slow diplomatic pouch communication with the Cairo office, a condition which Mr. Sheperdson points out is beyond the realm of OSS to control. The suggestion also made that working facilities within Embassy buildings be established to facilitate the upkeep of files, a suggestion on which Mr. Sheperdson contemplates no further action.

Thomas Victor
Pvt. Thomas Victor
Reports Office

file
enc

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No.

Date Rec'd. SA.....

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
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2. Chief, SI	1A122	JUN 17 1945 JUN 12 1945		WJ	
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S E C R E T

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

11 July 1945

TO: Director, OSS
FROM: Chief, SI
SUBJECT: Field Report of Elliot Grant

The attached field report covers very briefly the mission of agent "Elliot Grant" to Iran over a period of nearly three years. As may be noted from Section 1, his cover was on the "cultural" side, and while it provided him with fine mobility and a wealth of already established contacts, it at the same time limited his close associations largely to a single class of Iranians and foreigners. Nevertheless he has proved himself an able and prolific reporter and often a shrewd commentator on events and trends.

Section 2 of the report outlines the evolution of the nature of SI work from the period of expected enemy invasion to the post war period where the activities are concentrated on the clashes of interests and influence of the great powers.

The complaint registered in Section 3 - the slowness of the diplomatic pouch - is beyond the realm of OSS to remedy.

The problem of document field security (Section 4) is perhaps magnified through Grant's own desire for an Embassy appointment, coupled with the fact that coming from the academic world he probably maintains a greater reference file than is usual in the field. Safes have sometimes solved this problem, but in this case the agent claims a safe in his apartment would at once arouse suspicion of extra-cover activities.

W. H. Sturges
W. H. Sturges

Attachment

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gl.

11 July 1945

FIELD REPORT OF ELIOT GRANT1. Work carried out in the field

The undersigned left the U.S.A. for activity in Iran on 1 August 1942, was in the U.S.A. on temporary duty early in 1944, and returned again to the U.S.A. on temporary duty on 9 July 1945. The station in Iran was at Tehran, but a number of extensive trips were made by automobile to various parts of the country in ostensible continuation of the research and exploration work previously carried out in the years 1935, 1936, 1937 and 1939. As field representative of the organization which sponsored previous work in Iran, normal and satisfactory relations were maintained with the various branches of the Iranian government. The acknowledged interests of that organization made it possible to gather certain publications and documents of value to OSS as well as to travel widely without any questions being raised as to the reasons for such trips. This cover seems to have been adequate since relations with all Iranian officials and individuals continue to be good. The undersigned has been responsible for the revival and current activity of the Iran-America Relations Society of which he is a member of the board of Directors, and also the director of the Iran-America Club. This work brings him in close contact with many leading cabinet ministers and high officials, as well as with the 350 members of the Society.

2. Progress of work in the field

The precise nature of the SI work has varied considerably with the passage of time. In the fall of 1942 the Germans were nearing the frontier of Iran and early efforts were devoted to recording and planning those installations which would be useful to the Germans, and therefore potential bomb targets, in case of their entry into the country.

In a second phase which followed emphasis was placed upon drawing up rather detailed reports relating to Iranian industries, economics, finances, political parties, etc. - all material of a type which previously had not been collected and digested by any other agency.

During the first and second periods the initiative for reporting remained in the field, but by late 1943 requests for specific information on a variety of subjects began to come in from the home office. Such requests have arrived in increasing

SECRET

Field Report of Eliot Grant - 2.

number and are most welcome as valuable guides to the type of material most in demand. In this later period an attempt was also made to document certain aspects of Iranian political and social life.

In recent months special emphasis has been placed upon the following subjects: (1) interpretation of internal politics with repeated attempts to forecast future developments; (2) study of Soviet activities within Iran and an attempt to define their ultimate aims; (3) study of British interference in Iranian politics and their efforts to dominate the post-war markets in this country. We believe that the next six months will be most vital in determining the long range future of Iran, and that the gradual background of information and familiarity with the situation acquired during the past three years should pay off in comprehensive coverage of expected developments.

3. Field conditions which might be improved

A primary problem is the slowness of communication with the Cairo office. Reports are turned in at specific times set by the cooperative and helpful officials of the American Embassy. These should go out by pouch and in a Cairo bound plane within a few hours, but the normal time for delivery at the Cairo office is from six to eight days. Naturally such delays lessen the value of spot material on the rapidly changing political scene.

4. Specific difficulties in the field

The major difficulty relates to the filing and preparation of material. To maintain full security all papers and notes must be kept at the American Embassy. This means that it is rather difficult to consult back material and nearly impossible to keep expanding and up-to-date files on a variety of important subjects. Further, the physical effort of noting and then typing material is often a severe tax on the time of the individual who must maintain security while such work is in progress. The only apparent solution of these difficulties would seem to be the establishment of a cover within the Embassy or facilities for work within the Embassy buildings.

Eliot Grant

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: 24 July 1945

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: CSp(P) Allen Q. Thompson
Field Photo/IBT

Chief Thompson, overseas from December 1944 to June 1945, shot still and motion pictures of the different camps and operations in and around Nazira and made a complete movie of MO operations in Bhamo. He also accompanied Major Joost's detachment from Mogwe to Lashio. He makes no criticisms or suggestions.

Thomas Victor
Pvt. Thomas Victor
Reports Office

*file
done*

SECRET**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.****MEMORANDUM**

TO: Lt. S. P. Karlov, USNR
Reports Office, Secretariat
209 South Building

FROM: Acting Chief, Field Photographic Branch

SUBJECT: Overseas Returnee Report of CSp(P) Allen Q. Thompson, USNR

16 July 1945

In reference to your memorandum of 7 July 1945, regarding overseas returnee report of CSp(P) Allen Q. Thompson, USNR, dated 2 July 1945, wish to advise that this man hasn't registered any criticisms or advanced any suggestions and is not inclined to speak of his personal opinions. He is a solid, hard working person, and capable of making the most out of any situation.

Chief Thompson has left the service since he is far past the age limit and it is now impossible to obtain any further information from him.

In view of the above, we are returning herewith report as submitted on 2 July 1945 for your information and files.

E. R. Kellogg
E. R. KELLOGG
Lieut., USNR
Acting Chief
Field Photographic Branch

Encl. 1-Report of Chief Thompson,
dated 2 July 1945

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SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

TO: Director, OSS, Administration Building
VIA: Secretariat, Administration Building
Chief, Field Photographic Branch
FROM: Allen Q. Thompson, CSp(P), USNR
SUBJECT: Overseas Returnee Report

2 July 1945

Left the United States 2 December 1944. Arrived in Calcutta 21 December 1944. Left Calcutta 14 January 1945 arriving at Nazira 15 January 1945. For approximately two weeks shot stills of the different camps and operations going on in each.

1 February 1945 left for Taro-Burma for five days of shooting color movies for added scenes for Washington Office.

Left for Burma 28 February 1945 and made complete movie of MO operations. After completing picture joined Major Joost's outfit in the field close to Mogree. Stayed with this outfit until they arrived in Lashio, then went back to Bhamo for a few weeks to shoot stills, then went to Nazira where I stayed until the whole outfit were ready to leave for China.

Returned to Washington 23 June 1945.

Allen Q. Thompson
ALLEN Q. THOMPSON
CSp(P), USNR

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Office Memorandum

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: 24 July 1945

FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office

SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Mrs. Kathryn W. Smail
SI/KFO

Mrs. Smail served in the London registry and Reports Division/SI from Sept. 1943 to May 1945.

She suggests (1) that reports be screened with regards to the needs of the individual customer before dissemination (2) that a weekly political summary from current reports be distributed to field customers and (3) that there be closer liaison in reporting between R&A and SI.

Mr. Shepardson agrees with Mrs. Smail's observations but does not believe that action should be taken on her suggestions.

Thomas Victor
Pvt. Thomas Victor
Reports Office

WBK

OS: Form 2702

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PAGES:

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. *Bayland*

Date Rec'd. SA.....

Houch

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd.	For'd.		
<i>Seaford</i>				<i>A</i>	
<i>Chief</i>		<i>JUL 16 1945</i>	<i>JUL 16 1945</i>	<i>W</i>	
<i>Haty</i>				<i>W</i>	
<i>Ensign</i>				<i>S</i>	
<i>Butler</i>					

Each comment should be referred to correspond with number in To column.
 A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
 Officer's signature should be made in To column.
 Each comment should be initial (and if not identified) before further routing.
 Officer's name or name of his office should be indicated in Comments column.
 Initials of each officer should be entered in Remarks.
 The routing sheet should be returned to the sender.

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Office Memorandum

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, OSI

FROM : Chief, SI

DATE:
14 July 1945

SUBJECT: Field Report of Mrs. Kathryn W. Small

Mrs. Small occupied a responsible position in handling political secret intelligence distributed by the Reports Division, RTU. I find myself in complete agreement with the substance of her report; there are no suggestions on which action should be taken.

William F. Sheppard
William F. Sheppard:ccs.

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13 July, 1945

TO: Director, OSS
THROUGH: Chief, SI
FROM: Kathryn W. Smail
SUBJECT: Field Report

1. Assignments in London Office

a) Registry, SI: September 1943 - August, 1944

My original assignment placed me in charge of all French Resistance material received in the London SI Registry. These reports reached a peak volume of approximately 5000 documents and 300 cables a month, and it was arranged in agreement with the Chief of London Reports Division that this material should be classified, given a preliminary screening and prepared for distribution in my section in the Registry. After the partial liberation of France, the number of reports received from French Intelligence declined and I transferred to work in Reports Division.

b) Reports Division, SI: August 1944 - May 1945

My first assignment and training as a Reports Officer was as Assistant to the Economic Reports Officer. In September I transferred to the Political Section as Balkan Reports Officer. Although the Reports Division in London was organized on a functional basis, political reporting was sub-divided into geographic areas, and my eventual assignment included Poland, Czechoslovakia, Turkey and northern Italy, as well as the Balkans. By far the greatest number of reports on these countries were received

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as disseminations from the Caserta Reports Division. Despite the remarkably high quality of these disseminations, the requirements of the customers in the London theatre were solely for information classed as high echelon, and it was necessary to delete great portions of the original disseminations, collate series of small and detailed reports, and in many instances re-write entire reports. This duplication of the processing of reports was in part eliminated by an arrangement between the London and Caserta Reports Divisions whereby the two offices exchanged ~~unwanted~~ multiple copies of disseminations of high echelon material. This system had only been in effect for two months before my departure and it had become apparent that although it would indeed save time and labour in the case of reports of exceptional quality, it was necessary that greater information on specific requirements be exchanged and closer liaison between the two theatres be maintained. Eventually, it should have been possible to reduce the work of the Balkan Reports Officer in London to the processing of cabled material and the routine duties of checking the dissemination sheets for that area.

Material from other sources came in negligible quantities and was in many instances of doubtful quality. During this period vital political information on the Balkans from London might have been gathered for information and distribution in Caserta. However, this duty exceeded the functions and powers of the Reports Officer and no arrangements had been made in SI for this work in the London field.

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2. Comments and Suggestions

a) Quantity of Disseminations

One unfavorable criticism which might be made concerning the work of Reports Divisions in the field is that in the compiling of the monthly statistical reports there appeared to be a growing tendency to place faith and credit in numbers - the quantity of reports, the variety of subjects, the long lists of customers. Reports Officers are expected to screen old and duplicated material, to carry out routine editorial duties of cutting and re-writing for clear presentation of information, to study with care the reliability of sources, but far less attention is paid to the requirements of individual customers and the imperative need to reject all information which could be of no conceivable immediate interest or value to the customer, no matter how useful or entertaining it may seem to the observer. The danger of a policy of dissemination built upon quantity must finally be that the customer, an expert in his field, who is sent a proportion of indifferent or valueless documents may eventually under-rate the value of all the reports, or being pressed for time fail to read all of the material.

b) Function of Political Reports Officer

A political observer is trained to report what he sees, hears and learns, not what he thinks, imagines, or hopes may be. A careful examination of the reports received from Greece during the internal crisis and war in December 1944 shows unmistakably that even in the highly qualified and trained observers, personal

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prejudice and the wishes and fears of the individual enter into the reporting of a critical situation. With the best will to remain without bias in the presentation of information, the political Reports Officer is nonetheless liable to the same error in rejecting or accepting and evaluating the material he receives. No series of rules and regulations could entirely remove this margin of error, but it should be of use to define as clearly as possible the extent to which the Officer is expected to employ his knowledge and judgment of political, social and economic conditions and to exercise his critical faculty in the screening of material and presentation of reports, or conversely to state that the function of the Officer is confined to the rejection of only the utterly worthless and unreliable information and the dissemination of everything else which he receives.

c) Weekly Summaries

In the field a fair proportion of the reports received must be processed and disseminated as quickly as possible for the immediate use of the customer, and the atmosphere of a Reports office strongly resembles that of a daily newspaper one hour before press. General surveys and exhaustive analyses of political conditions can safely be held for later dissemination. There is nevertheless a large body of material consisting of small disjointed bits of information which is of momentary interest in giving a short-term view of the situation. For the most part, the field Reports Divisions send this out in bits and pieces. A weekly summary of the political situation collating these small items should be of immense practical value to the customer, satisfying

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the need for frequent information of every description and providing a running review of the developing situation.

d) Collaboration

A study of the reports of recurrent crises in the Balkans during the past year reveals a noticeable duplication of work between R&A and SI. In one country only, Yugoslavia, did there appear to be a concerted and successful effort to carry out separate functions and at the same time pool resources and knowledge for collaboration. From Rumania a series of excellent reports from SI showed as well on occasion internal evidence of political and personal bias. This was followed by a long and detailed series of equally good surveys from R&A in which there was also internal evidence of prejudice in the analysis of the situation from the opposite point of view. From the point of view of a Reports Officer, one series of reports compiled by both groups in collaboration might reasonably have been expected to have approached the truth more closely and to have saved time and labour.

Harry White Smith



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director
FROM : Secretariat - Reports Office
SUBJECT: Returnee Report: Capt. Reeve Schley
SC/BTO

DATE: 24 July 1945

1. Capt. Schley, who was CO II Corps OSS Detachment in Italy, states that experienced military men, preferably with the rank of major, were badly needed in Resistance Headquarters. He adds that planners should consider terrain as well as the normally varied requirements for guerrilla warfare before packing containers and in sections when enemy forces are concentrated in prepared positions, that partisan participation should be limited to small "sneak and peek" patrols.

2. Lt. Duggan contemplates no further action on the above, as the problems applicable to FETO have been worked out by the 350 officers concerned.

Thomas Victor
Pvt. Thomas Victor
Reports Office

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1101

SECRET

2nd Ind.

VWB/cd

Chief, SO 17 July 1945

TO: The Director, OSS (through Reports Office of the Secretariat)

1. Excellent recommendations are made in this report as to the training, number and type of OSS Staff personnel to be assigned to military corps, divisions and regiments in combat areas. It is believed this is of great value for future planning purposes.

2. In reference to qualifications of military personnel being recruited by this branch, it is desired to state that personnel being sent to the Far East theaters are of the highest type available. All are given a course of instruction at the West Coast Training Center with the exception of a very few who have had previously similar OSS experience in ETO, MTO, or NATO and are considered trained beyond that which they would receive at that Center.

3. It is considered that SSO officers in the Far East theaters have previously worked out problems presented in this report as are applicable to their military situations, hence no further action is contemplated.

William E. Duggan
WILLIAM E. DUGGAN
1st Lt., USMCR
Chief, SO

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

27 June 1945

SUBJECT: Overseas Report

[illegible]

E-358

Captain Santack

SECRET

27 June 1945

definite information as to contents and dates of expected parachutages should be given organizers in the field and commitments as to parachutages should be fulfilled to the letter. Inability to fulfill commitments to the Resistance caused great embarrassment to organizers and natural loss of prestige. A greater elasticity in the contents of containers was essential. At least one container in each plane should remain empty in order that last minute requests from the field could be fulfilled. Granting that long-range planning is essential and that containers must be packed in advance, planners should take into consideration the varied requirements for clandestine and guerilla activities, and again for mountainous, wooded and open terrain. As an example, in open terrain, one 50 caliber machine gun is worth 1,000 Sten guns. Organizers should be instructed to maintain all local communication lines. The enemy have radio communication and cutting telephone lines only handicaps the Resistance groups themselves.

B. Working in Cooperation with Corps or Divisions. In sectors where enemy forces are concentrated in prepared positions, Partisan or Maquis participation should be limited to small "sneak and peek" patrols of two or three men. Thus, a small band of especially chosen men for this work, particularly in reference to their knowledge of the enemy terrain, would be sufficient. Trained OSS personnel speaking the particular language are essential for this work. Without them, patrols cannot be successfully dispatched through our lines without confusion and misunderstanding in the forward elements of our troops. At least one officer should be assigned to each Division and one to Corps Headquarters so that the service OSS is capable of rendering be constantly brought to the attention of the Headquarters involved. For each officer, at least one trained enlisted man should be added. In addition to the above and wherever a large scale offensive is contemplated, a staff for each Corps should be trained in advance. Each regiment should have one officer speaking the language of the country and also one language-speaking enlisted man. As far as possible, these staffs should be completely familiar with each OSS agent and with the Partisan leaders in the prospective area of the advance. This is essential in order that the officer may evaluate the accuracy of the intelligence received before passing it on to the G-2 or S-2 of the unit involved. The Commanding Officer of the staff should be located at the Corps C.P. with sufficient liaison to his officers attached to the various Divisions and regiments. The importance of speed in a break-through has been proved and the ability of OSS to provide intelligence to accelerate this speed is without question. In the recent break-through in Italy, in many cases even the regimental S-2 had no intelligence except as received from OSS sources.

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Captain Kantack

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27 June 1945

5. It is suggested that personnel of the highest type be assigned to liaison between forward elements and rear echelons. It is felt that the medium of reports passing from front to rear through the various echelons, reflecting the personality and idiosyncrasies of various individuals, do not either reflect a correct picture of the situation, either at the front or behind the lines, or result in the necessary personal touch to insure complete cooperation and mutual understanding.

Reeve Schley Jr
REEVE SCHLEY
Captain, Cav.

1st Ind.

HTB/oa

Operations Officer, ESO, OAS, Washington, D. C. 28 June 45

TO: Chief, SO

1. Forwarded for your information.

Harrison T. Barrow
HARRISON T. BARROW
Captain, Ord.
Operations Officer, ESO

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FROM:

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No.

Date Rec'd SA

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd	Del'd		
1. PE-50 Office	2.73 9			<i>SL</i>	Any action for PE-50? 52d <u>UOCC</u>
2. Col. Roubal	209 Said				
3. Capt Hansen				<i>gt</i>	
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

Each column should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.

A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.

Officer's designation should be used in To column.

Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.

Action taken or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.

Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.

For Officer's designation see separate sheet.

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2nd Ind.

VWB/cd

Chief, SO 13 July 1945

to
TO: The Director (through FB-SO Operations Officer and
Reports Office of the Secretariat)

1. Observations noted and occurred in.
2. Action is being taken to pouch to the Far East
theater such observations as are considered applicable.

William E. Duggan
WILLIAM E. DUGGAN
1st Lt., USMC
Chief, SO

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D.C.

6 JULY 1945

TO: Captain William E. Kuntz

THROUGH: Captain Harrison T. Burton

FROM: Lt. Alfred G. Johnson

SUBJECT: Overseas Report - Report of Work Done in the Field
January - April 1945.

Summary - March: Attached to the First Army Detachment. Work included recruiting, training, equipping, and interesting agents through the lines, then setting up forward listening base for making short range radio contacts. The object of the mission was to obtain information of tactical value. During this period, only one team, consisting of two men, succeeded in making a penetration of about eight miles, returning to our lines after ten days. They were unable to make any contacts by radio since their set (A Mk. 5) had been in the carrier while crossing a river and damaged.

Observations

1. Agents must be briefed in detail as to the mission they are to accomplish. They must be given one or two specific objectives and not merely a general aim to be covered. If not they are liable to send back a great deal of useless information which probably has only little value. The sending of such long messages by radio immediately consumes most of the power contained in the short-lived batteries which the agents carry.

2. The three short ranged missions, agents must not overload themselves with unnecessary equipment and heavy bulky food. Mobility in the field is an absolutely essential.

3. Agents should be equipped in a waterproof casing so as to prevent damage to their sets when they are crossing a river or through being left in the rain.

4. Agents using a radio set such as the T-1, T-2 or the A Mk. III, require a short range transmitter and take with them at the same time a small transmitter which has only a very short time. As a result of this, the only radio (T-1) set was found to have many advantages over short range transmitters and etc. Transmitters equipped with short range sets of which was within 500 yards flying over thirty miles from the ground. Agents were made to use this method of communication, allowing the agents for contact daily, one in

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Captain Kantack

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6 July 1946

the morning, and one in the evening. The half battery which provides the power for this set has about three times the life of the small batteries which must be carried when using key sets, and are of approximately the same weight. It is very easy to teach an agent how to use this set and he can handle it perfectly after a few days of practice with it.

5. Shallow infiltrations can never have the same advantages or value as in the case of agents dropped at a short distance behind the enemy line. With the First Army, advances were so rapid that agents were liable to be overtaken before reaching their objective.

March-April: Attached to First Allied Airborne Army detachment

The object of the mission was to land four teams with the main landing of the 17th Airborne Division across the Rhine, with the teams infiltrating into the German held area immediately upon landing.

Observations:

1. On this operation the base station radio operators, who were to contact the agents and also maintain contact with Corps, went in by glider with Division H.Q. They did not have any transportation with them, which proved to be a great drawback and could have had serious consequences. As a result of this it was decided to use a radio jeep which would be brought in by glider on the next operation of a similar nature.

2. It would have been of far greater value had it been possible to drop the agents about fifteen miles behind the area chosen for the airborne landings twenty four hours before the time chosen for the landings. In this manner it would be possible to make contact with the agents as soon as the landings have taken place, obtaining information during the first twenty four hours of the landing which is the time when information of a tactical nature is of the greatest value. This is almost impossible to accomplish when the agents must infiltrate during or after the landings.

/s/ Alfred G. Johnson
1st Lt.

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

Charles P. Frank
CHARLES P. FRANK
1st Lt., PA

1st Ind.

CPT/cd

Operations Officer, ASO, OSJ, Washington, D.C. 6 July 1946

TO: Chief, SO

1. Forwarded for your information.

Charles P. Frank
CHARLES P. FRANK, 1st Lt., PA
Asst. Operations Officer, ASO

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